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Wim De Ceukelaire
Intal – Belgium
Prepared for the International Panel Discussion on Overseas US Military Bases, Quezon City, Philippines, 6 July 2011

Officially, the US military operates 909 facilities in 46 countries and territories worldwide. In fact, it has a military presence in over 130 countries, ranging from vast installations to smaller spy bases or joint training camps, stores for nuclear missiles, “rest and recreation” facilities and refueling stations. In addition, the US has port-of-call rights, landing rights for military and intelligence planes, refuel rights and flyover rights, often formalized in a Status of Forces Agreement.

After the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall and the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, the US started a massive “base restructuring” program. The program intended to reduce the number of US troops based in Europe and East Asia, while at the same time expanding its global military reach by opening strategic, often small, bases in previously US-army free areas.

Objectives

The inability to sustain military ground invasions in Somalia in the 1990s and in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last decade has shed doubt among US military elites over the original aim to reduce the presence of its ground troops overseas. In addition, the US seems to be planning about a dozen “enduring” bases supporting thousands of its troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, actually expanding its overseas military infrastructure as well as putting debates about US “withdrawal” into perspective.

Next to nuclear weapons dominance, there is no more universally recognized symbol of the US superpower status than its overseas basing system. Pentagon documents indicate that overseas US military bases are seen as military assets for power projection in the region in which they are located. The United States has been extremely reluctant to relinquish any base once acquired. Bases obtained in one war are seen as forward deployment positions for some future war, often involving an entirely new enemy. US bases in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Diego Garcia were crucial to the prolonged bombing campaigns against Iraq in the 1990s, not to mention the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the US-backed invasion of Lebanon by Israel. The current build-up of military means in Iraq, Afghanistan, central Asia, Pakistan and the Gulf states could allow the US to suppress or even invade Iran in the future.

The projection of US military power into new regions through the establishment of US military bases should not be seen simply in terms of direct military ends. They are always used to promote the economic and political objectives of US imperialism. For example, US corporations and the US government have been eager for some time to build a secure corridor for US-controlled oil and natural gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea in Central Asia through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Arabian Sea. The war in Afghanistan and the creation of US bases in Central Asia are viewed as a key opportunity to make such pipelines a reality. The principal exponent of this policy has been the Unocal corporation (now part of Chevron Corporation).

Recent developments in North Africa and the Middle East have brought to light a loss of influence of US imperialism, with the people of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and other countries rising up against reactionary regimes and aspiring for sovereignty, democracy and social progress. US imperialism, at first taken by surprise, rapidly adjusted to the new situation and took advantage of the turmoil in Libya to re-enter the stage in force, with a full-fledged military intervention.

MIDDLE EAST

In the Middle East, there is a number of US military bases that have been left behind by each of the interventions since 1990. The Gulf War, the Balkan wars in the former Yugoslavia, the Afghan war and now the Iraq war have left behind these sprawling installations in places where the US didn’t have permanent bases before. And if you look at it collectively, this US sphere of influence sits strategically right in between the EU and China, its two main economic competitors.

US military bases expert Zoltan Grossman observes: “You could say bases were used te be constructed to wage wars. Now you can almost say: wars are being waged in order to station bases. Pentagon documents consider what is left behind after the war as more important than the war itself.” In fact, Syria and Iran are about the only countries left in the region without any US military presence.

Not surprisingly, Iraq contains dozens of US bases. One of the largest of these is Camp Anaconda, near Balad Airbase, 64 km north of Baghdad. It houses 30,000 troops and 10,000 contractors, and extends across 16 square miles with an additional 12-square-mile “security perimeter.” These mammoth base areas are a world apart from Iraq itself, with working lights, proper sanitation, clean streets and strictly observed rules and codes of conduct. Some bases have populations of more than 20,000, with thousands of contractors and third-country citizens to keep them running.

While US combat forces may start withdrawing by the end of 2011, an expected 50,000 troops will remain on several permanent US military bases in Iraq and in the massive fortress in the Green Zone of Baghdad that is the “US Embassy” – as large as the Vatican.

It is easy to understand why the recent uprising in Bahrain became such a headache for US imperialism if you know the tiny Kingdom’s importance in the US military’s structure of overseas bases. Naval Support Activity Bahrain (or NSA Bahrain) is home to US Naval Forces Central Command and United States Fifth Fleet. It is the primary base in the region for the naval and marine activities for the US wars of aggression in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In 1996, lacking an air force of its own, Qatar built Al Udeid Air Base at a cost of more than $1 billion with the goal of attracting the US military. Al Udeid Air Base has served as a major command and logistics hub for US regional operations including its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is home to a forward headquarters of the United States Central Command, in charge of military operations in the Middle East and parts of Asia.

Other Middle East countries

There are also US bases and troops in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. It is no coincidence that Saudi troops – trained and armed by the US and its NATO allies – invaded Bahrain to quell the popular protest during the so-called Arab Spring, nor that Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were the only Arab countries to participate in the US-led war of aggression against Libya.

It is often forgotten – or deliberately omitted – but US imperialism is also militarily present in the territory of its Middle East satellite Israel. The Dimona Radar Facility is a US-operated radar base in the Negev, staffed by 120 US military personnel, while the Port of Haifa maintains facilities for the US Sixth Fleet.

Turkey

Incirlik Air Base on the outskirts of Adana, Turkey, is the largest US military facility in a strategically vital NATO ally. It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of the Incirlik Air Base for US power projection in the Middle East. The entire Iraq policy of the United States hinged on Incirlik.

Resistance to foreign military presence is almost as widespread as the bases themselves. The perception of US military bases as intrusions on national sovereignty is widespread in “host” countries. Even in Iraq, for example, protest organizations are launching sit-ins in front of military bases. Among the protesters is also Muntazer al-Zaidi, the famed Bush shoe-thrower, who helps lead an organization, called the Popular Movement to Save Iraq.

Since the start of the war of aggression on Iraq in 2003, over four thousand US military died in combat, but the total figure of US deaths related to the Gulf War may run into the tens of thousands. Attacks by Iraqi resistance fighters on US troops and bases continue to take place on a weekly basis, all over the country. The Arab Spring didn’t pass unnoticed in Iraq: on several occasions, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis took to the streets to demand an end to the occupation, sovereignty and democracy.

AFRICA

Until the 1990s, direct US military interventions in Africa were relatively marginal. While the US was engaged in the Korean or Vietnam war or in other military projects in Asia and Latin America, they preferred to exert their influence through political pressure and networks. Whenever they needed military power, they relied on local proxies or European allies. The US has become more involved since the importance of Africa for the US has increased.

It is only very recently, in October 2008, that a new US military command structure was established especially for Africa, the AFRICOM. The AFRICOM’s creation is indicative of the increasing competition with the European allies and signals the greater interest of US imperialism to militarily control events in the resource-rich African continent. Already in 2002, a US government think tank, the National Intelligence Council, estimated that by 2015, West African oil exports to the US would constitute about 25% of total US oil import requirements.

One reason why Africa has become an important continent for the US is the growing presence there of its competitors India and China. What makes US and European imperialists nervous is that Africa now has alternatives to Western impositions. It has become increasingly important to show some muscle in order to maintain dominance in the continent.

During a conference on ‘The Evolution of African Militaries,’ in February 2009, co-hosted by US Africa Command and the US Department of State, Professor David H. Shinn, adjunct professor for George Washington University, observed: “China is projected to pass the United States by 2010 as Africa’s largest trading partner. It has diplomatic relations with forty-nine of Africa’s fifty-three countries (four countries still recognize Taiwan) and has an embassy in all forty-nine countries except Somalia. That equals the number of US embassies in Africa, and China has more independent consulates than the United States. India is expanding rapidly in Africa and plans in five years to reach China’s current level of trade with the continent, which exceeds $100 billion. Brazil has made a major push into the continent in recent years, especially with lusophone countries. Several Gulf States, Iran and Turkey are also expanding their ties with Africa. The playing field is much more crowded than it was just ten years ago. This gives the Africans more options, but it also complicates the nature of Africa’s interaction with outside interests.”

“A prosperous and stable Africa is strategically important to the United States,” AFRICOM commander General Carter F. Ham told the US Senate Armed Services Committee last April 7. “An Africa that can generate and sustain broad based economic development will contribute to global growth, which is a long-standing American interest. However, poverty in many parts of Africa contributes to an insidious cycle of instability, conflict, environmental degradation, and disease that erodes confidence in national institutions and governing capacity. This in turn often creates the conditions for the emergence of a wide range of transnational security threats that can threaten the American homeland and our regional interests.”

It shows the objectives of AFRICOM are twofold: On the one hand it wants to maintain and consolidate its control on key African regimes that support its economic interests. On the other hand it acknowledges the threat of people’s protest to these interests. Ham further observed ‘ in his testimony before the Senate Committee that “forty-three percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s population is below the age of 15. (…) this potential pool of undereducated and unemployed youth could present a possible source of instability and potential recruiting pool for violent extremist organizations or narcotics traffickers.”

AFRICOM is carrying out a whole series of activities designed to strengthen the ability of key African allies to stay in power, through arm sales and providing military training programs for African military forces. There are also various other security assistance programs to strengthen the military capability of, first of all, regimes that control countries which are primary sources of oil and other natural resources like Nigeria, Algeria, Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea and other oil producing countries. There are also some countries that have been able to count on US military assistance in so far as they have been willing and able to serve as proxies for the US on the global war on terror, particularly Kenya and Ethiopia.

In addition to the assistance already mentioned, there has been a dramatic build-up of US naval forces off the coast of Africa, particularly off the oil-rich coast of Guinea and also off the coast of Somalia.

According to Daniel Volman from the African Security Research Project, the US actually knows that this is a strategy which is likely to fail over time. This kind of regimes are not stable and will not stay in power indefinitely, as they tend to collapse with the growing movement of democratization in Africa. The day may come when the US may have to use its own forces to intervene directly in Africa.

This evolution is not unlike what we have seen in the Middle East under the US Central Command, which was established in essentially the same way in 1979. It started out as a small headquarters based in Florida, without any control over or command of troops, but it is currently running two major wars in the Middle East and has major military bases in the region at its disposal.

So far, the US has established, essentially as part of the Central Command, only one base on the African continent in Djibouti, with approximately 2300 troops. Camp Lemonnier originally focused on US involvement in the Middle East but is becoming increasingly focused on the Horn of Africa and East Africa. It’s the base from which the US launches military strikes into Somalia, for example.

In addition the US has concluded what are known as ‘access agreements’. It is understood that it is not desirable for the US to build a lot of expensive and highly visible military bases around Africa. Rather, what they need is access to as many local military facilities as possible. The US has therefore concluded base access agreements with governments across the continent.

Because of these flexible arrangements, the US has the capability to set up very large military bases literally in a few days’ time. That is essentially what happens when a US president visits an African country. They establish a temporary military base for the duration of the trip and bring in thousands of marines, and stockpiles of military equipment and other supplies, including sophisticated communication equipment systems. In addition to that they have started contingency planning and other preparations for direct military interventions in Africa.

Until its closure by Qaddafi in 1970, the US maintained an air force base in Libya, Wheelus Air Base. It is not far-fetched to think that the US or NATO may be interested in re-establishing a military base in an occupied or otherwise controlled Libya, right in between Tunisia and Egypt, and overseeing the entire African continent.

Washington has one major problem: there is a growing resistance and hostility on the African continent against the US as a whole, and against the US military in particular. Of all African nations, only Liberia has publicly expressed willingness to host AFRICOM’s headquarters. The US has been forced to keep the Africa Command headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany for the “foreseeable future”.

The Africans are well aware of the US role in wars fought by proxies. It would have been impossible, for example, for a small country like Rwanda to invade the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1998 to 2003 without any outside help. Also the ongoing war on Libya is creating more opposition throughout the continent. The African Unity has opposed the aggression from the very beginning, and several high-profile African leaders have tried to broker peace in order to avert and, later, stop the war. Neighboring countries like Niger and Mali are already bearing the brunt of the war because its migrants that used to work in Libya are now unemployed. The more the US gets involved in the war, the more it will be met with resistance from governments and the people across the African continent.

VIEW SLIDE PRESENTATION

Len Cooper
Chairperson ILPS Australia
4th July 2011

The Australian authorities are completely subservient to the alliance with US Imperialism. This has led to the dominance of Australia’s politics, economics, foreign policy and culture by US Imperialism’s objectives and priorities.

The military and intelligence cooperation between the Australian and United States Governments is very close and this has led to the establishment of a series of US bases, facilities and operations which are a central component of the US military capability and communications across the globe.

For example, the US uses a low frequency communications system which amongst other things allows the US nuclear fleet to communicate without the requirement to break the surface of the ocean waters and it uses a system which enables the US fleet to re charge their power supplies whilst submerged. The bases and facilities in Australia is a central part of those systems.

The Australian people have been campaigning against the US military bases and facilities since at least the 1970’s.In those days there were about 33 US bases and facilities and a few British bases. Today the number of US bases, facilities and operations has grown. The bases are part of an electronic communications network, a nerve system stretching over the entire world. But of course they are also much more than that.

They are part of intelligence collection, hosting of military aircraft, part of the US electronic and satellite war systems, and part of US military training. They span Northern Australia, West Austraia, Tasmania and further south, in Sydney on the east coast, Canberra the capital, Northern Victoria, and South Australia.

As a result of the WikiLeaks we are now aware of yet another secret agreement between the US and Australian governments.

As a result of recent AUSMIN talks, (talks with the Australian minister of defence), there is a major escalation of military cooperation with the United States.

AUSMIN envisages more visits by US ships and aircraft, greater access to Australian military facilities, increased numbers of US military personnel, and more joint military exercises. It may be a step towards a permanent US military presence in Australia. Townsville in Queensland, the Stirling naval base in West Australia, and Darwin in Northern Australia could be possible sites. Some of these military personnel could relocate from Okinawa where there is widespread opposition to US forces.

This is also part of the US/Australian build up aimed at China as the US repositions itself to further encircle China in line with the US objective to remain the dominant power in the Asia/Pacific.

The recent secret agreement includes the intensified cooperation and intelligence sharing in the field of GEOINT –geospatial intelligence derived from imagery and other information obtained from satellites and reconnaissance

The agreement was signed by the Federal Labor Government in February 2008,but only made known to us by the WikiLeaks.

The Talisman Sabre joint US/Australia military exercises are occuring again this year from the 18th to the 29th of July with lead up activities from the 11th July. TS11 as it is called, will involve 30,000 Australian and US personnel and will include use of live ammunition, parachute drops, amphibious landings, artillery, armour and infantry manoeuvres, air combat training, special forces operations, science and technology projects and advanced maritime operations.

The Australian people have begun various protest exercises and activities during the current school holidays, which include peace convergences in various parts of Australia, non violence training, and various children’s activities. The calls that have gone out from the peace movement include resist war, bring the Australian troops home from Afghanistan and resist the war machine.

Currently, Australia’s so called” defence” budget is $27 billion for 2010/11.Immagine if it was spent on low cost housing, adequate health care, better education, care for Australia’s refugees and so on. World military spending in 2010 was estimated to be US $ 1630 billion. It would take about one tenth of that of that to lift all people out of extreme policy by 2015,according to the United Nations.

Another campaign being waged in Australia, which has some support from the union movement is the world wide campaign by the International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), to rid the world of nuclear weapons. The nuclear powers led by the United States wish to hang on to their monopoly of nuclear weapons and at the same time deny other countries who feel threatened by the US Imperialist aggression the option of developing their own nuclear weapons. We must demand that the blackmail by us imperialism cease and demand that all nuclear weapons be destroyed.

One of the most spectacular examples of the immediate threat posed to a nations independence by the presence of US bases on another countries soil was the constitutional overthrow of the elected Federal Government of Australia, the Whitlam Labor Government, in 1974.

Because the Then US government was refusing to provide the Australian Government with information on the operation of the US bases and because the Whitlam Labor government was threatening to name, in parliament, certain CIA operatives who had dealings with the US bases, the then elected government of Australia was overthrown by the Governor General of Australia. This was the first Labor Government elected in Australia in over 23 years. It was elected on a popular and progressive policy programme which included withdrawal from the Vietnam war, ending conscription into the military and recognition of communist China. It carried out all these policies before being overthrown.

Please keep in mind that this was also the year of the overthrow of the socialist Allende Government in Chile by a US backed fascist coup de etat.

Over the past two years, the US under the Obama administration has stepped up its drive to expand and consolidate its worldwide economic and political domination under the guise of the “war against terrorism” and the sham of “spreading democracy to the world”.
US imperialism has attempted and is continuing to attempt to put a “friendly Obama face” on imperialist aggression and war and the imperialist drive to dominate and exploit the resources and labour of the world in it’s drive for super profits.

In terms of it’s invasion of Afghanistan the USA the people are making it clear by large majorities that they want the war to end and the troops to come home. This is also the case in Australia. A recent poll showed that over 70% of Australians want out. We must step up our campaigns against the wars of aggression in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon. US Imperialism must feel the peoples anger everywhere. We must also step up our protests and opposition to US/Israel aggression against and oppression of the Palestinian people, as well as the US attempts to further destabilise the Korean Peninsula and further threaten China.
There is a need for the broadest coalition of peoples forces against US bases, against nuclear weapons, and against US aggression and war, both within our separate countries and internationally. That is we must regularise and professionalise our coordination and support work on a grand scale across the globe.

Good research, to help demonstrate what the war policies of imperialism are costing the people and what could be done to meet the people’s needs could be an important motivating factor, particularly in the light of capitalisms austerity measures which are really biting on the people at present.

This could also be an important way to demonstrate the real cause of war and raise the question of ending imperialism and the profit motive in order to solve the world’s massive problems.

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By Bobby M. Tuazon*

*Bobby M. Tuazon is a co-author and editor of the book, Unmasking the War on Terror (2002, CAIS). A faculty of the University of the Philippines in Manila, Tuazon has also written special reports, journal articles, and analytical studies on national security, foreign policy, and international politics. He has also co-authored and edited other books dealing with human rights, corruption, political parties, elections, and on Bangsamoro.)

(Note: This short paper is contributed for the 4th assembly of the ILPS. It deals principally on the military repercussions of the renewed territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the profits they bring to the U.S. war industry. It does not, therefore, discuss China’s military modernization and its impact on the SCS territorial tensions.)

Just as the post-9/11 “war on terror” was used to justify U.S.’ increased militarism in Asia Pacific and elsewhere in the world the heightened territorial disputes in the South China Sea are now being spun to boost the Pentagon’s encirclement strategy on China. The tension triggered by the territorial disputes is giving the U.S. grounds for strengthening and expanding its security relationships with traditional allies, vassal states, and other countries in the region. The immediate beneficiary of this enhanced militarism is America’s arms trade involving weapons suppliers and military training providers. Their war industry has been boosted by President Barack Obama’s new arms exports strategy in the region including Southeast Asia.

At a time when peaceful and diplomatic approaches may help defuse the tension in the South China Sea arising from the conflicting territorial claims, this renewed war environment is even stimulating an arms race among major states in the region further enhancing their dependency on the U.S. weapons supply chain.

In the first six months of 2011, various reports pointed to Chinese incursions in parts of the Spratly Islands claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, and three other countries. Although Beijing denied the allegations, the reported incidents ignited diplomatic protests with at least one of the claimants – the Philippines – calling on U.S. protection by invoking the cold war-vintage 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).[1] Amid the tension, bilateral war exercises have been held by the U.S. with the Philippines, Thailand, and other countries even as China likewise enhanced its maritime surveillance in the South China Sea (SCS).

Described as the “mother of all territorial disputes,” the SCS is also claimed as the “second Persian Gulf” presumed to be rich in oil, gas, and other sea-based minerals aside from being one of the world’s richest fishing grounds. Being the world’s busiest maritime superhighway, over 50 percent of global merchant fleet and supertanker traffic traverse its waters particularly the Malacca Strait. The SCS along with the Spratly Islands is claimed by China that dates back to 2 BC although its first official sovereign claim was made in 1951. China’s claim was subsequently followed by other countries notably the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. Note, however, that the overlapping territorial claims on the Spratlys are just one of other flashpoints in the Sea that include Taiwan (China claim), the Korean peninsula, Senkaku Islands (Japan vs China), Sacotra Rock (South Korea vs China), Sabah (Philippines vs Malaysia), Hibernia reef (Australia vs Indonesia), Kanang Unarang (Indonesia vs Malaysia), Doi Lang (Burma vs Thailand), not to mention unresolved disputes between India and Pakistan, and between China and India.

‘Core national interest’

With its fastest growing economy and in reaction to the counter-claimants, China has become more assertive of its sovereign claims. Last year, China described the SCS as a “core national interest” at par with Taiwan and Tibet, adding that its territorial rights are “indisputable.” Such determination can also be explained by the fact that 75 percent of China’s energy needs (it is now the biggest oil importer) are currently supplied through the SCS. The SCS is also China’s gateway to the Indian Ocean and other trade routes for its energy supplies sourced from various continents of the world where it has become a major investor.

Citing statements from some member-countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) that China’s “bullying” warranted an active defense role of the U.S. in the SCS, Washington cast a new superpower posturing when last year it identified the Sea likewise as a “national interest.” While recent reports of Chinese incursions elicited policy reactions from the U.S. calling for “restraint” and “multilateral talks,” it has in no ambiguous terms continued to realign its military forces in the region while forging new defense partnerships, holding more war exercises, and opening new basing facilities. This network of treaties, access arrangements, forces and facilities is embedded in the U.S. Pacific Command with its 7th Fleet as well as the Central Command (Cencom) that have assured America an imperial presence in Asia Pacific in the past several decades.

Although security partnerships, expansion, and armed aggression have been embedded into the U.S. empire’s bid for continuing global supremacy, current conflicts and tensions not only in Iraq and Afghanistan but also in the SCS “arc of instability” boost the trade of arms and military services that earn huge profits for U.S. weapons manufacturers, military training providers, and other foreign suppliers. The military-industrial complex is very much in business.

Arms shopping

Tensions building up in the SCS since last year until today have led to unprecedented arms shopping in the U.S. particularly by claimant-countries including:

Philippines: Under President Benigno S. Aquino III, the purchase of U.S. naval equipment including a Hamilton class cutter, for patrolling the Spratly waters. Furthermore in April 2011, Aquino transferred PhP8 billion (U.S.$183 million) for the deployment and training of naval personnel assigned to secure oil and gas explorations off Palawan and Mindanao. A report said part of the funds was to go to Blackwater, a notorious U.S.-based security firm.[2] Aquino’s energy department also announced the purchase of three blue water ships from the U.S. as well as helicopters and radar systems in support of oil projects in Palawan and Mindanao, southern Philippines.

Taiwan: A leading arms importer and military aid recipient of the U.S., Taiwan in 2010-2011 was set to buy new models of F-16 combat aircraft and two other purchases, all worth $20 billion. U.S. arms manufacturers received $16.5 billion of arms orders from Taiwan in 2007-2010 alone. Taiwan ranks fourth among U.S. arms customers worldwide behind Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.

Indonesia: Indonesia recently planned to buy fighter and cargo aircraft from the U.S. costing hundreds of millions of dollars. The U.S. also pledged $35.7 million in 2010-2011 to help modernize the Indonesian military (TNI).

Aside from Indonesia, arms sales to Malaysia also increased significantly in recent years while Singapore became the first country in Southeast Asia among top 10 arms buyers worldwide.

By end-2011, U.S. arms traders would have amassed $46 billion of military sales worldwide, nearly doubling the 2010 figures. Of the world’s 10 largest arms vendors, seven are American: Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Raytheon, L-3 Communications, and United Technologies.[3] As the world’s biggest weapons supplier controlling more than 30 percent of the market, most of its military products go to, in descending order, Asia Pacific (39 percent), the Middle East (36 percent), and Europe (18 percent). Southeast Asia has been eyed by the Obama administration for major expansion of arms sales.

Obama’s arms export policy

A new U.S. presidential policy makes this possible. In July 2010, U.S. President Barack Obama ordered the relaxation of arms export restrictions aimed at expanding the U.S. market share so that by 2015, he said, U.S. weapons exports would have doubled. Obama’s new national security strategies and quadrennial defense reviews have essentially retained Bush’s war on terror-inspired unilateralist and pre-emptive doctrines that also gave primacy to arms transfers all over the world.

As the U.S. reels from a prolonged economic recession, arms trade remains lucrative to the military-industrial complex. Profits reaped from weapons sales are guaranteed in regions gripped by tension and risks of war and armed conflicts. Thus the tensions arising from the territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) have made it expedient for the U.S. to expand its military presence in the region capitalizing on revived xenophobia and anti-China bashing to justify Pentagon’s strategic encirclement of China not only by strengthening its current security partnerships but also by exploring new alliances and realigning its forward-deployed forces and weapons especially nuclear missile systems. In turn, the enhancement of U.S. interoperability of its network of alliances opens new grounds for more frequent joint war exercises and military trainings and instructions that are closely tied to weapons sales and transfers. In short, arms acquisitions especially from U.S. allies and client states are “an integral and long-term partnership between the supplier and the purchaser”[4]. The captive market guarantees long-term profitability for the arms suppliers.

Arms sales or transfers are transacted especially with U.S. strategic allies and partners through government-to-government schemes and commercial military sales. Through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process, about 79 percent of arms exports are financed by client countries and organizations with the balance funded by U.S. aid programs. Other programs that facilitate arms trade are those managed by the state department or the Department of Defense (DoD) such as Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Economic Support Fund (ESF), Coalition Support Funds, and the Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA). In recent years, these programs were used by the U.S. as leverage for securing preferential access to oil and other strategic resources[5] and for ensuring support to its wars of aggression. In particular, FMF and IMET help expand and deepen U.S. regional influence with its allies while the ESF, among other objectives, promotes U.S. engagement with ASEAN toward enhancing U.S. security objectives in the region.

U.S. security arrangements

The security issues sparked by the territorial disputes coupled with the much-hyped threats arising from China’s military modernization are now being used by the U.S. to strengthen treaty alliances and access agreements with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and New Zealand. While potential defense partnerships are being explored with India – which maintains military hostility with China – and Indonesia, plans for joint war exercises with Vietnam are also afoot. Parallel to moving forward the new U.S.-Japan-Australia trilateral security initiative are plans for the U.S. to deploy new forces and missile systems in existing military bases west of Australia. Part of moves by the U.S. for the ASEAN to check Chinese “hegemonic ambitions” in the SCS are plans to establish a NATO- or SEATO-type regional alliance force in the region. In no uncertain terms, these moves are clearly targeted supposedly to check an emerging “military hegemon” in China. The new security and basing rearrangements pursued by the U.S. enhance the military dependency of many countries in the region and, hence, reliance on the U.S. war industry for arms exports.

The arms strategy that the U.S. pursues in the region and elsewhere in the world bolsters the militarist and repressive tendencies of its traditional allies and defense partners who then adopt war-like policies even as peaceful and diplomatic mechanisms are in place that promote the resolution of territorial disputes. Repressive regimes among America’s allies and vassal states comprise the permanent ring of arms buyers and consumers for U.S. war profiteers or merchants of death. The U.S. arms strategy is consistent with the agenda of the military-industrial complex that, since the end of World War 2, has begun to cobble a permanent war economy. Entrenched in the top echelons of America’s social and political order, the financial oligarchs behind the military-industrial complex make sure that the armaments industry continues to thrive and profit under the permanent environment of instabilities and war scares most of which are contrived anyway by their ideologues, media monopolies, and neo-conservative think tanks.

END NOTES

[1] Forged by the U.S. and the Philippines in 1951, the MDT provides for mutual protection against “external aggression.” For the past five decades, progressives in the Philippines have called for its termination in the absence of guarantees for automatic retaliation by the U.S. and for being onerous in favor of the latter.

[2] Blackwater, founded by ex-SEAL members, has been denounced in the U.S. media as a mercenary army performing jobs for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It was also reported to be maintaining a training facility inside Subic, Olongapo City (Philippines) – former site of U.S. naval base.

[3] Figures by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

[4] Rick Rozoff, “Washington uses arms sales to achieve global supremacy,” Global Research, Dec. 30, 2010.

[5] William D. Hartung & Frida Berrigan, “U.S. weapons at war 2008,” New American Foundation, December 2008.

March 16, 1998

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
including the executive department and its agencies,
hereinafter referred to as the GRP

and

THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
including the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the
New People’s Army (NPA), hereinafter referred to as the NDFP

Hereinafter referred to as “the Parties”,

PREAMBLE

RECOGNIZING that respect for human rights and international humanitarian law is of crucial importance and urgent necessity in laying the ground for a just and lasting peace,

CONSIDERING that a comprehensive agreement on respect for human rights and international humanitarian law should take into account the current human rights situation in the Philippines and the historical experience of the Filipino people,

AFFIRMING that the principles of human rights and the principles of international humanitarian law are universally applicable,

ACKNOWLEDGING that the prolonged armed conflict in the Philippines necessitates the application of the principles of human rights and the principles of international humanitarian law,

REAFFIRMING their continuing commitment to the aforesaid principles and their application,

REALIZING the necessity and significance of assuming separate duties and responsibilities for upholding, protecting and promoting the principles of human rights and the principles of international humanitarian law,

UPHOLDING and complying with the mutually acceptable principles as well as the common goals and objectives in The Hague Joint Declaration of September 1, 1992, the Breukelen Joint Statement of June 14,1994 and pertinent joint agreements hitherto signed, and

FULLY AWARE of the need for effective mechanisms and measures for upholding, protecting and promoting the principles of human rights and the principles of international humanitarian law in a comprehensive agreement,

SOLEMNLY ENTER without reservation into this Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law.

PART I
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

Article 1. The Parties are governed by the framework of holding peace negotiations under mutually acceptable principles of national sovereignty, democracy and social justice and under no precondition that negates the character and purpose of peace negotiations, as stipulated in The Hague Joint Declaration (Paragraph 4) and reaffirmed in the Breukelen Joint Statement (No. 7 of II) and subsequent agreements.

Article 2. The Parties uphold the principles of mutuality and reciprocity in the conduct of the peace negotiations in accordance with The Hague Joint Declaration. The Parties likewise affirm the need to assume separate duties and responsibilities in accordance with the letter and intent of this Agreement.

Article 3. The Parties realize the need for a comprehensive accord on human rights and international humanitarian law based on realities involving violations of human rights and the principles of international humanitarian law.

Article 4. The Parties recognize that fundamental individual and collective freedoms and human rights in the political, social, economic and cultural spheres can only be realized and flourish under conditions of national and social freedoms of the people.

Article 5. The Parties affirm the need to promote, expand and guarantee the people’s democratic rights and freedoms, especially of the toiling masses of workers and peasants.

Article 6. The Parties are aware that the prolonged armed conflict in the Philippines necessitates the application of the principles of human rights and the principles of international humanitarian law and the faithful compliance therewith by both Parties.

Article 7. The Parties hereby forge this Agreement in order to affirm their constant and continuing mutual commitment to respect human rights and the principles of international humanitarian law and hereby recognize either Party’s acts of good intention to be bound by and to comply with the principles of international humanitarian law.

PART II
BASES, SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY

Article 1. This Agreement is meant to meet the needs arising from the concrete conditions of the Filipino people concerning violations of human rights and the principles of international humanitarian law, and to find principled ways and means of rendering justice to all the victims of such violations.

Article 2. The objectives of this Agreement are: (a) to guarantee the protection of human rights to all Filipinos under all circumstances, especially the workers, peasants and other poor people; (b) to affirm and apply the principles of international humanitarian law in order to protect the civilian population and individual civilians, as well as persons who do not take direct part or who have ceased to take part in the armed hostilities, including persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict; (c) to establish effective mechanisms and measures for realizing, monitoring, verifying and ensuring compliance with the provisions of this Agreement; and, (d) to pave the way for comprehensive agreements on economic, social and political reforms that will ensure the attainment of a just and lasting peace.

Article 3. The Parties shall uphold, protect and promote the full scope of human rights, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. In complying with such obligation due consideration shall be accorded to the respective political principles and circumstances of the Parties.

Article 4. It is understood that the universally applicable principles and standards of human rights and of international humanitarian law contemplated in this Agreement include those embodied in the instruments signed by the Philippines and deemed to be mutually applicable to and acceptable by both Parties.
Article 5. This Agreement shall be applicable in all cases involving violations of human rights and the principles of international humanitarian law committed against persons, families and groups affiliated with either Party and all civilians and persons not directly taking part in the hostilities, including persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict. It shall likewise be applicable to all persons affected by the armed conflict, without distinction of any kind based on sex, race, language, religion or conviction, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, age, economic position, property, marital status, birth or any other similar condition or status.

PART III
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Article 1. In the exercise of their inherent rights, the Parties shall adhere to and be bound by the principles and standards embodied in international instruments on human rights.

Article 2. This Agreement seeks to confront, remedy and prevent the most serious human rights violations in terms of civil and political rights, as well as to uphold, protect and promote the full scope of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including:

1. The right to self determination of the Filipino nation by virtue of which the people should fully and freely determine their political status, pursue and dispose of their natural wealth and resources for their own welfare and benefit towards genuine national independence, democracy, social justice and development.
2. The inherent and inalienable right of the people to establish a just, democratic and peaceful society, to adopt effective safeguards against, and to oppose oppression and tyranny similar to that of the past dictatorial regime.
3. The right of the victims and their families to seek justice for violations of human rights, including adequate compensation or indemnification, restitution and rehabilitation, and effective sanctions and guarantees against repetition and impunity.
4. The right to life, especially against summary executions (salvagings), involuntary disappearances, massacres and indiscriminate bombardments of communities, and the right not to be subjected to campaigns of incitement to violence against one’s person.
5. The right to liberty, particularly against unwarranted and unjustified arrest and detention and to effectively avail of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
6. The individual and collective right of the people and of communities to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and to effective safeguards of these rights against any illegal operations by GRP agencies.
7. The right not to be subjected to physical or mental torture, solitary confinement, rape and sexual abuse, and other inhuman, cruel or degrading treatment, detention and punishment.
8. The right not to be held in involuntary servitude or to perform forced or compulsory labor.
9. The right to substantive and procedural due process, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, and against self incrimination.
10. The right to equal protection of the law and against any form of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, belief, age, physical condition or civil status and against any incitement to such discrimination.
11. The right to freedom of thought and expression, freedom of conscience, political and religious beliefs and practices and the right not to be punished or held accountable in the exercise of these rights.
12. The right to free speech, press, association and assembly, and to seek redress of grievances.
13. The right to privacy of communication and correspondence, especially against intercepting, pilfering and opening of mail matters and conducting illegal surveillance and information gathering through electronic and other means.
14. The right to free choice of domicile, movement and travel within the country and abroad, to seek asylum, migration and exile, and against travel restrictions for political reasons or objectives.
15. The right not to be subjected to forced evacuations, food and other forms of economic blockades and indiscriminate bombings, shellings, strafing, gunfire and the use of landmines.
16. The right to information on matters of public concern and access to records, documents and papers pertaining to acts, transactions or decisions of persons in authority.
17. The right to universal suffrage irrespective of sex, race, occupation, social origin, property, status, education, ideological and political conviction, and religious belief.
18. The right to own property and the means of production and consumption that are obtained through land reform, honest labor and entrepreneurship, skill, inventiveness and intellectual merit and to use such means for the common good.
19. The right to gainful employment, humane working and living conditions, livelihood and job security, to work and equal pay, to form unions, to strike and participate in the policy and decision making processes affecting their rights and interests, and the right not to be denied these rights due to nationality, creed, minority status, gender or sexual preference, or civil status.
20. The right to universal and free elementary and secondary education, and access to basic services and health care.
21. The right to freely engage in scientific research, technological invention, literary and artistic creations and other cultural pursuits.
22. The right to form a marital union and to found a family, and to ensure family communications and reunions.
23. The equal right of women in all fields of endeavor and in all spheres of political, economic, cultural, social and domestic life and to their emancipation.
24. The right of children and the disabled to protection, care, and a home, especially against physical and mental abuse, prostitution, drugs, forced labor, homelessness, and other similar forms of oppression and exploitation.
25. The existing rights of the minority communities in the Philippines to autonomy, to their ancestral lands and the natural resources in these lands, to engage in and benefit from affirmative action, to their participation and representation in the economic, political and social life and institutions, and to cultural and all round development.

Article 3. The Parties decry all violations and abuses of human rights. They com­mend the complainants or plaintiffs in all successful human rights proceedings. They encourage all victims of violations and abuses of human rights or their surviving families to come forward with their complaints and evidence.

Article 4. The persons liable for violations and abuses of human rights shall be subject to investigation and, if evidence warrants, to prosecution and trial. The victims or their survivors shall be indemnified. All necessary measures shall be undertaken to remove the conditions for violations and abuses of human rights and to render justice to and indemnify the victims.

Article 5. The Parties hereby respect and support the rights of the victims of human rights violations during the Marcos regime, taking into consider­ation the final judgment of the United States Federal Court System in the Human Rights Litigation Against Marcos; Senate Resolution 1640; Swiss Supreme Court Decision of 10 December 1997; and pertinent provisions of the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1984 U.N. Convention Against Torture.
Should there be any settlement, the GRP shall also execute with the duly authorized representatives of the victims a written instrument to implement this Article and guide the satisfaction of the claims of said victims, with regard to the amount and mode of compensation, which shall be the most direct and quickest possible to every victim or heir in accordance with the relevant Swiss Supreme Court decisions.
In case of any settlement outside of U.S. jurisdiction, all or the majority of said victims shall determine their representation by power of attorney.

Article 6. The GRP shall abide by its doctrine laid down in People vs. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515, July 18, 1956), as further elaborated in People vs. Geronimo (100 Phil. 90, October 13,1956), and shall forthwith review the cases of all prisoners or detainees who have been charged, detained, or convicted contrary to this doctrine, and shall immediately release them.

Article 7. The GRP shall work for the immediate repeal of any subsisting repressive laws, decrees, or other executive issuances and for this purpose, shall forthwith review, among others, the following: General Orders 66 and 67 (authorizing checkpoints and warrantless searches); Presidential Decree 1866 as amended (allowing the filing of charges of illegal possession of fire­arms with respect to political offenses); Presidential Decree 169 as amended (requiring physicians to report cases of patients with gunshot wounds to the police/military); Batas Pambansa 880 (restricting and controlling the right to peaceful assembly); Executive Order 129 (authorizing the demolition of urban poor communities); Executive Order 264 (legalizing the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units); Executive Order 272 (lengthening the allowable periods of detention); Memorandum Circular 139 (allowing the imposition of food blockades); and Administrative Order No. 308 (establishing the national identification system).
Upon the effectivity of this Agreement, the GRP shall, as far as prac­ticable, not invoke these repressive laws, decrees and orders to circumvent or contravene the provisions of this Agreement.

Article 8. The GRP shall review its jurisprudence on warrantless arrests (Umil vs. Ramos), checkpoints (Valmonte vs. De Villa), saturation drives (Guazon vs. De Villa), warrantless searches (Posadas vs. Court of Appeals), criminalization of political offenses (Baylosis vs. Chavez), rendering moot and academic the remedy of habeas corpus upon the subsequent filing of charges (Ilagan vs. Ponce‑Enrile), and other similar cases, and shall immedi­ately move for the adoption of appropriate remedies consistent with the objectives of this and the immediately preceding Article.
Upon the effectivity of this Agreement, the GRP shall, as far as practi­cable, not invoke these decisions to circumvent or contravene the provisions of this Agreement.

Article 9. The Parties shall take concrete steps to protect the lives, livelihood and properties of the people against incursions from mining, real estate, logging, tourism or other similar projects or programs.

Article 10. The Parties shall promote the basic collective and individual rights of workers, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, migrant workers, ethnic minor­ities, women, youth, children and the rest of the people and shall take concrete steps to stop and prevent the violations of human rights, ensure that those found guilty of such violations are punished, and provide for the indemnification, rehabilitation and restitution of the victims.

Article 11. The GRP shall respect the basic rights guaranteed by the Inter­national Labor Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize and the standards set by the International Labor Organization (IL0) pertaining to job tenure, wage and living conditions, trade union rights and medical and social insurance of all workers, right of women workers to maternity benefits and against discrimination vis‑a‑vis male workers, right against child labor, and the rights of migrant workers abroad in accordance with the International Covenant on the Rights of Migrant Workers and the Members of their Families.

Article 12. The GRP shall respect the rights of peasants to land tenure and to own through land reform the land that they till, the ancestral rights of the indigenous peoples in the areas classified as public domain and their rights against racial and ethnic discrimination, the right of the poor homesteaders or settlers and the indigenous people to the areas of public domain on which they live and work and the right of poor fisherfolk to fish in the waters of the Philippines.
The GRP shall forthwith review its laws or other issuances pertinent to the rights mentioned in this and the immediately preceding Article and shall move for the immediate repeal of those found violative of such rights.

Article 13. The Parties shall promote and carry out campaigns of human rights education, land reform, higher production, health and sanitation, and others that are of social benefit to the people. They shall give the utmost attention to land reform as the principal measure for attaining democracy and social justice.

PART IV
RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

Article 1. In the exercise of their inherent rights, the Parties to the armed conflict shall adhere to and be bound by the generally accepted principles and standards of international humanitarian law.

Article 2. These principles and standards apply to the following persons:

1. civilians or those taking no active part in the hostilities;
2. members of armed forces who have surrendered or laid down their arms;
3. those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds or any other cause;
4. persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict; and,
5. relatives and duly authorized representatives of above‑named persons.

Article 3. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the persons enumerated in the pre­ceding Article 2:

1. violence to life and person, particularly killing or causing injury, being subjected to physical or mental torture, mutilation, corporal punish­ment, cruel or degrading treatment and all acts of violence and reprisals, including hostage‑taking, and acts against the physical well‑being, dignity, political convictions and other human rights;
2. holding anyone responsible for an act that she/he has not committed and punishing anyone without complying with all the requisites of due process;
3. requiring persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict to disclose information other than their identity;
4. desecration of the remains of those who have died in the course of the armed conflict or while under detention, and breach of duty to tender immediately such remains to their families or to give them decent burial;
5. failure to report the identity, personal condition and circumstances of a person deprived of his/her liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict to the Parties to enable them to perform their duties and responsibilities under this Agreement and under international humanitarian law;
6. denial of the right of relatives and duly authorized representatives of a person deprived of liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict to inquire whether a person is in custody or under detention, the reasons for the detention, under what circumstances the person in custody is being detained, and to request directly or through mutually acceptable intermediaries for his/her orderly and expeditious release;
7. practices that cause or allow the forcible evacuations or forcible reconcentration of civilians, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand; the emergence and increase of internally displaced families and communities, and the destruction of the lives and property of the civilian population;
8. maintaining, supporting and tolerating paramilitary groups such as armed religious fanatical groups, vigilante groups, private armed groups of businessmen, landlords and politicians, and private security agencies which are being used in land and labor disputes and the incursions in Article 9, Part III of this Agreement; and,
9. allowing the participation of civilian or civilian officials in military field operations and campaigns.

Article 4. The principles and standards of international humanitarian law shall likewise apply and protect the rights of persons, entities or objects involved or affected in any of the cases or situations cited hereunder.
Persons hors de combat and those who do not take a direct part in hostilities are entitled to respect for their lives, dignity, human rights, political convictions and their moral and physical integrity and shall be protected in all circumstances and treated humanely without any adverse distinction founded on race, color, faith, sex, birth, social standing or any other similar criteria.
The wounded and the sick shall be collected and cared for by the party to the armed conflict which has them in its custody or responsibility.

Neutral persons or entities and medical personnel, including persons of humanitarian and/or medical organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), shall be protected and respected. The establishments, facilities, transport and equipments of these per­sons, entities and organizations; objects bearing the emblem of the red cross and the flag of peaceful intention; and historic monuments, cultural objects and places of worship shall likewise be protected.

Civilian population and civilians shall be treated as such and shall be distinguished from combatants and, together with their property, shall not be the object of attack. They shall likewise be protected against indiscriminate aerial bombardment, strafing, artillery fire, mortar fire, arson, bulldozing and other similar forms of destroying lives and property, from the use of explosives as well as the stockpiling near or in their midst, and the use of chemical and biological weapons.

Civilians shall have the right to demand appropriate disciplinary actions against abuses arising from the failure of the Parties to the armed conflict to observe the principles and standards of international humanitarian law.

All persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be treated humanely, provided with adequate food and drinking water, and be afforded safeguards as regards to health and hygiene, and be confined in a secure place. Sufficient information shall be made available concerning persons who have been deprived of their liberty. On humanitarian or other reasonable grounds, such persons deprived of liberty shall be considered for safe release.

The ICRC and other humanitarian and/or medical entities shall be granted facilitation and assistance to enable them to care for the sick and the wounded and to undertake their humanitarian missions and activities.

Personnel and facilities of schools, the medical profession, religious institutions and places of worship, voluntary evacuation centers, pro­grams and projects of relief and development shall not be the target of any attack. The persons of said entities shall be guaranteed their safety.
Every possible measure shall be taken, without delay, to search for and collect the wounded, sick and missing persons and to protect them from any harm and ill treatment, to ensure their adequate care and to search for the dead, prevent despoliation and mutilation and to dispose of them with respect.

Article 5. The Parties decry all violations of the principles of international humanitarian law. They encourage all victims of such violations or their surviving families to come forward with their complaints and evidence.

Article 6. The persons liable for violations of the principles of international humanitarian law shall be subject to investigation and, if evidence warrants, to prosecution and trial. The victims or their survivors shall be indemnified. All necessary measures shall be undertaken to remove the conditions for such violations and to render justice to and indemnify the victims.

Article 7. The GRP shall review and undertake to change policies, laws, pro­grams, projects, campaigns and practices that cause or allow the forcible evacuation and reconcentration of civilians, the emergence and increase of internally displaced families and communities and the destruction of the lives and property of the civilian population.

Article 8. The GRP shall continue to review its policy or practice of creating, maintaining, supporting, or allowing paramilitary forces like the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs) and Civilian Volunteers’ Organizations (CV0s) or any other similar groups.

Article 9. Internally displaced families and communities shall have the right to return to their places of abode and livelihood, to demand all possible assistance necessary to restore them to their normal lives and to be indemnified for damages suffered due to injuries and loss of lives.

Article 10. The Parties shall provide special attention to women and children to ensure their physical and moral integrity. Children shall not be allowed to take part in hostilities.

Article 11. Medical, religious and other humanitarian organizations and their personnel shall not carry out other tasks inimical to any of the Parties. Neither shall they be compelled to carry out tasks which are not compatible with their humanitarian tasks. Under no circumstances shall any person be punished for having carried out medical activities compatible with the principles of medical ethics, regardless of whoever is benefiting from such medical activities.

Article 12. Civilian population shall have the right to be protected against the risks and dangers posed by the presence of military camps in urban centers and other populated areas.

Article 13. The Parties recognize the right of the people to demand the reduction of military expenditures and the rechanneling of savings from such reduction towards social, economic and cultural development which shall be given the highest priority.

Article 14. The Parties shall promote and carry out campaigns of education on international humanitarian law, especially among the people involved in the armed conflict and in areas affected by such conflict.

PART V
JOINT MONITORING COMMITTEE

Article 1. The Parties shall form a Joint Monitoring Committee that shall monitor the implementation of this Agreement.

Article 2. The Committee shall be composed of three members to be chosen by the GRP Panel and three members to be chosen by the NDFP Panel. Each Party shall nominate two representatives of human rights organizations to sit in the committee as observers and to do so at the pleasure of the nomi­nating Party. The Committee shall have co‑chairpersons who shall serve as chief representatives of the Parties and shall act as moderators of meetings.

Article 3. The co‑chairpersons shall receive complaints of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and all pertinent information and shall initiate requests or recommendations for the implementation of this Agreement. Upon its approval by consensus, the Committee shall request the investigation of a complaint by the Party con­cerned and make recommendations. By consensus, it shall make reports and recommendations on its work to the Parties.

Meetings of the Committee shall be every three months and as often as deemed necessary by the co‑chairpersons due to an urgent issue or com­plaint. The meetings shall be held in the Philippines or in any other venue agreed upon by the Parties.

Article 4. Members of the Committee and the observers shall be entitled to the safety and immunity guarantees stipulated by the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees.

Article 5. The Committee shall create a joint secretariat that shall provide staff support. Each Party shall nominate an equal number of members in the joint secretariat who shall serve at the pleasure of the nominating Party.

Article 6. The Committee shall be organized upon the effectivity of this Agree­ment and shall continue to exist until dissolved by either Party by sending to the other Party a written notice of dissolution which shall take effect thirty days after official receipt. Dissolution of the Committee shall not mean the abandon­ment of rights and duties by any Party under this Agreement and under the principles and standards of human rights and international humanitarian law.

PART VI
FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 1. The Parties shall continue to assume separate duties and responsi­bilities for upholding, protecting and promoting human rights and the principles of international humanitarian law in accordance with their respec­tive political principles, organizations and circumstances until they shall have reached final resolution of the armed conflict.

Article 2. The Parties recognize the applicability of the principles of human rights and principles of international humanitarian law and the continuing force of obligations arising from these principles.

Article 3. Nothing in the provisions of this Agreement nor in its application shall affect the political and legal status of the Parties in accordance with the Hague Joint Declaration. Subsequently, this Agreement shall be subject to the Comprehensive Agreements on Political and Constitutional Reforms and on End of Hostilities and Disposition of Forces. Any reference to the treaties signed by the GRP and to its laws and legal processes in this Agreement shall not in any manner prejudice the political and organizational integrity of the NDFP.

Article 4. The Parties may from time to time review the provisions of this Agreement to determine the need to adopt a supplemental agreement or to modify the provisions hereof as circumstances require.

Article 5. This Agreement shall be signed by the Negotiating Panels and shall take effect upon approval by their respective Principals.

IN WITNESS, we sign this Agreement this 16th day of March 1998 in The Hague, The Netherlands.

FOR THE                                                                                                                             FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC                                                                                NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT
OF THE PHILIPPINES                                                                                                        OF THE PHILIPPINES

By:

Amb. HOWARD Q. DEE                                                                                                     LUIS G. JALANDONI
Chairperson, GRP Negotiating Panel                                                                             Chairperson, NDFP Negotiating Panel

Rep. JOSE V. YAP                                                                                                                FIDEL V. AGCAOILI
Member                                                                                                                              Member

Sec. SILVESTRE H. BELLO III                                                                                              CONI K. LEDESMA
Member                                                                                                                              Member

Atty. RENE V. SARMIENTO                                                                                                ASTERIO B. PALIMA
Member                                                                                                                              Member

Ms. ZENAIDA H. PAWID                                                                                                     JOJO S. MAGDIWANG
Member                                                                                                                              Member

WITNESSES:

Hon. JOSE C. DE VENECIA                                                                                                 JOSE MA. SISON
Speaker, House of Representative                                                                                Chief Political Consultant
GRP                                                                                                                                     NDFP Negotiating Panel

Usec. A. WILFREDO CLEMENTE                                                                                       ANTONIO L. ZUMEL
DECS, GRP                                                                                                                          Senior Adviser
NDFP Negotiating Panel

Ms. MA. CARLA L. MUNSAYAC                                                                                        ROMEO T. CAPULONG
Executive Director III                                                                                                        General Counsel
GRP Negotiating Panel Secretariat                                                                                NDFP Negotiating Panel

March 16,1998

This JOINT AGREEMENT IN SUPPORT OF SOCIOECONOMIC PROJECTS OF PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTES is being entered into by and between:

The GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
hereinafter referred to as the GRP, through its Negotiating Panel
headed by its Chairperson, Howard Q. Dee;

and

The NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
hereinafter referred to as the NDFP, through its Negotiating Panel
headed by its Chairperson, Luis G. Jalandoni.

WHEREAS, both Parties are desirous of assisting private development organizations and institutes engaged in programs, projects and activities for the Filipino people’s empowerment and for their socioeconomic development; and

WHEREAS, these organizations and institutes are beneficial to the people and are helpful in laying the ground for a just and lasting peace.

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the Parties hereby agree as follows:

ARTICLE I
RESPECT, ENCOURAGEMENT AND SUPPORT

Section 1. The GRP shall respect, encourage and extend appropriate support to such private development organizations and institutes that carry out programs, projects and activities in pursuit of all or any of the following aims and purposes:
<p style=”padding-left:30px;”>
1.1. To promote and lay the ground for a just and lasting peace based on the Filipino people’s empowerment and their economic, social and cultural development;

1.2. To engage in research and planning for the Filipino people’s empowerment and their economic, social and cultural development and to make recommendations on the basis of such studies and planning;

1.3. To undertake programs and projects for the promotion and protection of human rights in general and particularly the rights of workers, peasants, women, youth, children and indigenous peoples as well as the protection of the environment;

1.4. To undertake programs and projects of relief, rehabilitation and development beneficial to communities, families and individuals who have been victimized by human rights violations or whose incomes are below the poverty line;

1.5. To promote rural and urban cooperatives among the poor in order to make them self‑reliant and allow them to raise their standard of living;

1.6. To generate the means of livelihood or employment for victims of human rights violations and released political detainees;

1.7. To cooperate with other entities that are genuinely committed to advancing the rights and interests of the people; and

1.8. To carry out such other aims and purposes as are related to the foregoing.
</p>
Section 2. The aforesaid organizations and institutes, hereinafter referred to as the “organizations,” shall be self‑governing and independent, as may be provided for in their respective charters. In order to transact business and carry on their work, they shall take an appropriate legal status and juridical personality.

Section 3. The organizations and institutes referred to in the preceding section are legitimate organizations entitled to all the rights, privileges, protection and legal remedies enjoyed by other similar organizations.

Accordingly, they and their personnel shall not be subjected to discrimination or any other form of prejudicial action.

ARTICLE II
FUNDING AND RESOURCES

Section 1. The organizations shall raise, manage and use such financial and other resources as necessary to be able to carry out their programs, projects and activities.

Section 2. The organizations shall have access to such sources of funding and resources as are available to similar organizations in the Philippines and abroad.

ARTICLE III
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. This Joint Agreement is being entered into in accordance with The Hague Joint Declaration.

Section 2. The obligations arising from the provisions of this Joint Agreement shall become effective and binding upon the approval hereof by the respective Principals of the GRP and NDFP Negotiating Panels.

Section 3. The Negotiating Panels or representatives of both Parties may consult each other regarding organizations to be assisted under this Agreement and execute such additional joint agreements or undertakings as may be necessary to implement this Agreement.

The GRP and the organizations concerned shall work out the modalities of implementation.

DONE on the 16th of March 1998 in The Hague, The Netherlands.

FOR THE                                                                                   FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC                                      NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT
OF THE PHILIPPINES                                                             OF THE PHILIPPINES

By:

Amb. HOWARD Q. DEE                                                           LUIS G. JALANDONI
Chairperson, GRP Negotiating Panel                                   Chairperson, NDFP Negotiating Panel

Rep. JOSE V. YAP                                                                      FIDEL V. AGCAOILI
Member                                                                                    Member

Sec. SILVESTRE H. BELLO III                                                   CONI K. LEDESMA
Member                                                                                    Member

Atty. RENE V. SARMIENTO                                                      ASTERIO B. PALIMA
Member                                                                                    Member

Ms. ZENAIDA H. PAWID                                                           JOJO S. MAGDIWANG
Member                                                                                    Member

WITNESSES:

Hon. JOSE C. DE VENECIA                                                        JOSE MA. SISON
Speaker, House of Representative                                       Chief Political Consultant
GRP                                                                                            NDFP Negotiating Panel

Usec. A. WILFREDO CLEMENTE                                              ANTONIO L. ZUMEL
DECS, GRP                                                                                 Senior Adviser                                                                                                                                                   NDFP Negotiating Panel

Ms. MA. CARLA L. MUNSAYAC                                               ROMEO T. CAPULONG
Executive Director                                                                   General Counsel
GRP Negotiating Panel Secretariat                                       NDFP Negotiating Panel

March 16,1998

These ADDITIONAL IMPLEMENTING RULES OF THE JOINT AGREEMENT ON SAFETY AND IMMUNITY GUARANTEES (JASIG) PERTAINING TO THE SECURITY OF PERSONNEL AND CONSULTA­TIONS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, hereinafter referred to as the IMPLEMENTING RULES, are being agreed by and between:

The GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(GRP), through its Negotiating Panel headed by its Chairperson,
Howard Q. Dee

and

The NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT OF THE PHILIPPINES (NDFP),
through its Negotiating Panel headed by its Chairperson, Luis G. Jalandoni.

WHEREAS, the Parties have the responsibility to protect their respec­tive personnel involved in the peace negotiations through their respective security forces;

WHEREAS, the duly accredited persons under the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) dated 24 February 1995, herein­after referred to as the duly accredited persons, because of their involvement in the peace negotiations, have the inherent right to their personal security;

WHEREAS, security is likewise required for the consultations, public meetings, and free and unhindered passage in all areas in the Philippines in connection with and in furtherance of the peace negotiations that the aforesaid duly accredited persons conduct; and

WHEREAS, there is a need to agree on the security methods and means in order to enhance the conditions of the peace negotiations and avert inci­dents adverse thereto.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the two Parties through their Negotiating Panels hereby agree to the following:

ARTICLE I
SECURITY FOR DULY ACCREDITED PERSONS

Section 1. The duly accredited persons may carry one (1) sidearm each including its ammunitions, accessories and spare parts for their security and self‑protection while in the performance of their functions in the peace negotiations. For purposes of these Implementing Rules, “sidearm” shall refer to revolvers and semi‑automatic pistols and excludes machine pistols.

Any case of alleged violation of the provisions of this section shall be the subject matter of appropriate consultations between the two Parties.

The appropriate circular needed to ensure the attainment of the abovestated purpose shall be issued within two (2) weeks from the date of effectivity of these Implementing Rules. For purposes of the issuance of the said circular, a list of names of the duly accredited persons of the concerned Party shall be furnished to the Panel Chairman of the other Party.

The contents of this circular shall be consistent with the pertinent provisions of the JASIG and these Implementing Rules.

Section 2. Both Parties shall ensure that these Implementing Rules are trans­mitted and fully understood by all personnel concerned down to the lowest unit on the ground. The two Negotiating Panels shall discuss and agree on additional implementing rules as they may deem necessary to avert any incident which may jeopardize the peace negotiations and the safety and unhindered passage of their respective duly accredited persons and the persons consulted by them as well as the peaceful conduct of the assemblies.

ARTICLE II
SECURITY COMMITTEES AND SECURITY FORCES

Section 1. The Parties shall organize their respective Security Committees composed of three members on each side which shall discuss and agree: (1) on the guidelines for these Implementing Rules on matters of detail which are not specifically covered herein; (2) on the implementation of such guide­lines; (3) on ensuring proper coordination in such implementation; (4) on prior notice on the holding of consultations and the appropriate information which should be disclosed regarding such consultations; (5) on the necessity of declaring a mutual ceasefire in the areas where consultations are being conducted and the nature, scope, implementing guidelines and parameters of such mutual ceasefire; (6) on the determination of the safety area, radius and distance from both sides and adequate protection for the routes of safe passage for participants in the consultation; and (7) on such other matters as may be assigned to them from time to time by agreement of the two Panels.

Section 2. The Party concerned may form a central security force of not more than thirty (30) members which, in the case of the NDFP, shall include the twelve (12) security personnel who are duly accredited persons. The central security force shall perform close‑in security of its duly accredited persons, security of participants in the consultations, and security for the safe passage of personnel and participants in the consultations.

Section 3. For purposes of the consultations, the Party concerned may form a regional security force in each of the fifteen (15) regions of the country, not exceeding thirty (30) members in each region at any one time, inclusive of those who may come from the central security force. Such security force shall perform its tasks during the period of consultations and in the area where such consultations are being held.
The guidelines to implement this section including the carrying of sidearms/firearms shall be discussed and agreed upon by the Security Committees.

Section 4. Members of the aforesaid central and regional security forces shall enjoy the protection provided for by Section 3, Article II of the JASIG.

ARTICLE III
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. The duly accredited persons and members of the security forces authorized to carry sidearms/firearms, including its ammunitions, accesso­ries and spare parts, pursuant to these Implementing Rules shall act in a manner that will promote the objectives of the peace negotiations.

Section 2. The authority to carry sidearms/firearms issued pursuant to the preceding section shall not be transferable and shall be in the possession of the bearer together with the sidearms/firearms covered by said authority.

Section 3. These Implementing Rules or any provision hereof shall not impair or diminish the safety and immunity guarantees provided for under the JASIG.

Section 4. These Implementing Rules shall take force and effect upon signing by the Chairpersons of the two Negotiating Panels and approval by their respective Principals, and shall remain in force during the effectivity of the JASIG dated 24 February 1995.

DONE on the 16th of March 1998 in The Hague, the Netherlands.

FOR THE                                                                                   FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC                                      NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT
OF THE PHILIPPINES                                                             OF THE PHILIPPINES

By:

Amb. HOWARD Q. DEE                                                           LUIS G. JALANDONI
Chairperson, GRP Negotiating Panel                                   Chairperson, NDFP Negotiating Panel

Rep. JOSE V. YAP                                                                      FIDEL V. AGCAOILI
Member                                                                                    Member

Sec. SILVESTRE H. BELLO III                                                   CONI K. LEDESMA
Member                                                                                    Member

Atty. RENE V. SARMIENTO                                                      ASTERIO B. PALIMA
Member                                                                                    Member

Ms. ZENAIDA H. PAWID                                                           JOJO S. MAGDIWANG
Member                                                                                    Member

WITNESSES:

Hon. JOSE C. DE VENECIA                                                       JOSE MA. SISON
Speaker, House of Representative                                       Chief Political Consultant                                                                                                                              NDFP Negotiating Panel

Usec. A. WILFREDO CLEMENTE                                             ANTONIO L. ZUMEL
DECS, GRP                                                                                Senior Adviser
NDFP Negotiating Panel

Ms. MA. CARLA L. MUNSAYAC                                              ROMEO T. CAPULONG
Executive Director                                                                  General Counsel
GRP Negotiating Panel Secretariat                                      NDFP Negotiating Panel

March 18, 1997

This Supplemental Agreement to the Joint Agreement on the Formation, Sequence and Operationalization of the Reciprocal Working Committees (RWC Agreement) is being entered into by and between:

THE NEGOTIATING PANEL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES, hereinafter referred to as the GRP Panel,
represented by its Chairperson, Howard Q. Dee;

and

THE NEGOTIATING PANEL OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT
OF THE PHILIPPINES, hereinafter referred to as the NDFP Panel,
represented by its Chairperson, Luis G. Jalandoni.

ARTICLE I
PREAMBLE

WHEREAS, the GRP and NDFP Panels signed The Hague Joint Declaration of 1 September 1992 which, among others, sets the framework of mutually acceptable principles and the substantive agenda of the peace negotiations, and the Joint Agreement on the Formation, Sequence and Operationalization of the Reciprocal Working Committees (RWC Agree­ment) of 26 June 1995 which provides for, among others, the conduct of work and reasonable time frame of the RWCs;

WHEREAS, both Panels affirm that the common goal of the aforesaid negotiations and agreements is the attainment of a just and lasting peace;

WHEREAS, the GRP acknowledges that there is a limited time for the peace negotiations to be completed within the Ramos administration and there is a common desire by both Parties to accelerate the peace negotiations.

ARTICLE II
PROCESS AND TIMETABLE

The two Negotiating Panels agree on the following:

Section 1. Conduct of Work
Pursuant to the RWC Agreement, the four RWCs of both Panels shall strive to complete their work on or before June 30,1997 by arriving at tenta­tive comprehensive agreements for each major heading of the substantive agenda assigned to them on the basis of the following schedule:

The RWCs on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (HR & IHL) shall strive to complete the tentative comprehensive agreement assigned to them within two weeks of continuous work in March 1997.
The RWCs on Social and Economic Reforms (SER) shall meet for the first time and endeavor to complete the tentative comprehensive agreement assigned to them within two weeks of continuous work in April 1997.

The Negotiating Panels may separately form their respective RWCs on political and constitutional reforms (PCR) and RWCs on end of hostilities and disposition of forces at any time, with the aim of preparing for and exerting the best effort to complete the tentative comprehensive agree­ments assigned to them for drafting within two weeks of continuous work in May 1997 and June 1997, respectively, provided the comprehensive agreements mentioned in paragraphs a and b above are signed by the Negotiating Panels and approved by their respective Principals.

Section 2. Effectivity of the Comprehensive Agreements
The agreement/s on each heading of the substantive agenda shall take effect upon its/their signing by the Negotiating Panels and approval by their respective Principals.
The sequence of the headings as set forth in the substantive agenda shall remain firm and the effectivity of an approved comprehensive agreement shall not be delayed but shall help to accelerate the work on the next com­prehensive agreement being worked upon.

ARTICLE III
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. This Supplemental Agreement shall take effect upon the signing hereof by the Chairpersons of the two Panels.

Section 2. The inability of the Negotiating Panels to complete their work according to the desired schedule in Section 1 above on or before July 1, 1997 shall be no ground for ending the peace negotiations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunder signed this Supplemental Agreement this 18th of March 1997 at Breukelen, The Netherlands.

The Government of the Republic The National Democratic Front
of the Philippines Negotiating Panel: of the Philippines Negotiating Panel:

Howard Q. Dee                                                                        Luis G. Jalandoni
Chairperson, GRP Negotiating Panel                                   Chairperson, NDFP Negotiating Panel

Rep. Jose V. Yap                                                                       Fidel V. Agcaoili
Member                                                                                    Member

Mr. Silvestre H. Bello III                                                          Coni K. Ledesma
Member                                                                                    Member

Atty. Rene V. Sarmiento                                                          Asterio B. Palima
Member                                                                                    Member

Ms. Zenaida H. Pawid                                                             Jojo Magdiwang
Member                                                                                    Member

Witnesses:

Teresita L. de Castro                                                               Jose Maria Sison
Asst. Chief State Counsel                                                       Chief Political Consultant
GRP                                                                                            NDFP Negotiating Panel

Ma. Carla L. Munsayac                                                           Romeo T. Capulong
Executive Director                                                                   General Counsel
GRP Negotiating Panel                                                           NDFP Negotiating Panel
Secretariat

Sotero Llamas
Political Consultant

NDFP Negotiating Panel
Brig. Gen. Raymundo Jarque (ret.)
Consultant NDFP Negotiating Panel

Danilo Borjal
Consultant
NDFP Negotiating Panel