by Atty. Marie J. Yuviengco

Introduction

The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) has been hailed by both the GRP and the MNLF as the most concrete avenue for a political settlement of the 24-year Bangsa Moro armed struggle. While both camps are one in trumpeting the SPCPD as the facility within which Chairman Misuari and the Moro National Liberation Front shall lay down their arms and join the mainstream of society, some have raised serious questions about its nature, purpose and effective in finally and genuinely resolving the armed conflict in muslim Mindanao.

Some sectors say that through the proposed council, President Fidel Ramos has granted Misuari and the MNLF earth-shaking concessions that could undermine not only the presidency but also the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the entire nation. Others would say that Ramos has granted Misuari immese powers that threaten the alleged momentum of progress of southern Philippines and the SPCDP is an actuality a provisional government in disguise.

Still others maintain that the SPCPD is the best way of arriving at a conclusion to the armed struggle. So, why not give it the benefit of the doubt in order to give peace a chance?

Defense Secretary Renato De Villa dismisses the growing opposition to the SPCPD as simply a problem of information dissemination. While it is true that there indeed is a failure specifically on the part of the GRP to inform the public about the development in the GRP-MNLF talks, we should examine the nature and thrusts of these so-called opposition forces. The opposition basically comes from the following: the Roman Catholic Church hierarchy, local politicians, other Moro movements, lumads and other indigenous peoples and other political and liberation forces.

Will the opposition succeed in slaying the SPCPD? Some would observe that the opposition may not even be genuine. Of late, the tide of opposition is slowly but surely waning. As of August 2, 1996, as reported in the national dailies, a majority of senators have withdrawn their opposition to the SPCPD. The Catholic bishops have already expressed their support for it.

Analysts would say that the effect of most of the opposition is merely to push the MNLF to agree to the barest of concessions from the government.

On another score, the agreement on the SPCPD has opened the doors for legislators to resurrect their call to amend the Constitution. They have passed on first reading Resolution No. 23 which proposes to amend the charter through people’s initiative. The most vocal proponent of this move is Speaker Jose de Venecia of the Lakas Party who has time and time again tried to sell the idea of changing Charter. This raises suspicions that the same will be employed for a possible extension of the legislators’ terms and that of Ramos. This idea of extending Ramos’ term got the affirmative vote of Nur Misuari who has painted a picture necessitating Ramos’ presence as chief executive in order to assure peace and development in the South.

In the recent past, moves to perpetuate Ramos and his people in power have been strongly opposed by a wide range of political forces. Among the more significant attempts include: first, the shift to a parliamentary system of government. Then the threat of terrorism was dangled which would justify the declaration of martial law. And now comes the SPCPD.

If only for this reason, we cannot simply dismiss the SPCPD as it may be the subterfuge for the possible extension of Ramos’ grand and insidious designs to coopt revolutionary forces in the name of “peace and development”? A close scrutiny of its provisions is, therefore, in order.

The SPCPD: its Evolution

The MNLF’s original reason for being was lead the Moro people “towards the revolutionary path for the primary objective of re-acquiring the Bangsa Moro people’s political freedom and independence and settling themselves free from the clutches of Filipino terror and enslavement.” It became then a logical battlecry to fight for secession or “complete political independence and sovereignty”.

After the Kuala Lumpur Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in 1974, Misuari and his group lowered their demand from “complete political independence” to “complete political autonomy”. The 1976 Tripoli Agreement is rife with provisions calling for such political autonomy.

Based on the sequence of events, the shift in the avowed goal of the MNLF was in all probability due largely to the pressure and influence of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

Several events ensued after the signing of the Tripoli Agreement which include, among others, the signing of a three-point agreement between Libyan President Muamar Khadaffy and President Ferdinand Marcos calling for the following:

1. Marcos would declare autonomy in the thirteen (13) areas defined in the Tripoli Agreement.

2. Marcos would form a provisional government for the autonomy in which members of the MNLF and the inhabitants of the areas covered by the autonomy may participate; and

3. The provisional government would hold a referendum in the areas of autonomy on the administrative arrangements “in accordance with Article XI (3) of the 1973 constitution.”2

To implement the accord, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1628 which declared autonomy in Southern Philippines and held a plebiscite which resulted in the reduction of the original (13) provinces to ten (10) and creation of two autonomous regions.

This was viewed by the MNLF as a blatant violation of the Tripoli agreement which later resulted in the breakdown of the peace negotiations with the Marcos government. The violation stemmed not from the act of reducing areas of autonomy but more substantially because of the impotence of the law creating the autonomous government in Southern Philippines which essence puts the Lupong Tagapagpaganap and the Sangguniang Pampook under the control and supervision of the President.

Thereafter, President Corazon Aquino resumed peace negotiations with the MNLF immediately upon her assumption to office. At issue again was the question of autonomy. Aquino did a Marcos in the sense that she also held a plebiscite which resulted in the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) through R.A. 6734 in four of the poorest provinces in Mindanao.

In October 1992, peace negotiations between the Ramos government and the MNLF were initiated. Misuari was summoned to the Libyan capital as there was a Manila contingent coming over. In Libya, the GRP formally asked the MNLF to discuss the possibility of resuming the talks. With the imprimatur of the OIC, Nur had the Manila contingent convey to FVR the MNLF’s readiness to return to the negotiating table, citing the fact that it was fully in accord with Islamic principles.

The following conditions were laid down by Misuari for the resumption of peace talks:

1. Negotiations should take place outside the Philippines and only in a neutral country;

2. Peace talks should be conducted under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference, and

3. Peace talks must be devoted solely to seeking of modalities for the full implementation of the letter and spirit of the Tripoli Agreement.

Two weeks later, instead of proceeding with formal talks, the parties decided to engage in exploratory talks which led to the Cipanas talks in 1993.

The parties were able to forge an agreement indicating their desire to engage in the peace talks. Thereafter, they began formal talks and engaged in a series of committee meetings which spanned a period of four years until the 8th Mixed Committee Meeting in Davao City.

At issue now is the establishment of the Ramos version of autonomy in Muslim Mindanao. Did the Ramos Government, via the SPCPD, accede to the demands of the MNLF for political autonomy via a provisional government or autonomous government? Will the Ramos government give in to the demand of Misuari for “complete political autonomy”? Will President Ramos resort to the same process of holding a plebiscite?

The GRP-MNLF peace talks under the Ramos administration has produced several agreements namely, the 1993 Interim Cease-fire Agreement, the 1993 Memorandum of Agreement on the Formal Peace Talks and the 1994 and 1995 Interim Agreements and the Davao Agreement. There has been talk of a forthcoming agreement which is referred to as the “1996 Jakarta Agreement” which finally close the peace negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF.

General Alexander Aguirre of the GRP Negotiating Panel points out the following contentious issues which have remained unresolved in the duration of the four-year GRP-MNLF negotiations, to wit: “the details of the joining of the MNLF with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the details of the establishment of the Special Regional Security Force (SRSF), the provisional government and the area of autonomy”.3

The main issue, Aguirre explains, is whether the establishment of a provisional government or transitional structure leading to a new autonomous government and the areas included therein necessitates the holding of a plebiscite. The MNLF maintains there is no need to do so, citing Paragraph 15, Article III of the Tripoli Agreement which stipulates that the establishment of a Provisional Government will take effect upon the simple expedient of signing the Final Agreement in Manila. The GRP, however, takes Paragraph 16, Article II of the Tripoli Agreement as basis for resorting to a plebiscite, to wit:

The Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire Agreement.

But what does the term “constitutional processes” mean? In a paper entitled “GRP Panel’s Position: Meaning of term Constitutional Processes”, the GRP took the following position:

In sum, our constitutional processes mean:

1. Any agreement which runs counter to the provisions of the Constitution or goes beyond its framework, needs to go through the tedious process of amending or revising the Constitution, through a proposal made by a constitutional convention called by Congress or a proposal made by Congress itself acting as a constituent assembly or a proposal by people’s initiative; and approval or ratification of the proposal by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite conducted throughout the Philippines.

2. Any agreement which remains within the confines of the present constitutional provisions but which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Organic Act, requires an amendment of the Organic Act which provides specific procedures for its amendment or revision…

The Organic Act or the law creating the ARMM (R.A. 6734), on the other hand, can be amended or revised by the following acts:

1. By a majority vote of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.

2. The Regional Assembly by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members or by recalling for the Regional Consultative Commission to propose said amendment or revision. In any case, the approval of Congress is still necessary.

3. Said amendment or revision shall be effective only upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose to be held not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days from approval of such amendment or revision. 4

For the ostensible reason of trying to break the impasse, Aguirre suggested the creation of a transitional body called the Southern Philippines Commission on Peace and Development which later evolved into what is now known as the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). 5
This SPCPD, in the Panel’s view, shall be created not by a plebiscite, but merely by executive action. But some quarters have taken the position that it should be created by Congressional legislation. This issue has already been resolved in the subsequent agreements.

The establishment of the SPCPD is fleshed out in a document containing 37 Points of Consensus arrived at by the 8th GRP-MNLF Mixed Committee Meeting with the Participation of the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six on June 21-23, 1996 in Davao City which shall refer to here as the “Davao Consensus”.

The GRP-MNLF Panel is composed of five (5) Support Committees, namely:
1. National Defense and Regional Security Force
2. Education
3. Economic and Financial System, Mines and Mineral
4. Administrative System, Representation in National Government, Legislative Assembly and Executive Council
5. Judiciary and Introduction of Shariah Law.

These committees are tasked to examine all the relevant issues “in their respective areas of responsibility and submit their respective reports with the recommendations to the Mixed Committee.”6 The Mixed Committee, on the other hand, composed of “representative of the Central Government of the Republic of the Philippines and representative of MNLF”, is tasked “to study in detail the points left for discussion in order to reach a solution” in conformity with the Tripoli Agreement. (See Article III, Paragraph 11 of the Tripoli Agreement).7

The Points of Consensus

The establishment of the SPCPD is divided in to two (2) phases. The first phase, otherwise referred to as the transition phase or phase for the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement, runs for a period of three years. During this phase, a “Special Zone of Peace and Development” shall be established in the fourteen (14) provinces and all cities therein covered by the Tripoli Agreement out of Mindanao’s twenty-three (23) provinces and sixteen (16) cities. In the Tripoli Agreement, the following provinces are included: Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, Palawan.

There has been some debate as to whether Davao City should be included in the SPCPD. To this, Atty. Jose Lorena of the MNLF legal panel for the talks posited the MNLF position that Davao City is indeed included in the SPCPD. It has been countered, however, by the GRP Panel that this untenable. This is probably because at the time the Tripoli Agreement had been signed on December 23, 1976, Davao was no longer a part of the province of Davao del Sur. Thus, Davao, in the GRP’s understanding, could not be contemplated to be within the coverage of the SPCPD.

The first phase, in effect, involves those provisions in the agreement which would not require legislative action for its implementation; the second phase, on the other hand, would be reserved for those needing the appropriate legislative measures. In this sense, the question on whether the SPCPD should be created by executive or legislative action has been resolved.

Phase I

The council will be headed by the MNLF, with three deputies representing the Muslims, Christians and Lumads. There will be consultative assembly which shall be headed also by the Council Chair. This consultative assembly shall have eighty-one (81) members composed of the Governor and Vice-Governor for ARMM, the provincial governors and mayors of the areas covered and representatives of NGO’s and PO’s upon consultation with the MNLF. The Council will basically perform administrative responsibilities and perform such other functions as may be delegated by the President. The Consultative Assembly, on the other hand, shall be tasked to serve as advisers to the council and to a certain extent, formulate policies for the President.

What does this implication of the said powers and functions? It is clear that the Council shall merely perform a role of being the alter ego of the President. In this sense, the MNLF is strictly obliged to abide by the dictates of the President even if, for instance, this may ultimately run counter to the greater interests of the Moro people.

It is interesting to note that the Council shall also be empowered to “assist in the holding of elections, referenda or plebiscite and people’s initiative in the area deputized by the COMELEC upon recommendation by the President”. This is interesting because if we take the aforequoted provision together with Misuri’s pronouncement supporting the proposal to extend Mr. Ramos term, the stated powers may be conducive to manipulation and fraud in the electoral process.

Point No. 13 of Phase 1 deserves attention. It states: “The tenure of the Executive Council and the Consultative Assembly shall be for a period of three years and extendable by the President upon recommendations of the Council.” Strictly speaking, tenure refers to the period within which public official shall actually hold office. The absence of a “term” of office would, therefore, imply that the Council and Executive Assembly shall serve at the entire pleasure of the President.

Thus, it is clear that Phase 1 of the Davao Concensus is designed to provide a transitional mechanism toward the setting up of a new autonomous government, if they are lucky, particularly in overseeing Ramos’ so-called development efforts in the fourteen (14) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao including Palawan.

Phase II

The Second Phase, otherwise referred to as the implementation of the “autonomous government”, will entail the amendment or repeal of R.A. 6734 through Congressional action. Said amendment or repeal shall be initiated within the First Phase of the SPCPD. During the Second Phase, a plebiscite will be held wherein the citizens residing within the proposed provinces and cities will decide whether they would agree to join the areas of autonomy. The holding of a plebiscite will determine:

a. The acceptability of the new ARMM law
b. The establishment of a new autonomous government
c. The specific areas of autonomy.8

The plebiscite curiously will be held in 1998 to coincide with the next Presidential elections. After the plebiscite, either of two scenarios may take place:

1. New areas of autonomy may be created if there are provinces/cities which would choose to form part of the autonomous regions;

2. No areas of autonomy at all will be created or, worse, the existing ARMM may even be diminished!

Misuari claims that “99% of the issues have already been done away with in the course of the three year talks” and what still needs to be done is to resolve the issue of the integrationof internal security forces. As to what particular aspect of security is still in contention, Misuari had occasion to state that the only major obstacle as to the integration issue is simply a question of “budget”!

In the remote possibility that a “new regular autonomous government” has been successfully established, a PNP Regional Command for the said area shall likewise be created and shall be called the Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF). 9

Any law governing the SRSF must be “consistent with the constitutional provision that there shall be one police force in the country which the is national in scope and civilian in character.”

There shall be SRSFs in the provincial, district, city and municipal levels. The SRSF shall be headed by the Provincial Director with the deputy each for the Administration and Operations. Provincial and District offices shall be headed by directors while city and municipal SRSFs shall be headed by a Chief of Police.

The Head of the Regional Autonomous Government shall also act as deputy of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). A Regional Police Commission (REPOLCOM) shall also be created which shall likewise be under the NAPOLCOM.

Legal infirmities & obstacles

Already, there has been talk that the SPCPD is legally and constitutionally infirm.

Early on, Ramon Gonzales in his capacity as a taxpayer, filed a prohibition suit before the Supreme Court and questioned the constitutionally of the SPCPD. The SPCPD, he says, is violative of the constitutional provisions relating to the creation of an office or the disbursement of funds without legislative action.

It was noted further that the creation of an autonomous region under Section 18(2) Article X of the 1987 Constitution has become functus oficio with the ratification by four provinces of the law creating the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. 10

Another issue is whether of not Misuari can hold two concurrent positions in the government as head of the SPCPD and as Governor for the ARMM. President Ramos himself has given the opinion that such was untenable for in effect, Misuari would be holding not only two, but three different positions, namely, as SPCPD Chair, ARMM Governor and Consultative Assembly member. Of relevance,however, is the provision in the Organic Act of ARMM (R.A. 6734) which prohibits the governor from holding any other employment, if one can call the position as an employment. 11 To this, Chairman Misuari reveals the existence of a “deal” with the GRP which would allow him to old on the said positions at the same time. This could be the same package proposals MNLF spokeperson Rev. Absalon Cerveza mentioned which the Government presented to the MNLF in Jakarta on June 3-5, 1996. Misuari said:

…(T)his is all part of the deal. The government proposed to us that it should be a single leadership only, so we could guide institutions towards the direction we want. Without this single leadership, there is no guarantee that we would get things done the way we want them to be done. And besides, there would be demands from the other groups, other parties. This agreement makes it certain that the MNLF will dominate the South. 12

It is specifically agreed upon the Council shall be assisted by a religious advisory council or the Darul Iftah. This provision has been the subject of great concern especially from members of the Christian community and the Catholic church as well. Why we give the Darul Iftah a distinct role in the administration of the Council? Is it because the MNLF considers the struggle a religious war between Muslims and Christians? Or is it the very nature of Muslim culture, they consider Islam as the foundation upon which their society is instituted? Does this not violate the principle of separation of church and state?

Who is to Gain From this Agreement

Jose Maria Sison, chief political consultant of the NDFP Peace Panel, is of the opinion that “(S)everal states belonging to the OIC, which are pro-US and on which Nur Misuari has long depended,… have finally pressed upon him to surrender completely to the Ramos regime.”13 The OIC has continued to prod the MNLF into arriving at a political settlement of the Bangsa Moro struggle. This has been proven by their role in pushing the MNLF into agreeing to engage in peace negotiations from the Tripoli Agreement up to the present negotiations with the Ramos government. Misuari even admits that the Ministers “made efforts” to enable the two panels to reach at a compromise solution in the present talks. 14

Professor Sison suspects that “(t)he US is very much behind the Ramos-Misuari deal, especially because the US is interested in bases and in the oil resources in the Moro areas.” This suspicion is not without basis. Already, members of the City Council of Zamboanga have filed a resolution recommending the initiation of a study to invite the Americans to install their military bases in Mindanao.

At present, there are massive development projects being undertaken in Southern Philippines under the Brunei Darassalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines (BIMP-EAGA), SOCSARGEN and Mindanao 2000 programs. The following are worth mentioning:

1. The construction of a US-AID designed and funded international airport in General Santos City. This airport, covering 600 has. reservation area, has a 3,200 meter concrete paved runway which accommodate wide-bodied aircrafts at full load capacity.

2. the US-AID designed and funded expansion of the Makar Port which is strategically located in the northwest coast of Sarangani Bay. The Bay is about 16 kms. at its widest and is about 33 kms. long from its mouth entrance in the Celebes sea. The 10.11 has. wharf will again be expanded by reclaiming 3.9 has. As of 1978, the wharf has a docking length of 561 meters with a controlling depth of 8.9 meters which can accommodate berthing spaces for about seven vessels at a given time. 15

These investments coupled with heavy concentrations of large multinational firms and investments could very well indicate that a political settlement of the issue is would greatly benefit them.

What is clear, furthermore, is the categorical accession and subordination of the MNLF to the limitations imposed by the Government. This is exemplified by the following:

1. Resolution No. 18 at the Kuala Lumpur Conference in 1974 calling for the resolution of the Moro issue within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic.

2. The following provisions in the Tripoli Agreement:

a. calling for “(t)he establishment of Autonomy in the Southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.” 16

b. requiring the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to take the “necessary constitutional processes” for the implementation of the Tripoli agreement.

3. A declaration from the OIC to the effect that the MNLF struggle is an internal struggle and should, therefore, be resolved within the framework of local laws.

4. The entering into an “indifinite” ceasefire agreement with the government at or about the same time formal negotiations have started.

5. The following provisions in the Davao Consensus:

a. That “(t)he powers and functions of the SPCPD and the Consultative Assembly are derivative and extentions of the President.” 17
b. That “(t)he local government units in the area including the ARMM, shall continue to exist and exercise their functions in accordance with the existing laws.”

c. That the creation of additional administrative offices and instumentalities shall be with the “approval of the President and for budgetary purposes.” 18

Even as Mr. Ramos denies that the suspicions that the SPCPD was created in order to create a climate conductive for the entry of foreign investors from the Islamic countries and other capitalists nations to take advantage of the cessation of armed hostilities 19 he himself admitted the same by saying:

Continued conflict would mean to the international community lack of political will on our part and resultant loss of business confidence in effecting a just resolution of the plight of our Muslim countrymen and countrywomen. 20

These suspicions even become clearer when the Davao Consensus specifically makes mention of the drive for attracting foreign investments, to wit:

The Council, in consultation with the Consultative Assembly, utilizing the funds from the National Government, shall orchestrate the development efforts in the area, including the attraction of foreign investment, specially from the OIC countries and the ASEAN.

Conclusions

Is the SPCPD the correct framework for achieving peace and development in Muslim Mindanao?

The Moro people have long been marginalized in almost all aspects of governance, i.e. economically, politically and culturally. By giving Misuari a significant role albeit constrictive in scope, a semblance of significant and relevant participation is created.

Many would recommend the SPCPD formula for the Mindanao prolem. For after all, the same is a product of years and years of peace negotiations. The country, they say, is anxious for a change of climate in Muslim Mindanao and if only for that temporary respite, the SPCPD is worth trying out.

There is no guarantee that Misuari may get his autonomous government under the present terms. Too much burden is given to Misuari to realize it. Even if all the provisions of the present agreement are followed to the letter, ha may still come out of the exercise with nothing. When this arises, unlike in the breakdown of the talks with Marcos, Misuari can no longer cry foul as Misuari has placed his stamp of approval on each and every step of the process.

Most basic is the requirement of properly understanding the Moro problem in its entirety. If we fail to fully comprehend the problem, then most likely, we will fail in arriving at a most appropriate solution. This, we think, is the fundamental flaw in the creation of the SPCPD.

In essence, we venture to say that:

1. The SPCPD is but a continuation of the MNLF’s series of submissions to the pressures and dictates coming from the OIC and foreign governments beholden to monopoly capitalists interests which began from the Tripoli Agreement down to the SPCPD.

2. The SPCPD is a structure that may lend justification for the extension of Ramos’ term beyond 1998.

3. The SPCPD is a concession which will leave marginalized Moro community as the losers in this so-called process for peace and development.

4. The SPCPD is a grand scheme hatched from the highest levels of the reactionary government and not surprisingly with the collaboration of government foreign monopoly capitalist countries like the US and countries forming part of the OIC in order to satisfy their growing need for markets and natural and human resources.

5. The SPCPD does not address the fundamental problems of Bangsa Moro struggle and instead, supports the perpetuation of feudal relationships, the use by government functionaries of their power to pursue their economic interests and those of foreign monopoly capitalism.

The Ramos government may have succeded in winning over the MNLF into the mainstream. But this victory will have little effect on the fundamental problems and issues subject of the 24-year Bangsa Moro struggle. What government has succeeded in doing is simply to have diminished its oppositionists by one force. For once, I am in agreement with Gen. Alexander Agurre when he said the MNLF “will cease to exist as a revolutionary force” once Misuari accepts the offer to head the SPCPD. 21

By announcing his candidacy for the ARMM under a Lakas-MNLF alliance, Misuari admits that he has “totally rejected the armed struggle.” 22

The MNLF has, therefore, surrendered its principles, abandoned its struggle and embraced the line of the ruling elite. The MNLF is no longer a “liberation force”. The MNLF is now a political party whose only chance for survival is to embrace wholeheartedly the oppressive and repressive system of governance and for Misuari to engage in elitist politics. Thus:

… Over time, objective reality may dictate that MNLF will cease to be a ‘liberation front’ and transform itself into a political party. Then it will have its share of politicians and managers out of its commanders and security forces…23

What then the alternative? We believe that there is no short and easy road to peace. So long as the roots of social unrest and conflict remain, no genuine and lasting peace can ever take place. Palliatives can at times even make matters worse.

Misuari claims that “(P)eace is now very near, if not, already in the offing”24 but we in the Public Interest Law Center believe that there can be no fundamental change if reforms are made within and under the framework of a reactionary system/state, as is the case at hand.

Notes

1 See “Understanding Armed Political Movements, The Quest for Moro Self-Determination”, p. 55, citing Misuari, Rise and Fall of Moro Statehood.

2 See Satur C. Ocampo, “Bangsa or Muslim Autonomous Regions”, Notes for a lecture to commemorate the Jabidah Massacre of March 18, 1968. Davao City, March 19, 1996, at page 6.)

3 See Secretary Alexander Aguirre, 5th Draft Working Paper on the Transitional Structure and Implementing Mechanism Re: GRP-MNLF Talks, May 9, 1996.

4 See Article XVIII Sections 1-3 R.A. 6734.

5 See Secretary Alexander Aguirre, 5th Draft Working Paper on the Transitional Structure and Implementing Mechanism Re: GRP-MNLF Talks, May 9, 1996.

6 See GRP-MNLF Memorandum of Agreement of November 7, 1993, Jakarta.

7 See Article III, paragraph 11 of the Tripoli Agreement.

8 See Point No. 16 of the Davao Consensus.

9 See Point No. 17.

10 See Atty. Allan Tan, “Hopes and Fears: On the Mindanao Peace Processes”, June 30, 1996.

11 See Section 14, Article 8, of the Organic Act.

12 See Jomar Kho Indanan, “Only MNLF can Guarantee Peace, Interview with MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari”, Today, July 21, 1996.

13 See Jose Maria Sison, Press Statement “On the Ramos-Misuari Deal”, July 11, 1996.

14 See Misuari’s videotaped speech, June 28, 1996.

15 See SOCSARGEN, PDI, July 3, 1996.

16 See Article 1 of the Tripoli Agreement.

17 See Point No. 7

18 See Point No. 15(6)

19 See Rolly A. San Juan and PDI Mindanao Bureau, “Gov’t MNLF agree on war reparations”, PDI, July 17, 1996.

20 See Carolyn O. Arguillas, PDI, August 1, 1996, citing FVR’s speech delivered before the graduates of the National Defense College.

21 See Ben Blin Gregorio, “Mindanao Talks: No Deal”, p. 1, Today, June 23, 1996.

22 See Jomar Kho Indanan, “Only MNLF can Guarantee Peace, Interview with MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari”, Today, July 21, 1996.

23 Dean Merlin Magallona, “Peacemaking: Issues and Themes in Perspective”, June 1996, General Santos City.

24 Misuari, Nur, “The Ongoing Challenge”, Speech on the occasion of a roundtable discussion on the Mindanao Peace Process, Peacemaking:, General Santos City, June 28, 1996.

By Atty. Romeo T. Capulong

The current GRP-NDFP peace negotiations under the administration of President Fidel V. Ramos began in the Hague in August 31, 1992. Earlier, in September 1990, exploratory talks were held between the two parties represented by Rep. Jose Yap as emissary of President Aquino and Luis Jalandoni and Jose Maria Sison of the NDFP. Today, after almost four years of bilateral talks, frequently interrupted by deadlocks, long adjournments and one collapse unilaterally declared by the GRP, a valid question which is often asked is : What have the two parties achieved; or, how far have they gone? This question becomes more compelling when as is often done, comparisons are made between the GRP-NDFP peace process and the ballyhooed “successes” of the Ramos administration in the peace talks with the MNLF and the RAM/SFP/YOU.

In this presentation I shall endeavor to address this question and a few other current issues including the denial of the application of Jose Maria Sison for political asylum and its causal connection to the Peace Process, refusal of the GRP to acknowledge the appointment of Brig. Gen. Raymundo Jarque as NDFP consultant and its implications to the binding force and effective implementation of the Joint Agreement on Safety and immunity Guarantees or what is now popularly known as the JASIG.

You all know that as a human rights lawyer I have participated as General Counsel of the NDFP Negotiating Panel in the current as well as in the 1986-87 negotiations. But let me state at the outset that my views here are my own and not of my clients.

Genuine and Lasting Peace vs. Pacification, Cooptation and Surrender

In my earlier paper entitled “The Ramos Peace Program Towards a Just and Lasting Peace or a Mere Pacification Campaign?”, I posed the following questions:

Will the Ramos government lead to just and lasting peace? Or will it be a mere pacification program that will attempt to subdue the armed challenges to the state but fail to bring peace in the long run?

Has the Ramos government discarded the worn framework of cooptation and surrender, or has it merely repackaged this into a more deceptive, if attractive and sophisticated, peace program?

From the start of the negotiations, the NDFP has put forward its position that the ultimate goal of the peace process is genuine and lasting peace not merely ending the armed conflict. And that to achieve this goal the parties to the armed conflict must identify and address the roots of the problems of the Philippine society and not merely with their symptoms. Likewise, throughout the conduct of the negotiations the NDFP has vigorously and consistently asserted its integrity and principles as the national liberation movement with an alternative program that will bring about social emancipation and genuine freedoms and democracy. Corollary to these, the NDFP (1) has ruled out capitulation and submission to the GRP constitution as the framework of the negotiations; (2) in consonance with the bilateral character of the negotiations and its legal status under international law, has upheld and maintained the principles of mutuality, parity and reciprocity not only in the negotiating table and in the joint agreements signed by the parties but also in the eyes of the international community.

At this juncture, and from our perspective as the peace advocates and social activists, is there anything objectionable in these fundamental positions?

It took almost three years of exploratory and preliminary talks from August 1992 to June 1995 before the two panels reached the formal and substantive phase of the negotiations.

The one year period of delay, from June 26,1995 to June 19, 1996 has been due to the initial refusal of the GRP to respect and apply the provisions of the JASIG to NDFP consultant Sotero Llamas, a position which subsequently yielded after one year.

I am aware that there are different public perceptions as to the legal reasons behind the slow pace of the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations. Regrettably, these perceptions generally come from those who take every opportunity to malign the NDFP and attribute the delays to it, often accusing it of insincerity and intransigence. This is most unfair and totally baseless. And the records will bear me out. In presenting my views on this issue I wish I could avoid indicting the GRP, given my role in the negotiations.

Time-wise, there are a number of reasons why it had taken the two parties four years before they could agree in principle on the preamble of the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, the first in the four-topic sequential substantive agenda agreed upon in the Hague on August 31 – September 1, 1992, Breukelen, on June 14 – June 16, 1994, De Bilt in October 10 – October 14, 1994, in Nieuwegein on February 24 – February 26, 1995 all in The Netherlands, and in Brussels, Belgium on June 26, 1995 and finally in the Hague on June 19 to June 26, 1996.

In between these six meetings, representatives both parties held discreet meetings and tele-conferences, and regularly exchanged communications to resolve pending issues. During the entire course of the negotiations there is nothing in the records that will show that the NDFP ever proposed, much less declared suspension, termination or unilateral adjournment of the talks. This couldn’t be said of the GRP side which, through its panel chairman Howard Dee, is in habit of either threatening or actually declaring a unilateral suspension or collapse of the talks every time he is personally displeased or confronted with a difficult problem.

In terms of issues and problems, what is clear in the records is that the two parties have been confronted with these and had tackled them, with the NDFP in the main raising prejudicial questions and critical issues and sincerely struggling its position solely for the purpose of properly steering the course of the talks towards the ultimate objective of attaining a jus and lasting peace; and with the GRP or some elements in it who are opposed to the peace process putting roadblocks and impediments or even deliberately sabotaging the talks.

To the credit of both parties, some difficult questions have been resolved, though not without objections from some quarters from the GRP side. These are: mutually acceptable principles as the framework of the talks, foreign neutral venue, mutual safety and immunity guarantees and respect for the revolutionary integrity of the NDFP.

Indeed, there is a short-cut to ending the armed conflict and concluding a peace accord. Gregorio Honasan, and Nur Misuari have done this!

But may I ask: Will the acceptance by Prof. Jose Maria Sison of the offer of Speaker Jose de Venecia of a sectoral seat in the House of Representative lead to a just and lasting peace in the country? This is not the only proposal made by the GRP or some elements in it as a way of ending the armed conflict and thereby attaining “peace”. Throughout the whole period of negotiations, the GRP has dangled at the revolutionary forces of the NDFP many similar proposals all aimed at decimating, fragmenting, demoralizing, coopting, enticing or entrapping the leaders and members of the CPP and the NPA and other organizations under the NDFP into capitulating or surrendering to the GRP. We are all similar with these proposals: ceasefires, both local and national, amnesty, peace zones, participating in the elections, giving up the armed struggle in favor of parliamentary struggle or simply laying down arms and contributing to the GRP program of economic development.

True these catchphrases, eloquently projected by propagandists and psy-war experts of the GRP and unfortunately re-echoed by our trapo leaders, some church leaders, some members of the media, business leaders and even some so-called peace advocates, easily win propaganda points for the GRP, successfully projecting it and its leaders as sincere and reasonable at the expense of the NDFP. In reality, these are not legitimate proposals in the peace negotiations if the objective is to achieve a genuine and lasting peace. They are clear evidence of bad faith and insincerity that pollute the atmosphere of the talks and deflect the attention of our people away from the roots of our problems that the peace negotiations should tackle.

If there has been delay in the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations, if it took four years to reach the substantive phase of the talks, if henceforth, there will be more delays or, for that matter, if the talks will fail, the reason will not be difficult to find. And that is: because the GRP has not given up its framework of capitulation and surrender with the sole aim of merely ending the armed conflict as it successfully did in the talks with the MNLF and the military rebels while the NDFP, on the other hand, sees the negotiation as another form of struggle and an opportunity to tackle the roots of the problems of Philippine society and achieve a genuine and lasting peace.

In this context, GRP panel Chairman Howard Dee’s unilateral and intimidatory imposition of a one year deadline from today will be both futile and inappropriate.

Jose Maria Sison’s Asylum Case

Under dare of July 22, 1996 the Dutch Ministry of Justice rendered a decision denying Jose Maria Sison’s application for political asylum in the Netherlands. This is the third time the Dutch Ministry of Justice denied Prof. Sison’s applications. Earlier, on July 13, 1990 and March 26, 1993 similar denials were made by the same Ministry. In the first two denials, the decision of the Dutch Ministry of Justice were reversed by the Raad van State of Council of State, an independent and impartial tribunal outside of the Dutch Government’s Executive and Political Department composed of senior non-political members of known probity, competence and independence which has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Dutch Ministry of Justice in political asylum cases.

Prof. Sison had announced he would contest their third denial as he did in the first two and his Dutch lawyer had already taken the required steps to perfect the appeal in the so-called Alien’s Court, if the decision would still be adverse, Prof. Sison may still appeal to the Dutch Supreme Court and from the latter tribunal an appeal may still be taken to the European Commission on Human Rights, a European Tribunal vested by a treaty to review the decisions of the Dutch National Government on human rights cases.

While all these appellate remedies are being availed of, the decision to expel Prof. Sison from the Netherlands is indefinitely stayed by the law. I am not in a position to predict with a degree of accuracy the length of time that the appeal process will take and correspondingly stay the expulsion order but his Dutch lawyer had given assurance that it will take a couple of years barring the successful interference and manipulation of the Dutch and European judicial processes by the Dutch, US and Philippine governments.

This brings us to a discussion of the real reasons behind the determined efforts of the Dutch government to expel Prof. Sison from the Netherlands in clear violation of his rights under international law and Dutch National Law.

Jose Ma. Sison’s role as a chief political consultant in the negotiations is immense value not only to the NDFP but also to the entire peace process itself. At crucial junctures in the peace process when both sides stuck rigidly to their positions and collapse was imminent, it was Prof. Sison’s wise fair counsel which broke the deadlock. The first breakthrough in the GRP-NDFP negotiations came with the signing of the now popularly known The Hague Joint Declaration of September 1, 1992 by the emissary of the GRP Hon. Jose V. Yap and representative of the NDFP Vice-Chair Luis Jalandoni and approved by their respective principals – President Ramos and Manuel Romero.
I recall that Congressman Yap who as emissary was duly authorized in writing by Pres. Ramos and who was, and still is, Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense of the House of Representatives, and State Counsel Teresita de Castro, the GRP Legal adviser, were both unyielding in their position that the NDFP must lay down arms as a precondition for the peace talks. It was Jose Ma. Sison’s fair compromise formulations which broke this deadlock, and now stipulated in paragraph 4 of the Hague Joint Declaration that the “holding of peace negotiations must be in accordance with mutually acceptable principles, including national sovereignty, democracy and social justice and no precondition shall be made to negate the inherent character and purpose of the peace negotiations”. The brief Hague Joint declaration is also the fundamental and landmark of document which set the “common goal” of the peace negotiations in the “attainment of a just and lasting peace”. It also provides four major topics constituting the agenda of the formal talks and the sequence and mode of tackling these four topics.

In sum, it was the Hague Joint Declaration which in the open is an NDFP proposal and particularly of Jose Maria Sison, that not only broke the deadlock on the prejudicial question of framework of the talks but also set the course of the ongoing and future talks in the correct objective and right track. In my view, it is also a model document worthy of a serious study and consideration by all peace participants and networks.

The narration of Jose Maria Sison’s role in the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations and our quest for a just and lasting peace belongs to historians. I made reference to these matter merely to underscore the fact that the denial of Sison’s application for political asylum is a political decision of the Dutch government, made in deference to the pressures of the Philippine government and the U.S. government, in violation of the rights of Sison under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees (Refugee Treaty) the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) as well as the Dutch Alien’s Law.

It is significant to note that the Dutch government in its decision admitted that Prof. Sison has a well-grounded fear of persecution by the Philippine government on account of his political beliefs entitled to the protection under the Refugee Treaty and applicable Dutch Law. But it rejected none the less the application because of alleged complicity in alleged bloody purges of its non members for the NPA in 1985 and 1988 and to protect the “integrity and credibility” of The Netherlands in its relations with sovereign states.

Shortly after the July 22, 1996 decision, the GRP panel took the position that it has now become “diplomacy inappropriate” to hold further talks in The Netherlands because of the expulsion order, and renewed its position that talks be held in the Philippines, contrary to Section 6 of JASIG that formal talks be held in a foreign neutral venue.

Holding the talks in the Philippines for that matter anywhere outside of The Netherlands will effectively prevent Jose Maria Sison from performing his role as a Chief Political Consultant to the NDFP. Holding such talks in the Philippines will also enable pro-government vested interest and forces to exert pressure on the NDFP to capitulate or yield to all the demands and enticements of the GRP, including a premature ceasefire, amnesty program, in the course of the talks and laying down arms or surrender. As in 1986 this will enable the Philippine military and police to surveil and gather valuable intelligence information about the NDFP forces. Hence, the expulsion order is intended not only to de-stabilize Prof. Sison and his family but also to place the Ramos government in a better strategic position to out-maneuver the NDFP in the peace talks into capitulation.

The decision against Prof. Sison by the Dutch government rests on very flimsy and whimsical grounds. Prof. Sison allegedly committed heinous crimes when he was either in the Marcos military prison in 1985 and when he was already in Utrech in 1988. I wish I had the time to discuss in detail here the contents of the paper I presented in a parallel NGO forum on the occasion of the Second UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June 1993. Let me just say that as late as August, 1991 the Philippine government filed criminal charges against Prof. Sison for murder in connection with the Plaza Miranda bombing that occurred in August 1971.

Prof. Sison was acquitted by the City Prosecutor and the Department of Justice of this charge. In September 1988 Prof. Sison was likewise charged with subversion before the Regional Trial Court in Pasig. This never mentioned any of the alleged purges and become academic when the Anti-Subversion Law, R.A. 1700 was repealed by the current dispensation. But the point is: at no time in the past and up to now has Prof. Sison been charged by the Philippine Government in its own court and forum with any of the crimes imputed to him and which the Dutch government used as a factual basis for its expulsion order and regarding which Prof. Sison was not furnished any copy much less given the opportunity to refute.

This is an implied but indubitable admission that the GRP has no iota of evidence and does not even believe that Prof. Sison was in any way involved in these crimes. Incidentally, the GRP filed charges against Satur Ocampo and Carolina Malay in connection with the 1988 alleged purge. They were both acquitted by the RTC Judge Maximiano Asuncion of Quezon City.

My friends, in connection with the peace negotiations, it has become common and even fashionable to criticize, malign and ridicule the NDFP and its leaders. Some of these attacks are vicious and malicious. Some come from supposedly enlightened or politicized members of our society.

The NDFP has often been accused of bad faith, dilatory tactics, having a secret agenda, intransigence and so forth. With due respect, my sense is that some of these critics are coming not from an honest disagreement as to the way the NDFP has conducted itself in the peace negotiations but from a fear of its politics and ideology and its forms of struggle, particularly the armed struggle. Some may simply be misinformed about the negotiations.

My appeal to you now is: let us critically examine and analyze the facts and the records. If we are convinced that the NDFP, far from being insincere and unreasonable, is merely asserting its legitimate rights as a revolutionary movement and steering the peace negotiations in the right course and towards the objective of a genuine and lasting peace; if we are convinced that the GRP is not sincerely interested in achieving a just and lasting peace; if we are convinced that the GRP is merely implementing a program of capitulation by making Prof. Sison do another Nur Misuari or Gringo Honasan — then I ask everyone, all peace advocates, all concerned Filipinos, all those who are for meaningful change in society, to shift gears and aim our efforts at criticizing and convincing the GRP not to use the GRP-NDFP talks as a forum for the capitulation of the NDFP but as an effective instrument for a comprehensive peace accord that will remove all the unjust and oppressive structures in our society and build a truly democratic, just, and prosperous and sovereign nation.

INTRODUCTION

Of late, there has been a lot of confusion and misunderstanding as to the prospects and developments regarding the present peace process between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the National Democratic Front (NDF). As a fellow student of the peace process and having had the privilege of observing its dynamics, allow me to contribute my own perceptions and analysis of the same.

Let me start by quoting from Sun Tzu. He said:

“The skilled general subdues the enemy’s army without fighting a single battle.”

Centuries later, our own President, Fidel V. Ramos said:

“Our peace initiative has succeeded beyond our expectations. It has brought the military rebels and southern secessionists to the conference table, and fragmented the insurgent communist party to its core (underscoring supplied).”

W A R  A N D  P E A C E

War, it is said, is the continuation of politics by other means.

To a military mind, peace may be merely the absence of war, a lull in the fighting, a breather during protagonists prepare for the next battle. War and peace are merely two faces of the same coin. Or more aptly, they are the two blades of the same sword with which the enemy must be struck, pierced, and vanquished.

To a military mind, peace is also a weapon, at a times a more potent and lethal one, because it can deceive. Peace becomes the continuation of the war by other means.

In his Inaugural Address a year and a half ago, President Ramos announced that he would work for the attainment of a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace. He called on “mutinous soldiers and radical insurgents to give up their armed struggle;” created the National Unification Commission (NCU) and task it with the recommending a viable general amnesty program and peace process; asked the Congress to repeal Republic Act (RA) 1700 and fashion out an amnesty policy that will “enable errant reformists to reenter civil society.”

He announced his government’s intention to negotiate with the National Democratic Front (NDF), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the military rebels; and facilitated the release of a number of prominent political prisoners as a confidence-building measure.

Coming from one of the planners and chief implementors of counter-insurgency campaign during the past two decades, including the martial law years, these moves were received with a measure of skepticism by peace advocates and cause-oriented people’s and non-government organizations. The Philippine Alliance of Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA), for example, entitled their assessment of the Ramos administration’s human rights policies and record “Is the President Working for Peace, or is the General Preparing for War?”.

The NDF and other armed groups responded positively, but without wariness and suspicion. After all, it was then the Chief of Staff and later Defense Secretary Ramos who repeatedly blocked and rejected all of the NDF’s overtures for the resumption of talks from 1987 to 1992, by insisting on the laying down of arms as pre-condition, and the acceptance of the 1987 Constitution as a framework for negotiations.

Further, Gen. Ramos persistently pushed, alongside massive military campaigns, a program of surrender and co-optation. He did so by promoting and encouraging peace talks with local rebel cadres and commanders, offering amnesty and personal benefits disguised as a rehabilitation programs and transparent bid to divide the revolutionary movement. He argued for the retention of the Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGUs) and the arming of vigilante groups despite their notoriety for committing human rights violations. He also reconstituted the Peace and Order Councils (POCs) that would coordinate the counter-insurgency efforts of military and local government officials.

Nonetheless, the administration’s peace initiative was lauded by a symphatetic press and the public at large, if only because it appeared to indicate an unexpected but welcome departure from Ramos’ previous hardline stance against negotiating with the armed rebel groups, particularly the NDF.

It has been generally understood that the Ramos government’s peace initiative and peace process consists of holding peace talks with the NDF, the MNLF and the military rebels, and arriving at the agreements that would lead to the resolution of the armed conflict.

It is also generally agreed that the bilateral talks with the NDF form the most crucial and substantial part of the peace negotiations. The armed conflict between the government and the NDF has persisted throughout the archipelago for more than two decades, with an intensity and scale that dwarfs the conflict between the government and the MNLF or the military rebels.

Tracing the history of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples Army-National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF) shows that the number of its armed cadres has increased considerably in so short a time since it was first formed. In 1969, there were only 88 guerillas, 192 young recruits and 140 combat supporters. In 1988, even government figures showed that the CPP-NPA had a total strength of 23,060 as of end-December (Armed Forces of the Philippines reports, 1989).

Moreover, it is the NDF that has presented by far the most comprehensive critique of Philippine society and proposed the national democratic programs as an alternative. It has mobilized hundreds of thousands Filipinos from a cross section of society but mostly from the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoise in the democratic struggle, and influenced millions more.

That the NDF has survived and even grown under the powerful attacks and the adverse conditions heaped upon it by both the Marcos martial rule and the Aquino administration, coupled by the AFP’s failure to deliver its claim of achieving the victory over the NPA year after year conclusively demonstrates the futility of using military might to defeat the movement. It underscores the need for the government to pursue other means of resolving the conflict, by going beyond a negotiated political settlement as a conductive atmosphere to address the structural causes of the armed conflict.

In its dealings with the NDF purportedly to enter into bilateral talks, events would show that the government has more than peace negotiations in mind when it speaks of the peace process. The NUC had preoccupied itself not much with the bilateral talks – rather it has extensively consulted with “all sectors concerned,” drawing up an amnesty and rehabilitation program independent and ahead of the negotiations, and even facilitating the surrender of rebel leaders despite an avowed policy not to negotiate with rebels on local levels.

T H E  P E A C E  P R O C E S S :  F A L T E R I N G ,  S T A L L I N G

The quest for genuine peace, notably when armed conflict is rooted in iniquitous social conditions, has never been easy endeavor. The Philippine struggle in particular is no exception.

While the government has repeatedly claimed the success in its initiatives and pictured the peace process as steadily and dramatically surging forward, real progress has been slow sporadic. In sum, we can describe the process as sometimes faltering, sometimes stalling. Perhaps, the only positive thing that can be said of the Ramos peace initiative is that it is still alive and continues to plod, albeit deceptively.

The most significant development does not lie in the fact that the armed hostilities with the MNLF and military rebels have ceased, even if temporarily, and formal peace talks between the GRP and the NDF, not to mention numerous historical precedents here and abroad, show that neither formal talks nor truce of any form guarantee the resolution of the armed conflict. Unfortunately, government measure the success of its policy by the degree it has neutralized and pacified the armed opposition, even to the extent of gloating, albeit prematurely, at how the peace initiative has disintegrated the communist insurgency.

With the genuine peace as the ultimate goal, real progress can only be measured in terms of how much closer the process has moved towards addressing the roots of the armed conflict, i.e. towards bringing about genuine, basic social change.

It can be said then, that the most significant step so far taken has been the NDF and GRP’s formal and official approval of the Joint Declaration signed in the Hague on September 1, 1992. Not only does it set the substantive agenda for formal talks, to wit:

“The substantive agenda of the formal peace negotiations shall include human rights and international humanitarian law, socio-economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms, end of hostilities and disposition of forces (underscoring supplied)

but it is also the objectives and modalities that might enhance their success.

With the Joint Declaration, the GRP and the NDF are placed in equal footing once negotiations are underway; furthermore, there is a positive recognition that it is only by the addressing the basic social, political, and economic problems that the armed conflict can be resolved.

Its objective goes beyond a conclusion of hostilities, amplifying the focus for the negotiations on trying to achieve a just and lasting peace, with no preconditions whatsoever.

A marked deviation from the old GRP framework is the provision declaring that negotiations should be held “in accordance with mutually acceptable principles (underscoring supplied), including national sovereignty, democracy, and social justice and no preconditions shall be made to negate the inherent character and purpose of the peace negotiation.” The Joint Declaration finally puts into agreement the above-mentioned principles as a common foundation on which the talks can be based.

While the agreement was forged only during the first round of exploratory talks, it far surpasses whatever was achieved in the 1986-87 talks, providing greater guarantees that the substantive agenda, the raison d’ etre for the talks, shall be given due importance and attention.

If there appeared to be little progress with respect to the peace negotiations between the GRP and the NDF for the entire year following the signing of Hague Joint Declaration, it was because the GRP, mainly through the NUC, hedged and hawed in negotiating in accordance with the provisions of the Joint Declaration.

The GRP approved the Joint Declaration subject to proposed refinements to the substantive agenda (underscoring supplied), but the ambiguity of the proposed refinements require another round of talks for clarification. GRP then set a precondition to any further talks by insisting that these be held in a local venue. It went on to delineate a peace process that would supposedly address the roots of the armed conflict, conveniently limiting these roots to age-old, innocuously-phrased issues as poverty, inequity, injustice and poor government, completely ignoring more fundamental issues such as the absence of economic sovereignty and the agrarian problem. Worse, the AFP continued its military offensives against NDF areas and predicted a military victory over the NPA by the end of 1993.

By August 1993, the GRP proposed that the next round talks be held in Vietnam. On September 15, Congressman Jose Yap of the GRP negotiating panel held preliminary talks with the NDF’s Luis Jalandoni and Jose Ma. Sison to discuss the possibility of holding talks in Vietnam. On the same day, President Ramos signed Executive Order (E.O.) 125 – “Defending the Approach and Administration Structure for Government’s Comprehensive Peace Efforts.”

E.O. 125 unilaterally delineates a “comprehensive peace process” and stresses that this process, including the negotiations, shall be approached and pursued within the context of the Philippine Constitution. The NDF charge that the E.O. 125, the GRP was once again imposing the Philippine Constitution as framework for the talks, a condition the NDF had rejected at the outset because it negates the inherent character of the negotiations. (The Joint Declaration provision that the talks be held on the basis of mutually acceptable principles was precisely a safeguard against this imposition.) While the GRP denies this, the NDF insists on the withdrawal of E.O. 125 as guarantee that the second round of exploratory talks shall be held in accordance with the Joint Declaration.

Furthermore, the said E.O. also outlines that “ a comprehensive peace process should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos” and that “it shall be defined not by the Government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community” as one of its underlying principles. The NDF likewise assails this because it believes that whatever is agreed upon would have to be subjected to the subterfuge of a plebiscite, thereby exposing the process to the danger of manipulation. In short, the NDF believes this may be another insidious attempt to situate the talks within the Constitution, a condition the NDF has already rejected.

It is significant to note that the GRP and the military rebels did not experience any such difficulty in proceeding with the formal talks, since the Memorandum of Agreement signed by both parties as early as December 23, 1992 specifically provided that the Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa-Young Officers’ Union renounce the use of violence in pursuit of their political goals and that the talks be held within the context of the Philippine Constitution. Similarly, the MNLF, in the tripoli Agreement, recognize the sovereignty of the Philippine government.

But even with ceasefires and formal talks officially in progress between the GRP and the MNLF and military rebels, little progress if any has been made on the substantive agenda of their talks. Thus, there has been no significant movement towards the attainment of a genuine and lasting peace even with respect to the basic problems raised by the Moro people and the military rebels. Instead, there is an increasing and marked impatience over the government’s dillydallying over substantive issues, and a growing suspicion that the government is not sincere in discussing, much less addresssing, the roots of the armed conflict.

The NUC, reportedly upon direct instructions of President Ramos, even deliberately slowed down the talks in anticipation of the so called “big split” in the CPP and NDF.

Despite the slow and erratic progress, or more accuretely, in the peace negotiations, a lot has been gained towards informing the people and generating greater interest and concern on the peace issue. Or more appropriately, on the issues behind the armed conflict, and the necessary structural changes that would lead to genuine peace. People’s organizations, alliances, and NGOs have joined the ranks of peace advocates and have significantly intervened in the peace process: studying the issues from a broader and deeper perspective, taking informed and studied positions, and generally making their voices heard and their numbers count.

Contrary to the Constitutional policy of transparency in government, President Ramos has withheld the NUC’s full report from the people for still unclear reasons. But its main components and thrusts have been announced, and the entire trajectory of the peace program is clearly discernible from Ramos’ policies and actions.

The important questions are:

Will the Ramos Peace Program lead to a just and genuine peace?

Or will it be a mere pacification program that will attempt to subdue the armed challenges to the State but fail to bring peace in the long run?

Has the Ramos government discarded the worn framework of cooptation and surrender, or has it merely repackaged this into a more deceptive, if not attractive and sophisticated peace program?

T H E R A M O S P E A C E P R O G R A M U N F O L D S

Philippines 2000: Formula for Peace and Development?

The peace program which the Ramos administration is attempting to carry out is best seen in the light of its overall program of government.

This overall program has been articulated as Philippines 2000, the Ramos vision and strategy for peace and development.

It calls for the restoration of political and civic stability as the first requisite for “putting the house in order” before the development agenda could be carried out. The two other requisites are “opening up the economy” by dismantling monopolies and cartels, and addressing the problems of graft and corruption. (Ramos, Inaugural speech, 30 June 30 1992; SON address, 26 July 1993; Almonte “Notes on the Armed Challenges….” January 1993, and “Philippines 2000: Vision or Illusion?” 16 July 1993)

Viewed in this context, the peace strategy, encapsulized, consists first of a series of measures to lower the level of fighting and neutralized and pacify the armed rebel movements in the short run. Thus is attained a certain level of political stability that allows the economic development plan to be set into motion, alongside social and political reforms.

Philippines 2000 – a promise of NIC-hood as measured and exemplified by a $1000 per-capita income and growth rate of 7% – is not only the Ramos government’s avowed strategy for development. Its ostensible objective is to institute social and political reforms, an objective which cannot be gainsaid to be laudable on paper. For who can argue with a noble program having for its objectives, for instance, the dismantling of cartels and monopolies and the eradication of graft and corruption in government?

However, to ensure the attainment of NIC-hood, Philippines 2000 embraces two main characteristics which puts to doubt and serious contraindication the main goal of attaining an improved quality of life for all the Filipinos: that the economy will be foreign investments-led and aid-dependent. The equation LIC+NUC = NIC becomes apparent as the framework of this much-ballyhooed program. In short, to guarantee the attainment of a newly-industrialized country, the peace and order situation must be assuring for foreign investments and the extension is aid. In order to achieve this situation, the elements of low-intensity conflict and attraction of amnesty is wielded as the carrot and stick solution.

Seen in this light, Philippines 2000 appears to be a cleverly-disguised vehicle for further coopting and neutralizing the armed movements opposing the state. The promise of dismantling cartels and monopolies, wiping out graft and corruption in government, and finally alleviating poverty – reminiscent of Marcos’ crusade in the early years of his rule – has already been hailed as President Ramos’ program for addressing the roots of the armed conflict (Almonte, 1 July 1993).

Aside from leveling the economic playing field, political reforms ostensibly to level the political playing field as well, will be dangled to lure rebel leaders into abandoning the armed struggle and carrying their struggle to the parliamentary arena. Along with an amnesty and rehabilitation program that is pursued outside the frame of negotiations, this is expected to drive the wedge deeper between the so-called moderates and the hardline leadership of the revolutionary movement. The aim is to isolate the latter and render it politically irrelevant and military vulnerable (Almonte, January 1993; 1& 10 July 1993).

The efficacy of the initial neutralization and pacification measures depends only on the credibility and attractiveness of Philippines 2000. But the ultimate success of the peace program, even from the government’s viewpoint, hinges on its actual implementation and outcome.

A critique of Philippines 2000 belongs to another paper. Whether or not it could even take off the ground is still debatable. Even granting that the government gets the resources – estimated by government at around P690 billion – and the momentum to launch it, Philippines 2000 is bound to get caught in its own web of contradictions.

For one, it counts heavily on the goodwill and civic spirit of the very elite it claims – or pretends – to threaten.

As Almonte puts it, Philippines 2000 seeks to “conscienticize the rich.” It claims to establish and uphold free enterprise, as though monopolies and cartels were not the enivitable products of such an open system.

For another, it imposes additional sacrifices from those it claims would be the eventual beneficiaries – the people. Despite all the cosmetics and repackaging, the formula is much too worn-out to escape recognition. It is the same old promises: sacrifice, civic spirit, etc. for progress.

The government is faced with the formidable task of convincing the people to shoulder the cost and sacrifice and is preoccupied on how to handle the social forces that will oppose its programs. The marginalized population stands to suffer more because Philippines 2000 maintains the same old state of affairs: inconsistent economic policies will remain, e.g wanton land conversion, regressive tax system, preferential treatment to foreign investors. Mang Pandoy can only ask, how can there be redistribution of wealth when there is no redistribution of pain?

But a serious flaw of Philippines 2000 lies in its blind spot insofar as foreign domination of the economy is concerned. Even as it cites the experiences of the new Asian tigers, it conveniently over looks and omits these NICs’ defiance and rejection of International Monetary Fund-World Bank (IMF-WB) impositions in charting their development course.

It is the same flaw in the NUC-Ramos peace program. Foreign domination of the economy is not singled out as one of the major roots of the armed conflict. Thus, sovereignty and freedom are taken for granted rather than identified as requisites for genuine peace.

Neutralization and Pacification

Peace signifies not simply the absence of war and conflict, but also eradication of the structures which divest individuals of their full human potential. We are looking for a sign that peace looms in the horizon. Could this be realized in the Ramos peace program?

The Ramos peace initiative, eventually taking on more definite form as NUC’s proposed amnesty and peace program basically has the following components:

1. Social, economic and political reforms;
2. Consensus-building and empowerment for peace;
3. Peaceful negotiated settlement with the different rebel groups;
4. Reconciliation, reintegration and rehabilitation;
5. Address concerns arising from armed hostilities; and
6. Build and nurture a climate conductive to peace.

An initial perusal of the said components would indicate that the peace initiative can be reduced into a strange combination of the following characteristics:

1. Amnesty and rehabilitation program;
2. Community-based consultations and peace constituency;
3. Continuing negotiations with the rebel groups;
4. Continuing military operations; and
5. Socio-economic and political reforms.

A deeper analysis, however would uncover graver flaws.

The Ramos peace program actually embarks on the following in order to implement its peace program;

1. Pursue an immediate pacification or neutralization of rebels by sugar-coating surrender campaigns under an amnesty and rehabilitation program, an offer of peace talks even to extent of going through the motions of negotiation, an invitation/challenge to compete in the preliminary arena, and a promise of constitutional and electoral reforms to even up the playing field.
2. Build the so-called nationwide community-based peace constituencies as base of support for the government peace program which is similar, if not a reactivation of Cory Aquino’s Peace and Order Councils or POCs. These peace constituents will be tasked to generate people’s vision and sentiments on peace favorable to or in accordance with government’s vision and program, particularly as a component of the third stage of consolidation under the Total Approach Strategy.
3. An immediate, superficial political stability that is provisionally achieved will allow the implementation of the economic measures under Philippines 2000; in particular, incurring additional foreign loans and enticing foreign investments into the country. This will further fuel the programs under the Medium Term Development Plan. The government will undertake, as it has been long doing, to project the Philippines 2000 as the solution to poverty and inequity, therefore as the means to addressing the roots of the conflict. The Ramos government wagers that once the Philippines 2000 is in place and picks up, coupled with countryside development programs especially in critical areas, insurgency will further lose adherents and insurgents will become politically irrelevant.
4. Pursue and intensify the Total War Policy to maintain pressure and ensure the elimination of the armed insurgents, dismantle the political and military infrastructure of the CPP-NPA whenever the opportunity arises; the total war policy was conceived not only to achieve the above but also to protect the interests and maintain the support of landlords, loggers, big business, and other members of the ruling elite.
5. Maximize the ongoing debate among the CPP-NDF members on strategy and tactics to further divide their ranks. To gain strategic victory, the government may sabotage the efforts of the CPP to consolidate its ranks through intensified psychological warfare and intelligence work. This in effect will drive the wedge deeper, sow intrigues, foment disunity and abet demoralization. Cooptation and promise of reforms will further isolate the hardliners.
6. If all these prove to be successful in implementation, all these will lead to the continuing demoralization and surrender of cadres and rank and file members of the CPP-NPA-NDF, the loss of support/sympathy for the CPP-NPA-NDF from the people, and the isolation of its hardcore leadership from a large section of the organization – rank and file and moderates – that may be attracted to peaceful reforms. Oplan Lambat-Bitag can be pursued to its conclusion with minimal opposition.

Particular Measures

1. The National Unification Commission. The government formed a nine-person NUC as a government body tasked to implement and supervise government’s peace initiatives and recommend to the President a peace program and an appropriate amnesty program after consultations with all concerned sectors.

   a.   Composition of the NUC – the NUC was a combination of highly credible and respected personalities, known peace and human rights advocates on one hand, (Commission on Elections Chairperson Haydee Yorac, Senator Wigberto Tañada, Bishop Fernando Capalla, and Protestant leader Feliciano Cariño) with the President’s trusted aides, mostly former close military aides (Defense Secretary Renato de Villa, General Eduardo Ermita, and Senator Rodolfo Biazon), plus an emissiary to the NDF (Representative Jose Yap) and a legal bureaucrat (Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon) on the other.

   De Villa played a dominant role in the NUC; he practically; spoke for the President in the NUC, but maintained a relatively low profile and the public. This was in turn camouflaged by the high-profile stance of Yorac, Yap, Biazon, Drillon, Cariño and Capalla.

   Only Senator Tañada and Congressman Yap had, in some instances, expressed views and taken positions contrary to the government line and framework, but because of this they were marginalized in the NUC.

   The composition of the NUC purports a democratic process taking shape considering the variance in the political backgrounds of the members. However, despite the difference in political backgrounds, not to mention the fact that several have a common military background, all NUC members have no choice but to work within the constraints of the existing government policy.

   b.   The occasional NUC supra-government stance created an illusion of independence, but in truth, taking all events into consideration, the NUC never really took a position contrary to the old government framework.

   c.   The NUC facilitated and/or stalled negotiations with armed groups. The facilitation or stalling depended largely on whether the had gained headway in coopting the other party to enter the 1987 Philippine Constitution frame, and whether propaganda points could be gained by the government.

   One motive behind GRP’s insistence to put the bilateral talks within the frame of the GRP Constitution is that the Hague Joint Declaration is seen as a concrete recognition on the part of the government of the international stature of the Philippine armed conflict. A belligerency status is forthcoming from the international community so the GRP has tried to downgrade the efficacy of the Hague Joint Declaration by forcing the issue of putting the talks within the context of the Constitution.

   On the other hand, the talks with military rebels are pushing through because to begin with, there is no disagreement on the Constitutional frame; it even becomes easier because the military rebels are willing to renounce the use of violence, enter into the parliamentary arena, and recognize the AFP as the sole legitimate armed force.

   d.   The NUC recommended a peace program that is basically a blueprint for surrender, cooptation, and token reforms that will preserve the status quo rather than address the real roots of the armed conflict. Reliable sources report that De Villa and company have been reported to have railroaded certain important provisions in the final NUC report, including those dealing with the conduct of the war and disposition of forces. This information puts into further doubt GRP’s sincerity in pursuing a genuine peace proram.

2. Attract rebels. GRP has embarked on an all-out thrust of attracting rebel-mainly those still in the field or in the underground. It is not likely, however that political detainees may also be a tempting target. The process involves offers of amnesty and rehabilitation, and a rosy prospect of participation in the parliamentary arena.

   a.   Surrender, surface/safe conduct—-The surrender contemplated here is not necessarily surrender with honor or dignity but rather a surrender that would play on the battle fatigue or demoralization of the rebels; however way the surrender would be premised, the financial package and benefits (which includes cash awards such as cash-for-arms. Reward money given to surrenderees, and livelihood programs) shall definitely accompany each surrender.

   b.   Surrender with “honor and dignity”—- This surrender would project the viability of continuing their struggle through parliamentary means. The Government has ostensively cleared the way for the rebels to return to the fold by repealing the Anti-Subersion Law (RA 1700), a repressive law of Marcos descent which was made especially handy during the Aquino Administration. The GRP tries to bait the rebels by promising Constitutional amendments that would address the root causes of the armed conflict, particularly political and electoral reforms to even up the playing field and delegate to Congress the task of amending the Constitution to institute reforms. Congress is therefore expected to make amendments that will appear to be far-reaching and basic reforms, but in truth these reforms will itself perpetuate the very system which convinced the cadres to resort to armed struggle in the first place.

   c.   Surrenders of prominent national and loose personalities in the revolutionary underground such as Hector Mabilangan are given big publicity. This publicity is meant to picture the revolutionary movement as a fast depleting force. It is not far-fetched however that the so-called prominent personalities in the underground movement are in fact deep penetration agents of the government posing as revolutionaries.

   It has been observed that there seems to be an unrsolved issue as to whether amnesty should be general, unconditional or selective (the main proponent of which is the Department of National Defense); but there is a general agreement that amnesty should be offered regardless or independent of the negotiations with armed groups.

3. Pursue bilaterals talks but “canalize” and limit these to talks within the framework of the RP Constitution. In response to the consistent refusal of the NDF to be situated within the framework of the Constitution, and realizing further that GRP’s propaganda points have become scarce, the NUC eventually tended to downgrade the provisions of the Hague Joint Declaration. Their constant pronouncements of sincerity could not conceal the real purpose as unmistakably reflected in their actuations, to wit:
   • The GRP insisted on a local venue for the formal talks. Their insistence on a local venue was to emphasize and project that the insurgency problem was internal in nature. If successful, they could effectively deprive foreign sovereigns a consequential basis for recognizing the NDF as a belligerent.
   • The GRP reformulated the substantive agenda of the peace talks to downplay the NDF proposed substantive agenda; it also used consultations to water down the roots of the armed conflict which they have for so long refused to address.
   • The GRP engaged in hard selling the option of reforms and agreements within the frame of RP Constitution, especially in the form of immediate “doables.”

   It can be said further that the GRP had consciously embarked on a deliberate and systematic misrepresentation and distortion of facts regarding the ongoing negotiations. This campaign helps project the GRP as an entity clothed with reasonableness and with an undersigning interest in holding the talks while projecting the exact opposite and discrediting all sincere efforts insofar as the NDF is concerned.

4. Build a community-based constituency and generate a mass-based and community-based support for the government’s peace program.
   a.    The peace constituency is patterned after, and is in fact basically a continuation of, the Peace and Order Council concept. The community-based peace constituency becomes the third leg of the POC with the local government and the military comprising the two other legs. A sound appreciation of this pattern can be made if we could recall the POCs’ relevance to the Total War Policy.
   As backgrounder, the Total War Policy or Strategy implemented during and after the Aquino administration, consists of four phases or stages, which are (1) Clearing (2) Hold and Defend (3) Consolidation and (4) Development. POCs were utilized to assist in the last three stages of the Total War Strategy. In fact, during the last round of peace talks, POCs became visible and conducted localized peace talks with the armed groups in the regions. Their aim was to divide the armed movement and draw the rebels back into the mainstream, promising a new life under a cooperative system, and a financially rewarding livelihood program.
   b.    The NUC consultations were ostensibly meant to:

   •  generate inputs from all sectors of society, for the formulation of a peace program;

   •  generate awareness and interest among all the citizenry, whether organized or not, in the issue of peace;

   •  mobilize the citizenry’s active support for and participation in the peace process, in both the formulation and the implementation of a peace program…

   The NUC consultations were held principally to serve a counter-insurgency function. The NUC maneuvered and geared consultations to reflect ultimately the government’s principles, premises and design, relegating and in fact downplaying the NDF alternatives for a genuine and lasting peace.

   c.    The roots of conflict were watered down to issues on poverty, inequity, injustice, graft and corruption, totally ignoring and muddling the basic issues raised by national formations, people’s organizations, and NGOs such as land reform, national sovereignty, nationalist industrialization, debt repudiation and IMF-WB impositions.
   d.    The Peace Consultations were availed by the government as a pretext to open talks with and offer safe-conduct passes to local cadres. This practice is in direct contravention of the spirit and letter of the Hague Joint Declaration, thereby downgrading and sabotaging the bilateral talks at the national level. When the NUC claims that no talks are being held with the local leaders, it is clearly engaging in falsehood. In the meantime, it seeks out and offers safe-conduct-passes to local readers who may want to participate in the consultations.

5. Continue military operations. As universally understood, government military operations are meant to protect our democratic ways and preserve our gains; sadly however, the military operations are meant to:
   a.   Maintain pressure on the CPP-NPA-NDF and dismantle its political and military infrastructure without seriously seeking to resolve the root causes of the armed conflict. It appears the government has not learned well from the history of the Philippines armed movement; with the death of one cadre, more are sure to take his place. The cycle can only be broken once government comes into terms and faces head-on the root causes of the armed struggle.
   b.   Protect the interests of the ruling elite. This explains why logging operations closely follow military operations and why CAFGUs are being subsidized by the landlords, as have been observed in the Negros islands.
   c.   Terrorize the broad masses of the people and keep them from joining, much less supporting, the revolutionary movement.
   d.   Implement Oplan Lambat-Bitag III: conduct general military offensives and achieve strategic military victory over the CPP-NPA.

 

1. Economic Development Program. The government shall embark on a national economic program and implement local development programs having as its apparent objectives, the “alleviation of poverty’, “eradication of graft and corruption”, “bringing government services to the people,” and many other “development” programs emphasizing the people’s interest in all cases. This is nothing but the implementation of the development phase of Oplan Lambat-Bitag. In actuality:The Meduim-term Development Plan of Philippines 2000 does not offer new strategies for growth and development; great emphasis and great faith is placed on the private sector and promises an even playing field as though big business will not exercise control to their own benefit.
   MTDP and Philippines 2000 do not address the problems of land reform, debt management, financing, etc. but instead relies heavily on foreign investments and external aid.
   The management of finances focuses more on pouring millions of pesos into identified critical areas in the name of development. These critical areas are the areas so identified by the military which demand infusion of resources to support the counter-insurgency program.

Conclusions

The Ramos Peace Program, as designed and currently being carried out, cannot lead to a lasting, just and geuine peace. It fails to identify the true root causes of the armed conflict and therefore will be unable to address these root cases.

Instead of a blueprint for basic structural reforms to remove the roots of rebellion, it is a hodgepodge of token reforms and palliatives that will only tend to perpetuate the unjust social system and in the long run aggravate the conditions of the exploited and oppressed.

Rather than pursue a negotiated settlement with the armed opposition, especially with the NDF, the Ramos Peace Program offers an amnesty and rehabilitation program which is nothing more than a charade of cooptation and surrender. And to entice the more principled who would not give up their arms in exchange for mere personal benefit, electoral reforms are promised to even up the playing field and draw the rebels into the parliamentary theatre.

The Ramos Peace Program has not departed from the old GRP framework of seeking peace by cooptation and surrender of the rebel groups, especially the NDF. It continues to insist on working exclusively within the context of the Philippine Constitution.

“The ultimate aim,” Pres. Ramos said, :is for legal and constitutional processes to prevail…” The ultimate objective is to stamp out rebellion and achieve political stability.

Recommendations

There is only one criterion for making recommendations—- that these should be departures from past policies which have proven to be failures.

The criterion for alternatives must be progressive, in the sense that these are improvements of existing policies and are characterized by substantial changes. The alternatives may also be described to an extent as radical (from the root word radix, meaning roots), since they attempt not only to cure the symptoms, but to get to the roots of the problem.

In this light, we venture then to advance the following initial recommendations:

1. The people must actively intervene in the peace process. People’s organizations, NGOs, and concerned individuals should underscore the basic issues and the real roots of the armed conflict that need to be addressed in order to bring about genuine and lasting peace.
2. The Government should pursue bilateral talks with the NDF in earnest and immediately and sincerely work for a negotiated political settlement based on the agreement outlined in the Hague Joint Declaration.
3. The offer of amnesty and the eventual disposition of forces should be pursued in the context of a negotiated political settlement and not as a mere subterfuge to coopt the elements of the armed struggle and decapitate its ranks through surrender.
4. The Government should adopt goodwill measures and build a favorable climate for the peace process such as the release of political prisoners and the halting of their total war against the people. The NDF should also release their prisoners of war as a counterpart goodwill measure.
5. The Government should respect the revolutionary integrity of the NDF and should therefore desist from exploiting their internal problems by sowing dissension and bloody intrigues; they should also desist from engaging in localized talks and from granting so-called amnesty and rehabilitation programs outside of the substantive agenda of the bilateral talks.
6. The Government should revoke Executive Order 125. It should realize that EO 125 is an elemental obstruction to the process.
7. The Government should not be over-cautious over the belligerency status of the NDF. It should adopt a uniform norm or standard with respect to the issue of belligerency in dealing with all revolutionary forces.

 

A P P E N D I X

HAGUE JOINT DECLARATION

We, the undersigned emissary of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the undersigned representative of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) have held exploratory talks at the Hague, the Netherlands on August 31- September 1, 1992 and have agreed tp recommend to our respective principals the following:

1.   Formal peace negotiations between the GRP and the NDF shall be held to resolve the armed conflict.
2.   The common goal of the aforesaid negotiations shall be the attainment of a just and lasting peace.
3.   Such negotiations shall take place the parties have reached tentative agreements on substantive issues in the agreed agenda through the reciprocal working committees to be separately organized by the GRP and the NDF.
4.   The holding of peace negotiations must be in accordance with mutually acceptable principles, including national sovereignty, democracy and social justice, and no precondition shall be made to negate the inherent character and purpose of the peace negotiations.
5.   Preparatory to the formal peace negotiations, we have agreed to recommend the following:

a. Specific measures of goodwill and confidence-building to create a favorable climate for peace negotiations; and

b. The substantive agenda of the formal peace negotiations shall include human rights and international humanitarian law, socio-economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms, end of hostilities and disposition of forces.

Signed on September 1, 1992 at The Hague, The Netherlands.

Rep. JOSE V. YAP                                                                                                                               LUIS JALANDONI
Emissary                                                                                                                                              Representative

WITNESSES:

Rep. Eric D. Singson                                                                                                                          Coni Ledesma

Teresita de Castro                                                                                                                             Byron Bocar
State Counsel

                                                                                      Jose Maria Sison

ROMEO T.CAPULONG
Ad Litem Judge
International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia

(Presented at the Forum to Commemorate International Humanitarian Law Day, August 16, 2001 held at Carlos P. Garcia Conference Hall, Department of Foreign Affairs)

It is not very well known that on September 1, 1992 the two parties in the GRP-NDFP Peace Negotiations made a breakthrough in their talks in the landmark document called The Hague Joint Declaration by including in their substantive agenda international humanitarian law. Six years later, after painstaking efforts, the two parties achieved a more significant breakthrough by forging an accord known as the 1998 Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian (CARHRIHL), a bilateral agreement that was signed by the two Negotiating Panels and approved by their respective principals, namely, the Chairman of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines and the President of the Republic of the Philippines.

To be candid, CARHRIHL, as the agreement is now popularly known among peace advocates, has sparked controversies and debates among the legal experts of the GRP. As a consequence, it remains a frozen instrument despite its strong merits and relevance. As a human rights lawyer and now a member of a UN bench, and one who actively participated in the discussions and crafting of CARHRIHL, I have my partisan views about the legal merits and the moral and humanitarian bases for advocating that it be immediately implemented even while the two parties in the armed conflict continue to discuss and agree on the political, social and economic agenda of the peace negotiations. But that is not my piece in this program. I mentioned CARHRIHL to highlight the fact that today, IHL is beginning to be recognized as a necessary part of our legal system that may soon hopefully evolve also as part of our national consciousness.

Not so long ago, the mere mention of International Humanitarian Law evoked such comments as “humanizing the conduct of war” and, therefore, legitimizing it as a means to effect societal reforms or giving legal recognition to violence as a permanent feature of our national life——indeed, an unacceptable if not a dreadful position if we follow this line of reasoning. Some legal experts from the government side even went further by arguing in the negotiating table that any agreement on International Humanitarian Law between the parties in the armed conflict automatically vests the status of a co-belligerent to the revolutionary movement. I take it that today’s topic of our forum—- National Legislation on International Humanitarian Law—– will finally lay to rest all these illogical, erroneous and anachronistic views about IHL. More significantly, today’s forum shows that there is now a growing awareness by many sectors of our society, including the government, that unredressed social inequities and unjust economic structures will continue to breed both political and armed conflicts. And finally, contemporary events in other parts of the world and our own historical experience especially under the Marcos dictatorship have highlighted the imperative of effective means, mechanisms and sanctions to implement International Humanitarian Law.

I mentioned CARHRIHL as the starting point of my brief presentation. As a part of government initiative akin to national legislation, I propose that the present administration take the appropriate steps to implement CARHRIHL by forming jointly with the NDFP the Joint Monitoring Committee in accordance with Part V of the said agreement.

CARHRIHL is a rich and vibrant document, being the product of the joint effort not only of the peace negotiators and experts on both sides but also the top leaders and policy-makers of the parties to the three-and-a-half decade-long armed conflict. As such, it addresses problems and violations particular to the Philippine situation and concretely experienced or suffered by innocent civilians and non-combatants. Let me cite some significant provisions of CARHRIHL.

“The Parties shall promote and carry out campaigns of education on international humanitarian law, especially among the people involved in the armed conflict and in areas affected by such conflict”. (Article 14)

“The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the persons enumerated in the preceding Article 2:

practices that cause or allow the forcible evacuations or forcible reconcentration of civilians, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand;the emergence and increase of internally displaced families and communities, and the destruction of the lives and property of the civilian population;

“maintaining, supporting and tolerating paramilitary groups such as armed religious fanatical groups, vigilante groups, private armed groups of businessmen, landlords and politicians, and private security agencies which are being used in land and labor disputes and the incursions in Article 9, Part III of this Agreement”. (Article 3)

“The GRP shall review and undertake to change policies, laws, programs, campaigns and practices that cause or allow the forcible evacuation and reconcentration of civilians, the emergence and increase of internally displaced families and communities and the destruction of the lives and property of the civilian population”. (Article 7)

“Internally displaced families and communities shall have the right to return to their places of abode and livelihood, to demand all possible assistance necessary to restore them to their normal lives and to be indemnified for damages suffered due to injuries and loss of lives”. (Article 9)

Substantively, I only have a few simple but significant suggestions on the essential requirements of an effective National Legislation on IHL. And in making these suggestions I must confess partiality to CARHRIHL whose significant provisions may be similar to my own ideas.

First, the national law on IHL should take into account the current human rights situation in the Philippines and the historical experience of the Filipino people. In this way, the national legislation on IHL will be based on realities and not a mere theoretical formulation existing in a vacuum.

Second, the national law should be able to render justice to all victims of violations of IHL, address problems of impunity and provide adequate compensation to the victims.

Third, the legislation must provide for effective mechanisms for implementation and adequate measures for upholding and promoting International Humanitarian Law.

Fourth, while sanctions are important deterrence and an essential component of justice, I submit that education on IHL for combatants of both parties and the general public should be given priority consideration.

And lastly, but most important of all: government should vigorously address the roots of the armed conflict, take all necessary measures to remove the conditions that breed IHL violations and lay the ground for a just and lasting peace.

I. Istorikal na Pagbalik-tanaw

Mahigit tatlumpung taon nang umiiral sa ating bayan ang digmaang sibil. Noong 1968-69, halos magkasabay na nagdeklara ang Communist Party of the Philippines- New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) at ang Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) ng mga armadong paghamon sa kapangyarihan ng Gobyerno ng Republika ng Pilipinas (GRP). Noong 1972, ginamit ni Marcos ang diumanong “rebelyon mula sa Kaliwa at sa Kanan” bilang dahilan o katwiran para sa pagdeklara ng batas militar. Pero sa katunayan, ipinataw ni Marcos ang pasistang diktadurang pahahari para panatilihin ang sarili sa kapangyarihan at supilin ang protesta at paglaban ng mamayan para sa kanilang kapakanan at mga karapatan.

Hindi nagawa ng buong lakas ng estado maging sa rurok ng lakas ng diktadura na supilin ang paglaban ng mamamayan. Bagkus, ang panunupil ng estado ay tinugunan ng mamamayan ng mas matibay at mas malakas na paglaban. At sapagkat inianak ng diktadura ang higit pang pagkatuta sa dayuang interes, mga katiwalian at korupsyon sa gobyerno, at pang-aabuso ng mga pasistang militar, higit pang tumindi ang pagsasamantala at pang-aapi sa mamamayan. Ang hindi na mabatang pagsasamantala at pang-aapi ang nagtulak sa parami nang paraming mamamayan na tumutol at lumaban, kapwa sa armado at di-armadong mga paraan.

Kapwa lumakas, lumaki, lumaganap at tumindi ang pakikipaglaban ng CPP-NPA-NDF at ng Bangsa Moro sa Gobyerno ng Republika ng Pilipinas. Kaalinsabay, ang pagtindi ng krisis at ang kasakiman ng mga naghaharing paksyon ng mga reaksyunaryo ang nagpalalim at nagpalaki sa bitak sa hanay ng mga naghaharing uri. Hanggang namuo ang makapangyarihang anti-pasistang daluyong na nagpabagsak sa diktadurang Marcos.

Sa ilalim ng humaliling administrasyong Aquino, idinaos noong Disyembre 1986-Enero 1987, sa kauna-unahang pagkakataon, ang negosasyong pangkapayapaan sa pagitan ng gobyerno (GRP) at ng National Democratic Front (NDF). Pero nabahura ito sa pag-uusap hinggil sa mga teknikalidad ng seguridad at tigil-putukan. Kagyat itong gumuho matapos ang Mendiola Massacre ng Enero 22 kung saan 27 magbubukid ang napatay nang pagbabarilin ng mga tropa ng gobyerno ang mga magsasakang mapayapang nagpapahayag ng kanilang lehitimong mga hinaing at kahilingan sa harap ng Malacanang.

Noong 1990, nagmungkahi ang NDF na muling buksan ang negosasyong pangkapayapaan, subalit hinadlangan ito ng mga militarista sa gobyerno sa pangunguna ni Hen Fidel V. Ramos, na naggiit na dapat munang magkaroon ng tigil-putukan at magsalong ng mga sandata ang mga NPA bago muling buksan ang negosasyong pangkapayapaan.

Kaya’t maraming nagulat nang ihayag ni Ramos, sa kanyang Inaugural Address matapos mahalal na Pangulo noong 1992, ang patakarang itulak ang negosasyong pangkapayapaan sa mga armadong grupong lumalaban sa gobyerno, kabilang ang NDF, ang MNLF at MILF, at ang RAM-SFP-YOU. Nagbunga ito ng kagyat na kasunduan sa pagitan ng GRP at RAM noong Disyembre 1992, at ang Kasunduan sa pagitan ng GRP at MNLF noong 1996. Itong huli ang nagbunsod ng pagkakabuo sa ilalim ng GRP ng SPCPD sa pamumuno ni Nur Misuari, ang pinuno ng MNLF.

Hindi kataka-taka ni kagulat-gulat ang kasunduang GRP-RAM-SFP-YOU. Mula’t mula’y kinikilala at nagpapailim ang mga rebeldeng militar sa Konstitusyon ng Republika ng Pilipinas at sa prinsipyong ang AFP ang tanging lehitimong armadong pwersa.

Hindi rin kataka-taka ang kasunduan sa pagitan ng GRP at MNLF dahil noong 1974 pa lamang, tinanggap na ng MNLF ang tagubilin ng OIC na dapat lutasin ang sigalot sa Mindanao sa balangkas ng Konstitusyon at mga batas ng GRP. Sa Kasunduang Tripoli ng 1976, pumayag ang MNLF na ipatupad ang “pang-rehiyong awtonomiya” sa balangkas ng Konstitusyon ng GRP, na taliwas sa dating ipinaglalaban nitong isang Bangsa Moro na malaya at hiwalay sa Republika ng Pilipinas. Hindi ito naging katanggap-tanggap sa isang bahagi ng MNLF sa pamumuno ni Hashim Salamat. Paglaon, noong 1984, humiwalay sa MNLF ang bahaging ito at itinayo ang Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Kung ikukumpara sa negosasyon ng GRP sa RAM at MNLF, higit na naging mabagal, atras-abante at masalimuot ang negosasyong GRP-NDF. Noong 1992, inihayag ang “The Hague Joint Declaration” sa pagitan ng GRP at NDF na nagtatakda ng layunin, balangkas, mga pamamaraan at substantibong agenda ng usapang pangkapayapaan sa pagitan ng dalawang panig.

Malinaw na isinaad sa Deklarasyon na pangunahin at ultimong layunin ng negosasyon ang resolusyon ng armadong labanan sa pamamagitan ng pagharap at paglutas sa mga ugat nito. (Note: in contrast, tinangkang igiit ng GRP bilang ultimong layunin ang “paglutas o pagharap sa mga ugat ng armadong labanan sa pamamagitan ng mapayapang paraan.”)

Inilinaw rin na ang balangkas ng negosasyon ay ang mga prinsipyong katatanggap-tanggap sa dalawang panig tulad ng demokrasya, pambansang soberanya at katarungang panlipunan. Ibig sabihin, hindi ipapataw ng alinmang panig ang sarili nitong Konstitusyon at mga batas sa kabilang panig. Nangangahulugan din itong hindi dapat magkaroon ng mga paunang kundisyong taliwas sa likas na katangian ng negosasyon kung saan magkapantay at magkatimbang ang dalawang panig. (cf GRP framework: GRP Constitution and legal processes)

Bagamat mabagal at masalimuot ang proseso, nakamit ng GRP at NDF ang ilan pang mahahalagang kasunduan sa mga pamamaraan (o tinatatawag na “modalities”) ng negosasyon. Tampok dito ang JASIG, ang Ground Rules of the Formal Meetings, at ang Formation, Sequence and Operationalization of the RWCs. Nagsimula ang Pormal na Usapan noong Hunyo 1995, bagamat noong Hulyo 1996 na lamang nagsimula ang aktwal na usapan hinggil sa unang substantibong agenda, ang paggalang sa Karapatang pantao at sa Internasyunal na Batas Pantao (International Humanitarian Law).

Matapos ang halos dalawang taon na negosasyon, nilagdaan ng dalawang panel noong Marso 16, 1998 ang “Komprehensibong Kasunduan sa Paggalang ng mga Karapatang Tao at sa Internasyonal na Makataong Batas” (Comprehensive Agreement on the Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, o CARHRIHL). Kagyat itong inaprubahan ni Mariano Orosa, Tagapangulo ng NDF, noong Abril 10, 1998. Sa kabilang dako, hindi ito inaprubahan ni Fidel Ramos kahit may nalalabi pang panahon sa kanyang panunungkulan bilang Pangulo ng GRP. Noong Agosto 7, 1998, inaprubahan ni G. Estrada ang CARHRIHL. Pero sa halip na ipatupad ang CARHRIHL, tumanggi ang GRP na ipatupad ito batay sa pagdadalawang-isip at pagtutol nila sa ilang probisyon ng Kasunduan.

Simula lang ito ng isang serye ng paglabag ng GRP sa mga kasunduan sa NDF, na humantong sa de-facto at sa pormal na pagbaklas ng GRP mula sa negosasyon sa NDF at terminasyon ng negosasyong GRP-NDF noong Hunyo-Hulyo 1999. Tampok sa mga ito ang sumusunod:

1. ang makaisang panig na pagwawalang-bisa sa JASIG noong Pebrero 24, 1999
2. ang pagtutulak sa VFA na paglalapastangan sa pambansa at teritoryal na soberanya
3. pagtangging repasuhin ang mga mapanupil na batas
4. patuloy na paglulunsad ng malalaking opensibang militar at paggamit ng sobra-sobrang lakas ng armas sa mga ito lalo na laban sa masang magsasaka sa kanayunan
5. patuloy na pagsasakdal at pag-uusig sa mga bilanggong pulitikal sa mga salang kriminal sa halip na pulitikal
6. pagtannging bigyan ng indemnipikasyon ang mga biktima ng pang-aabuso sa karapatang pangao noong panahon ng batas militar
7. pagdukot kay NDFP consultant Vic Ladlad kahit may bisa pa ang JASIG

Ilang buwan makalipas ang pagsasara ng negosasyong pangkapayapaan sa pagitan ng GRP at NDFP, de-facto ring binaklas ng GRP ang negosasyong GRP-MILF nang patraydor na nilabag nito ang mga naunang kasunduan sa MILF, at todo-todong sinalakay ang mga pwersa ng MILF at ang mamamayang Moro sa Central Mindanao noong Pebrero-Hulyo 2000. Bagamat pansamantalang tumaas ang popularidad ni Estrada sa mga di-Muslim na bahagi ng Pilipinas bunga ng mga pananalakay na ito, naging mayor na salik naman ito sa pagbulusok ng ekonomya at pagtindi ng krisis pampulitika at pang-ekonomya sa buong bayan. Kalaunan, humantong ang krisis sa pagpapatalsik kay Estrada mula sa poder.

II. Negosasyong pangkapayapaan sa ilalim ng gobyernong GMA

Ipinangako ni Gng. Arroyo, noong siya’y Bise-Presidente pa, na babaligtarin niya ang patakarang “all-out war” kapag napatalsik si Estrada at siya ang umupong Presidente. Ngayon, makaraan ang anim na buwan bilang Presidente, masasabi bang nabaligtad na ni Gng Arroyo ang patakarang “all-out war”?

Oo, nga’t itinigil na ang pambobomba at pagsalakay sa mga kampo at komunidad ng mga Muslim sa Central Mindanao, at muling binuksan ng gobyernong Arroyo ang negosasyong pangkapayapaan kapwa sa MILF at sa NDF. Nagresulta na ito sa isang kasunduan para sa tigil-putukan sa pagitan ng GRP at MILF. Nagkaroon na rin ng dalawang round na pag-uusap ang GRP at NDF sa Oslo nitong nakaraang Abril at Hunyo. Sa isang banda, pumayag na ang GRP na buuin ang Joint Monitoring Committee ayon sa CARHRIHL, at nasimulan na ang pag-uusap ng dalawang RWC hinggil sa repormang sosyo-ekonomiko. Sa kabilang banda naman, makaisang panig na nagdeklara ng recess ang GRP panel bilang pagprotesta sa pagpaslang ng NPA kay Koronel Rodolfo Aguinaldo, isang sagadsarin at kinamumuhiang kriminal at tortyurer.

Sa katunayan, walang katwiran ang pagprotesta ng GRP sa pagpaslang kay Aguinaldo. Walang tigil-putukang umiiral. Sa bahagi ng GRP, nananatili ang mga operasyon at kampanyang militar ng AFP at PNP sa lahat ng dako ng Pilipinas. Ang mga kampanyang ito ay laban diumano sa CPP-NPA pero sa katunayan, malaking paghihirap at pagkasalanta ang idinudulot nito sa masang magsasaka sa kanayunan. Hindi humuhupa, bagkus ay dumarami pa at lumalala, ang mga pang-aabuso ng mga militar at paglabag nila sa karapatang tao.

(Tingnan ang “Human Rights Violations — GMA Administration – Jan 20 – Sept 21, 2001.)

Pansinin din, halimbawa, na sa maiksing panahon ng panunungkulan ni GMA, mayroon nang mahigit 100 bilanggong pulitikal, mga biktima ng arbitraryo at ilegal na pagdakip at detensyon. Samantala, hindi pa nito pinalalaya ang lahat ng mga napatunayan nang mga bilanggong pulitikal at kung gayon inosente sa sakdal sa kanilang kriminal na pagkakasala. Sa halip na mabawasan, nadagdagan pa nga ang mga bilanggong pulitikal.

Noong Abril 24, 2001, dalawang araw bago mag-resume ang usapang pangkapayapaan sa pagitan ng GRP at NDFP, inatasan ni Macapagal-Arroyo ang AFP at PNP na dapat ipagpatuloy ang mga operasyong militar laban sa CPP-NPA-NDF para pahinain ito at palakasin ang pusisyon sa negosasyon ng GRP.

Higit pa, walang makikitang anumang malinaw na senyal na nais ng gobyernong Arroyo na harapin at lutasin ang mga saligang suliraning ugat na dahilan ng armadong tunggalian. Sa halip, ipinagpapatuloy nito ang parehong mga patakarang nagpapatindi sa pagsasamantala at pang-aapi sa mamamayang Pilipino at nagpapalala sa krisis ng lipunang Pilipino. Pangunahin na rito ang pangangayupapa sa dayuhang monopolyo kapital, at pagtatanggol sa interes ng malalaking komprador at panginoong maylupa, samantalang binabalewala at niyuyurakan ang kapakanan at mga karapatan ng malawak na masang Pilipino. Walang-habas na ipinapatupad ang deregulasyon, liberalisasyon at pribatisasyon. Isang resulta nito ang pagtutol na ibigay sa mga manggagawa ang hinihinging makabuluhan at sapat na P125 pagtaas ng sahod. Bagkus, ginigipit ito nang husto at nagbigay lamang ng pakitang-taong pagtaas nang P35 kada buwan.

Kamakailan, isa pang matingkad na halimbawa nito ang mistulang pagkatuta at kahiya-hiyang pag-sipsip sa US matapos maganap ang pambobomba sa US noong Set. 11. Hindi pa man hinihiling ng US, nagkandakumahog ang gobyernong GMA sa pag-alok sa US ng mga pasilidad, baseng militar at kahit mga tropang panlaban sa binabalak na pagsalakay sa Afghanistan.

III. Ilang obserbasyon, aral at kongklusyon

• May kapayapaang makatarungan at matagalan; mayroon ding “kapayapaan” na dimakatarungan at panandalian. Ang tunay at matagalang kapayapaan ay nakabatay sa katarungan, sa paggalang sa mga karapatan ng mamamayan – hindi lamang sa karapatang pulitikal o sibil, kundi, at higit na mahalaga, sa karapatang panlipunan, pang-ekonomya at pangkultura. Tanging sa isang lipunan kung saan tinatamasa ang kalayaang pambansa at panlipunan maaaring yumabong at umunlad ang mga pundamental na indibidwal at kolektibong mga karapatang ito.

Sa buong itinakbo ng mga negosasyong pangkapayapaan, makikitang may iisang prinsipyong tumatahi sa mga patakaran at pagkilos ng GRP: ang pagkamit ng “katahimikan” o “political stability” sa pamamagitan ng pagpapahina hanggang sa pagpapasuko sa mga “rebelde”. Sa maraming pagkakataon, malinaw at lantad ito sa mga kundisyong “magbaba o magsalong muna ng mga sandata”, “magtigil-putukan muna”. Sa ilang pagkakataon, nakakubli ang layuning ito sa paggugumiit ng “natatanging pampulitikang awtoridad o soberanya” at sa paggamit ng Konstitusyon at mga legal na proseso ng GRP bilang balangkas ng negosasyon.

Hindi nito layunin ang tunay at makatarungang kapayapaan kundi ang simpleng pasipikasyon o kapitulasyon ng mga “rebelde”.

Mayor na salik sa pagpasok ng GRP sa negosasyong pangkapayapaan ang pangangailangang maibsan ang krisis pampulitika at pang-ekonomiya na patuloy na bumabatbat dito. Tahasang inihayag ni Ramos noong 1992 na kailangan ang political stability para maakit ang mga dayuhang puhunan na aniya’y kailangan para mabuhay ang ekonomya. Kaya’t kasabay nito, ipinatupad ni Ramos, tulad din nina Marcos, Aquino at Estrada, ang mga patakaran sa ekonomyang aakit sa mga dayuhang puhunan ngunit makakasalanta naman sa kabuhayan ng mamamayan, tulad ng pagpapababa sa sahod ng mga manggagawa at iba pang neo-liberal na patakaran ng globalisasyon at WTO. Hindi pumapasok sa konsiderasyon nito na ibsan ang krisis sa pulitika at ekonomiya sa pamamagitan ng pagpapatupad ng mga makabayan at maka-mamamayang mga patakaran.
• Mahalagang anyo ng pakikibaka ang negosasyong pangkapayapaan, pero hindi ito ang pinakamahalagang anyo. Hindi matatamo ang kapayapaan sa pamamagitan ng negosasyon lamang, kahit humantong pa ito sa isang kasunduan para sa pagsalong ng mga armas ng mga “rebelde”. Maaaring magkaroon ng isang kasunduang pangkapayapaan sa pagitan ng gobyerno at isang armadong “rebeldeng” grupo pero magpapatuloy pa rin ang digma.

Ipinapakita ito sa buong kasaysayan ng Pilipinas, kung saan nagkaroon ng mga kasunduan sa pagitan ng naghaharing rehimen at ng mga lumalabang grupo na sa katunayan ay kapitulasyon o pasipikasyon ang katangian. (hal., ang Pact of Biac na Bato) . Sa kasalukuyan, malinaw na halimbawa ang Kasunduang Tripoli at 1996 Kasunduang GRP-MNLF na kapwa hindi nagdulot ng kapayapaan sa Mindanao at sa mamamayang Muslim, bagkus higit pang nagpalala ito sa krisis at digma, dahil hindi nito hinarap at nilutas ang saligang ugat ng armadong tunggalian: ang suliranin sa lupa at ang pang-aapi at pagsasamantala sa Bangsa Moro.

• May karahasang di-makatarungan at mayroong karahasang makatarungan. Dimakatarungan ang anumang karahasang sumusupil at yumuyurak sa mga karapatan ng mamamayan, nang-aapi at nagsasamantala sa kanila. Makatarungan ang karahasang nagtataguyod at nagtatanggol sa mga saligang karapatan at interes ng mamamayan. Makatarungan kung gayon ang karahasang bunsod ng pakikibaka para sa pambansa at panlipunang pagpapalaya.

• Mahalaga at mahigpit ang pangangailangan sa paggalang ng mga karapatang tao para mailatag ang batayan ng isang matagalan at makatarungang kapayapaan. Ito ang dahilan kung bakit ipinanunakala ng NDFP mula pa noong 1990 bilang unang sustantibong agenda ng negosasyon ang usapan hinggil sa paggalang sa karapatang tao at internasyunal na makataong batas. Dahil sa malawak at matinding paglabag sa mga karapatang tao sa nakaraan at maging sa kasalukuyan, ang isang kasunduan dito ay makakatulung sa kagyat na pagbibigay ng pinakamalaking lunas sa paghihirap ng mamayan kahit habang nagpapatuloy pa ang armadong tunggalian.

• Maaaring may makamit na mga pakinabang para sa mamamayan ang negosasyong pangkapayapaan, kahit hindi ito humantong sa isang komprehensibong kasunduan. Halimbawa, malaki ang benepisyong matatamo ng mamamayan kapag ipinatupad ang CARHRIHL.

(Nota: bahagi ng CARHRIHL ang sumusunod na mga probisyon na kagyat na dapat ipatupad ng GRP: indemnipikasyon ng mga biktima ng paglabag ng karapatang tao sa panahon ng diktadurang Marcos, pagpapalaya sa lahat ng bilanggong pulitikal, pagtigil sa mga opensibang operasyong militar ng AFP at PNP, at pagpapawalambisa sa mga mapanupil na batas.)

• Gumaganap ng mahalagang papel ang kilusang masa sa pagsulong ng negosasyong pangkapayapaan.

Anumang kasunduan sa negosasyong pangkapayapaan na kapaki-pakinabang sa mamamayan, tulad ng CARHRIHL, ay tunay na mapapakinabangan lamang sa pamamagitan ng paggugumiit at pakikibaka ng mamamayan para sa kanilang mga karapatan. Kung hindi ipaglalaban ng mamamayan ang kanilang interes, mananatiling walang-halagang pirasong papel ang mga kasunduang ito.

Hindi naging posible ang pagpapanumbalik o resumption ng negosasyon kung hindi napatalsik ng higanteng daluyong ng kilusang protesta ang bulok na rehimeng Estrada na tumayong pangunahing balakid sa pagsulong ng usapang pangkapayapaan.

Mahalagang patuloy na maihayag ng mamamayan ang pagtutol nila sa mapagsamantala at mapang-aping sistema, para maidiin sa GRP at sa publiko ang pangangailangan sa mga saligang pagbabago.

Mahalagang mailantad ang pagtatangka ng gobyerno at ng ilang mga repormista at kontra-rebolusyonaryong grupo na palabasing ang gobyerno o ang mga grupong ito ang tunay na kumakatawan sa interes at mga kahilingan ng mamamayan. Binabalak ng GRP na magdaos ng mga “konsultasyon” diumano hinggil sa repormang sosyo-ekonomiko, ala-NUC noong 1992-93. Matatandaang sa mga konsultasyong iyon, pinalabnaw kundi man lubusan nilang pinagtakpan ang saligang mga suliranin ng lipunang Pilipino – ang imperyalismo, pyudalismo at burukrata-kapitalismo – at tinangkang palabasing ang mga ugat ng armadong tunggalian ay matinding kahirapan, di-pagkakapantay-pantay, kawalan ng katarungan, at mga katiwalian sa gobyerno (poverty, inequity, injustice, graft and corruption).

Kung susumahin, walang ibang landas tungo sa tunay na kapayapaan kundi ang pagpapatupad sa mga saligan at radikal na reporma sa lipunan. Hindi maaasahan ang kasalukuyang gobyernong Arroyo, na tulad ng mga nakaraang rehimen ay lantarang nagsisilbi sa interes ng mga dayuhan at ng iilang naghaharing uri, na ipatupad ang mga repormang ito. Makakamit lamang ito sa pamamagitan ng pakikibaka ng buong sambayanang Pilipino para sa pambansang kalayaan at demokrasya, sa lahat ng maaaring porma at pamamaraan.

Rey Claro Casambre
Philippine Peace Center
2nd Anniversary EDSA 2
January 17, 2002
Shalom Center, Manila

At the height of our campaign to oust the immoral, corrupt, and warmongering Erap, we presented to then Vice President GMA the “People’s Agenda” which is basically identical to what we are challenging her with now. We recall that even then, GMA had hedged and hawed on the issues of national and economic sovereignty. And it was only on the issue of the peace that she categorically, emphatically and unequivocally committed herself to “reverse the Estrada policy of all-out-war” and embark on the road to all-out-peace. Specifically, she would resume the peace negotiations with the NDF and the MILF which had both been terminated during Estrada’s time.

Indeed, when GMA assumed the presidency, we were dismayed, but not surprised, that she would retain, continue to pursue and even reinforce the same anti-national and anti-people and anti-national economic policies and foreign policies of previous administrations. On the other hand, she did keep her promise of resuming talks with the NDF and MILF.

But not for long. Formal talks with the NDF were unilaterally recessed by the government in June 2001 and have never been resumed since then.

From June 2001 up to the present, instead of undertaking confidence and building measures to pave the way for the resumption of formal talks, the GMA government put up one obstacle after another and made the resumption virtually impossible.

First, it expanded Cabinet Cluster E (which oversees the peace negotiations with armed the NDF, MILF and MNLF) into a Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COC-IS) with the addition of top defense, military, police and intelligence officials, thereby allowing the hawks and militarists to dominate and control government policy and decisions on the peace process.

Second, it emasculated the GRP Negotiating panel’s mandate to negotiate by requiring it to clear everything and anything with the COC-IS before it signs anything – be it an agreement, a joint communique, implementing guidelines, or even a one-page press statement, by suspending formal negotiations (in March 2002) and ordering backchannel talks in its stead, and adding a new layer of authority — special emissaries for backchannel talks with the power to negotiate and sign agreements with both the NDF and MILF.

Third, in several backchannel talks, the GRP proposed ,a “final peace agreement” that departed from the previous framework set by The Hague Joint Declaration of 1992 by providing for the end of hostilities and disarming and demobilization of the NPA even without comprehensive agreements on socio-economic, political and constitutional reforms that would address the roots of the armed conflict, and providing that the Agreement be implemented in accordance with the GRP Constitution and its legal processes . Thus, instead of paving the way to the resumption of formal talks, the GRP succeeded, through backchannel talks, in making the resumption of formal talks virtually impossible.

Fourth , the GMA government, at the instance of the hawks and militarists, collaborated with the warmongering US Bush government in using the so-called “war against terror” as a pretext to promote the line of employing superior military force to crush armed opposition groups and end the armed conflict. The US and GMA governments attempted to blackmail both the NDF and MILF into laying down their arms and rejoining the mainstream of society under the government’s terms or run the risk of being tagged terrorist and facing the full force of the gobal “counterterrorist war”. Indeed, the CPP-NPA and Prof Jose Ma Sison were eventually branded “foreign terrorists” by the US, Canada, Australia, and the European Union including The Netherlands and Belgium.

The terrorist tag now presents the single biggest obstacle to the resumption of the formal talks. The NDF points to the GRP’s campaign to have the CPP-NPA and JMS named “terrorist” as a gross violation of the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees or JASIG, and declared that it cannot negotiate with the GRP while the NDFP negotiators and personnel are under duress.

(Note: if there is time, cite similarities or parallels in GRP-MILF peace talks)

“Healing the divisiveness in our society” — this is the second item in GMA’s avowed priorities after she had announced her withdrawal from the 2004 presidential derby.

What “divisiveness” was she referring to? Is it the divisiveness between her political party and that of the opposition? Or could she be referring to the deepest divides in our society — between the haves and the have-nots, the oppressors and the oppressed, the exploiters and the exploiters?

So far we have not seen signs of her addressing these deepest divides, only attempts at conciliation and rapproachment with the opposition. But if, as she claims, she is withdrawing from the 2004 race precisely to be freed from the distractions of politics, then one would think that her avowed new priorities and goals includes resolving the armed conflicts that have been raging in our country for the last 30 plus years – the armed conflict between the government and the NDF, and the armed conflict between the government and the Moro separatist movements.

As many have already pointed out, there can be no true reform without an objective and sincere appraisal and admission of shortcomings and faults. Without correct diagnosis, there can be no correct prescription and cure. Or, as Christians would say, without an act of contrition, there can be no penance, reform, nor forgiveness.

With respect to the armed conflicts, there can be no genuine peace — no healing of divisiveness — without the parties agreeing on what are the causes of the armed conflict and how these can be uprooted and removed. That is why the agenda of the formal peace talks (between the government and the NDF and the MILF) properly conisist of negotiations on basic social, economic and political reforms

We now hear about the GRP accelerating the draft of its “final peace agreement” with the NDFP, and a so-called “package” for the MILF, in preparation for the resumption of formal talks with both parties. This morning, in Today, Secretary Reyes is reported to have announced the “National Internal Security Plan”, which has a “holistic approach” and aims to minimize if not end the threat of insurgency in five years’ time. Is there anything new here? Is this any different from the holistic, total war approach of Marcos, Aquino, Ramos and Estrada?

Will the GMA government reverse herself and remove all the abovementioned obstacles to the resumption of formal peace negotiations with the NDF and MILF?

Learn from the Mindanao experience. There have been two “final peace agreements” in the past 20 years: the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 and the GRP-MNLF Peace Accord of 1996. The Tripoli Agreement led to the formation of the ARMM as well as the formation of the MILF and eventually the continuation, intensification and expansion of armed conflict in Mindanao, including with the MNLF which subsequently rejected the ARMM. The 1996 Accord led to the formation of the SPCPD and the installation of MNLF Chair Nur Misuari as the governor of ARMM. As we very well can see, the two peace agreements did not resolve the armed conflict and Mindanao and Nur Misuari himself is behind bars for rebellion.

To conclude, what is needed is a Genuine Peace Agreement, not a “Final Peace Agreement” that, by its design, intent and content, is anything but final. Genuine because it will lead to genuine peace, genuine because it is genuinely agreed upon by two forces with mutual respect and with the common goal of seeking peace by upholding national freedom, genuine democracy and social justice.

The road to freedom, democracy and social justice is long, winding and tortuous. There are no shortcuts in the genuine quest for genuine peace. #

by Rey Claro Casambre
Philippine Peace Center

Introduction: The armed conflicts in the Philippines

There are two major armed conflicts that have been raging in the Philippines for over three
decades now. One is the civil war between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) a broad united front fighting for national and social liberation under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and with the New People’s Army (NPA) as its armed force. The other is the war between the Manila government and the Muslim secessionist movement initially led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and currently by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

It is no coincidence that the CPP and the MNLF were both founded in the late 1960s and early 1970s amidst the social crisis and turbulence that embroiled Philippine society then. Half a century of colonial rule and two decades of neo-colonial rule has stunted the economy in its backward pre-industrial and semi-feudal state. The economic and political crisis had reached a point where significantly large segments of the population, especially the toiling peasants and workers, were prepared to take up arms against foreign, mainly US, domination and the central political authority. The ruling classes could no longer rule in the old way.

The suspension by President Marcos of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in August 1971 and his subsequent imposition of martial rule in September 1972 indeed demonstrated that the ruling class could no longer rule in the old way, and the country was ripe for revolution. In one stroke of a pen, martial law rendered all dissent and opposition to the Marcos regime illegal, including that of the factions of the ruling class not in power. For fourteen years, the Marcos dictatorship threw its entire apparatus and arsenal of deception and force to suppress the people’s resistance, and especially against the revolutionary forces fighting for national democracy and the Moro liberation movement fighting for self-determination.

Martial law brought about massive human rights violations, intensified social inequities and opened up the nation’s wealth to plunder by foreign monopolists and their local big comprador partners led by the Marcos fascist clique. The intolerable economic hardships and political repression wrought on the people merely drove them to fight the dictatorship even more resolutely and in ever greater numbers. Rather than be intimidated and stifled, both the legal democratic struggles and the armed movements grew in strength and scope. From a few rifles and handguns in a single district in Central Luzon in 1969, the NPA grew to force of a few thousand high power rifles and was deeply rooted among the peasantry in all regions throughout the archipelago by 1986.

As for the Moro secessionist movement, the Marcos regime succeeded in drawing the MNLF into signing the 1976 Tripoli Agreement whereby the Moro people would supposedly be granted regional autonomy in the thirteen southern provinces that consist the island groups of Mindanao and Palawan, but in accordance with the GRP Constitution and legal processes. This resulted in the partial and temporary neutralization of the MNLF.

Partial because in 1977, a significant fraction of the MNLF that rejected the Tripoli Agreement, led by no less than it Vice-Chairman then, Hashim Salamat, broke away and formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Temporary because it soon became clear that the Manila government had no intent to grant outright regional autonomy to all 13 provinces of Mindanao and Palawan, instead subjecting the question to a referendum, purportedly in accordance with the GRP constitutional and legal processes. The Manila-controlled referendum resulted in a token autonomous region of only four provinces.

The sham GRP referendum and autonomy raised the credibility and standing of the MILF among the Moro people. On the other hand, to maintain its following and to regain lost prestige, the MNLF was compelled to condemn the GRP for reneging on the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. The MNLF eventually resume its call for armed struggle.

In 1996, the MNLF once again signed a peace agreement with the GRP, resulting in the formation of a Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development headed by MNLF Chair Nur Misuari but under the GRP. Again, regional autonomy was promised, this time with substantial funds for administration and development. Clearly, this “Final Peace Accord, as it was optimistically, if deceptively called fully coopted and effectively neutralized the MNLF. But it did not finally bring peace to Mindanao and the Moro people, and in no sense at all could it be called “final”.

The MILF on the other hand persisted in armed struggle even as engaged the Manila government in peace negotiations. Learning from the GRP-MNLF peace talks, the MILF resisted the adoption of the GRP constitution as framework for negotiations. While the MILF entered into interim cease-fire agreements with the GRP for the duration of talks, sporadic fighting continued, flaring up in an all-out war initiated by the Estrada government in 1999. This resulted in the dismantling of large MILF camps in Central Mindanao but not in any significant decimation of MILF armed forces.

Peace negotiations between the GRP and MILF have more or less run a parallel course with the GRP-NDFP negotiations. The MILF have likewise been following closely the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations and are known to have drawn valuable lessons from this. This makes for an interesting comparison, but a comprehensive study is beyond the scope of our discussion now. We shall only refer to some salient points regarding the GRP-MNLF and GRP-MILF talks insofar as they will help clarify and amplify the points we shall raise with regard to the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations.

The GRP-NDFP Peace Negotiations

Peace negotiations between the GRP and the NDFP first became possible in 1986 with the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship and the installation of the Aquino government through a combined people’s uprising and military rebellion. However, the peace talks which began in December got bogged down in issues on safety and immunity guarantees and monitoring the cease-fire. Before any discussion on substantive issues could be undertaken, the talks were scuttled in January 1987 after government troops fired on a demonstration of thousands of peasants clamoring for genuine land reform, killing more than a dozen, and ultra-rightist military elements plotted to assassinate the NDFP negotiators to destabilize the government as part of a coup plot.

The GRP-NDFP peace negotiations that have been going on for the past ten years was initiated by then GRP President Fidel Ramos as soon as he assumed the presidency in 1992. Ironically, it was Ramos who, as Defense Secretary in the Aquino government, stood as the main obstacle to having peace negotiations with the NDFP by insisting that the NPA first lay down their arms, that the talks should be held under the framework of the GRP Constitution, and that local-level talks (i.e., regional and provincial) should be held rather than on the national level, in order to divide the armed movement.

In his inaugural address, Ramos explained that he was calling for peace negotiations with all armed opposition movements (i.e., the CPP-NPA-NDF, the MNLF, the MILF and the RAM-YOU-SFP military rebels) to improve the political atmosphere and thereby attract and retain foreign investments. This is partly true and can be considered among the GRP’s minimum objectives in entering into peace talks with the NDFP and the Moro liberation movements. (In several instances where talks have been recessed or suspended by the GRP, the GRP would return to the negotiating table whenever foreign investments were being driven away by the deteriorating business infrastructure, or by revelations of scandalous cases of graft and corruption.)

What Ramos did not say then was that he wanted peace negotiations because he could ill afford to face armed opposition from several flanks, having been elected by a small 23% minority. . Indeed, engaging the armed opposition in peace talks promptly brought Ramos clear dividends when the military rebels under the RAM-YOU-SFP signed a peace accord with the GRP on December 22, 1992. This is not surprising since, unlike the other armed groups, the military rebels had no problem in recognizing the sovereignty of the GRP and accepting the GRP Constitution as the framework for a peace accord, including its provision that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is the sole legitimate military force in the country.

In fact, the larger and principal objective of Ramos’ offer for peace talks in 1992 was to neutralize the armed opposition by inducing it to capitulate or at the least by sowing confusion, dissension and demoralization among their ranks and their supporters. The peace talks are aimed at driving a wedge deeper between those who firmly advocate armed struggle on one hand and those who are demoralized and tend to prefer parliamentary struggle as the main if not the only form of struggle on the other. They are meant to divert the revolutionary forces and the people as a whole away from revolutionary solutions to the age-old problems of foreign domination, feudal exploitation and oppression, and bureaucrat capitalist graft, corruption and plunder.

In his first State of the Nation address on July 1, 1993, Ramos crowed that “our peace initiative has succeeded beyond expectation… we have split the leadership of the communist insurgency to the core…” The boast turned out to be premature and empty, and the Ramos government was soon compelled to resume talks with the NDFP. Nonetheless, neutralizing the revolutionary movement would remain the overriding GRP goal in the negotiations that would determine and explain the GRP’s positioning, maneuvering and its entire conduct in the peace talks up to the present. What the GRP could no longer achieve through military means in the battlefield, it sought to accomplish over the negotiating table through peace talks.

The key to achieving this objective lies in enticing the armed opposition groups into subordinating themselves to the GRP sovereignty or political authority. This is expressed through the following basic preconditions or stipulations which the GRP would time and again attempt to spring if not impose on these groups in the negotiations:

• That the peace negotiations would be held with the GRP constitution as the framework, and corollarily, that all agreements shall be interpreted and implemented in accordance with the GRP constitution and legal processes.
• That the armed opposition groups lay down their arms first before peace talks are held or, in cases of termination, suspension or recess, before they are resumed.
• That nothing in the negotiations and agreements shall confer to the other party (NDFP, MNLF or MILF) a status of belligerency.

The NDFP is keenly aware of all these objectives of the GRP. Why then had it entered into peace negotiations and continued to engage the government in this form of struggle?

NDFP Chief Political Consultant Prof. Jose Ma.Sison, in two major articles that discussed the historical circumstances and basic principles that would guide the NDFP’s conduct in the peace negotiation, clearly discussed the opposing objectives and frameworks of the GRP and the NDFP in peace negotiations, while pointing out the conditions under which these contradictory aspects could be brought together and contend with the negotiating table as the arena.

First of all, the NDFP recognizes that despite the GRP’s objectives and the resources at its command, any ruling government cannot fully do as it wishes insofar as the negotiations are concerned. The very nature of the negotiations allows the NDFP to consider or weigh whatever terms are being set, and simply reject any precondition that will undermine and destroy its revolutionary integrity. If vigilant and firm enough, the NDFP can always refuse to negotiate under conditions that will lead or amount to its capitulation or surrender

Moreover, any GRP president may be compelled to negotiate by the growing intensity of the social and economic crisis and the growing all-round opposition to its rule or to the entire ruling system. As pointed out earlier, the GRP negotiating panel had unilaterally recessed and suspended the talks several times, but always returned to the negotiating table whenever there was a critical need to improve the political climate. Even the deposed President Estrada, who terminated peace talks with the NDFP before his first year in office was over, seriously and urgently sent emissaries to the NDFP negotiating panel in The Netherlands, offering to resume peace talks at the height of the people’s campaign for his ouster, in a futile attempt to mitigate the increasing attacks on his self and his administration.

The minimum objective of the NDFP in accepting the Ramos initiative to hold peace talks is to show the people that it is the NDFP, and not the GRP, that is genuinely interested in addressing the roots of the armed conflict and attaining a just and lasting peace. By engaging the GRP in peace talks, defining and standing firm on what constitutes a reasonable framework and modalities for the talks, the NDFP challenges and frustrates any GRP administration’s attempt to project itself as seriously seeking social reform to bring genuine peace, and compels it to reveal its real reactionary intentions.

Properly and skillfully handled, the peace negotiations are an important and useful platform for propagating the NDFP’s programme for a people’s democratic revolution based on its analysis of the problems that beset Philippine society. The NDFP programme for a genuinely free, democratic and just society is reflected in its proposals for social, economic and political reforms which form a major part of the substantive agenda of the talks. The NDFP line for achieving a just and lasting peace is no other than the revolutionary line of fighting for national freedom and genuine democracy.

The peace negotiations are also an arena in which the NDFP articulates and demonstrates its firm and principled adherence to international norms, principles and policies such as on human rights, international humanitarian law, and other international social covenants and instruments. In this regard the NDFP is placed on equal footing as the GRP in the eyes of the international community as a legitimate and responsible political authority.

The NDFP goes as far as demonstrating its political and moral superiority over the GRP as a revolutionary force fighting for the interests of the Filipino people. In negotiating the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL), for example, the NDFP consistently applied revolutionary principles on the concrete Philippine human rights situation and adamantly pushed specific provisions for giving redress to and alleviating the plight of human rights victims. Likewise, the principles and instruments of international humanitarian law were applied by the NDFP to the armed conflict in the Philippines to propose concrete provisions that could mitigate the human cost and suffering from war.

The NDFP aims to forge with the GRP bilateral agreements that benefit the people immediately and in the long term. Again the CARHRIHL is an excellent example of how the people are provided a potentially powerful instrument for safeguarding and upholding the their human rights, especially now that both the GRP and NDFP principals have approved it, making it binding and effective on both parties and with both having joint and separate responsibilities in implementing it.

The CARHRIHL by itself and thru its implementation also serves as a confidence-building measure for the continuance of the peace negotiations. That the GRP and NDFP have been able to forge such an agreement was beyond literally everybody’s expectations. It thus provides confidence in and brightens up the prospects for achieving similar agreements on the more contentious issues of social, economic and political reforms.

Viewed in this light, branding the CPP, NPA and Prof Sison terrorists to isolate, stigmatize, demonize and criminalize them is ridiculous, absurd and grossly unjust.

How has the NDFP escaped the trap of capitulation, surrender, or the spread of confusion and dissension in its ranks and among its supporters? How has it preserved and enhanced its revolutionary integrity through ten years of negotiating with the GRP?

First, by clearly establishing that the objective of the negotiations is the resolution of the armed conflict and the attainment of a just and lasting peace. The latter qualification is a safeguard against any attempt merely to attain a cessation of hostilities by whatever means without addressing the social and historical roots of the armed conflict.

Second, by firmly rejecting and resisting the GRP scheme of using the GRP constitution as the framework for the peace negotiations, or corollarily, of interpreting and implementing all agreements in accordance with the GRP constitution and legal processes. The GRP had tried to impose this as a precondition to holding the talks, but the NDFP had always rejected this as absolutely unacceptable and made it clear that it would never negotiate under this framework, in much the same way that the NDFP does not expect the GRP to agree to negotiate with the NDFP constitution as framework.

Third, by firmly rejecting and resisting GRP attempts to subordinate the NDFP legally or politically by various means, such as in the modalities or conduct of the talks and in the formulations of provisions in the agreements on the substantive agenda. These include issues on safety and immunity guarantees, the venue and ground rules for the formal talks, the formation, sequence and operationalization of reciprocal working committees that do preparatory work on each substantive agenda for the negotiating panels.

It would be quite informative and helpful to examine how these safeguards and guidelines are instituted or, in computer parlance, “installed” (in the same way one installs an anti-virus shield in one’s computer) and reflected in a number of major bilateral agreements so far achieved by the GRP and NDFP.

The Hague Joint Declaration of September 1, 1992 is the landmark framework agreement that sets the basic parameters, principles, conditions and guidelines under which the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations can and must take place. It is a one-page document that clearly states the following:

1. Formal peace negotiations between the GRP and the NDFP shall be held to resolve the armed conflict.
2. The common goal of the aforesaid negotiations shall be the attainment of a just and lasting peace.
3. Such negotiations shall take place after the parties have reached tentative agreements on substantive issues in the agreed agenda through the reciprocal working committees to be separately organized by the GRP and the NDFP.
4. The holding of peace negotiations “must be in accordance with mutually acceptable principles including national sovereignty, democracy and social justice and no precondition shall be made to negate the inherent character and purpose of the peace negotiations.
5. Preparatory to the formal peace negotiations, we have agreed to recommend the following:a. Specific measures of goodwill and confidence-building to create a favorable climate for peace negotiations; and
   b. The substantive agenda of the formal negotiations shall include human rights, international humanitarian law, socio-economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms, end of hostilities and disposition of forces.
   We note that items (1) and (2) commit both parties to the goal of resolving the armed conflict and achieving a just and lasting peace. Coupled with item (5), we see that the underlying logic in having the end of hostilities and disposition of forces as the final item in the substantive agenda is that these can only be considered when there are agreements signed and sufficient guarantees in place on substantive reforms that address the roots of the armed conflict.

The Hague Joint Declaration does not explicitly set this sequence, and the GRP not surprisingly attempted to “refine” the substantive agenda by inserting capitulation-related items such as amnesty and rehabilitation and by jumbling the sequence so that cessation of hostilities comes on top. But the NDFP objected to the proposal of adding superfluous and capitulation-oriented items, and insisted on the logic behind the sequence in which they are expressed The Hague Joint Declaration.

This would subsequently be firmed up in the “Joint Agreement on the Formation, Sequence and Operationalization of the Reciprocal Working Committees (RWCs)” signed by both panels on June 26, 1995, and the “Supplemental Agreement on the Formation, Sequence and Operationalization of the Reciprocal Working Committees (RWC Agreement) “ signed on March 18, 1997. The latter agreement stipulates that each agreement on the substantive agenda shall be effective and binding on both parties, with each party having joint as well as separate responsibilities in implementing the agreement, and that the third agenda item will only be.

The importance of the proper sequence is underscored by the fact that throughout the ten years of talks, the GRP had constantly attempted to push for an “adjustment”, proposing one or another variation of a scheme wherein agreements can be crafted and signed by the panels and even their respective principals but the implementation of these are reserved or deferred until the agreement on end of hostilities and disposition of forces is achieved. Currently, the GRP has been pushing for a “final peace agreement” using this formula of “3-in-1”, i.e., three comprehensive agreements in one “final peace accord”.

Item (4) of The Hague Joint Declaration establishes as the framework of the negotiations “mutually acceptable principles including national sovereignty, democracy and social justice…” thus preventing either party from imposing on the other any framework that is not mutually acceptable, especially its own constitution. The NDFP has repeatedly invoked this principle to parry and frustrate all GRP attempts to impose its constitution as framework for the talks.

Furthermore, the NDFP has had to be constantly on the alert against GRP attempts to insert specific provisions stipulating that the agreements, partly or entirely, must be interpreted and implemented in accordance with the GRP constitution and legal processes. The GRP justifies these by equating “national sovereignty” with its claim to being the “sole sovereign power”, therefore implying that the NDFP must submit to its political authority.

But this argument falls flat on its face when “mutually acceptable principles including national sovereignty” is understood in the context of the entire sentence in which it is found. The sentence concludes with “…no precondition shall be made to negate the inherent character and purpose of the peace negotiations”. This phrase at once precludes the precondition that the NDFP recognize the GRP as the “sole sovereign power”. The very reason why negotiations have become necessary is not merely the NDFP’s own claim to being a sovereign power, but that it wields in fact political authority over a significant portion of Philippine territory and population, and a people’s army that defends and enforces that political authority.

Another clear example of such a precondition which the NDFP considers non-negotiable is the GRP’s prior insistence that the NPA first lay down its arms before talks are held. Again, the NDFP has had to be on the alert for other variations of preconditions that effectively subordinate the NDFP to the GRP’s political authority, negating the inherent character and purpose of the negotiations. A not-so-subtle precondition is the proposal of the GRP to have an “interim cease-fire for the duration of the talks”. With this proposal, the GRP can stretch the negotiations indefinitely and preside over a de-facto end of hostilities without a single substantive reform in place. In the negotiations for the CARHRIHL a more innocuous precondition is the proposal to place the Joint Monitoring Committee under the Office of the President of the GRP, effectively subordinating the NDFP members of the JMC under the authority of the GRP.

The GRP time and again has proposed and insisted on holding the negotiations in the Philippines and without any foreign third party. This notwithstanding JASIG, Section III, No. 6 which provides, “The venue of the formal talks shall be Brussels, Belgium, unless both parties mutually agree on another neutral venue. For this purpose, both parties shall separately make arrangements with the host country concerned..”

The GRP argues simplistically that the armed conflict is a domestic and internal problem and should be resolved bilaterally between the GRP and the NDFP, in Philippine territory. Or, it argues that holding negotiations abroad is much more expensive than holding them locally. The NDFP on the other hand insists on holding the talks in a neutral foreign venue, since it will always be under duress if the talks are held in the Philippines, unless they are held in territory controlled by the NDFP, with the NPA providing security to the GRP panel and staff. The GRP, of course, will never concede on paper that the NDFP controls any part of Philippine territory, although in practice they do so whenever they arrange for a safe and expeditious release of prisoners of war held by the NPA.

In this regard, the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) plays an important role not only in safeguarding the security of NDFP personnel and others involved in the negotiations but not necessarily members of the NDFP, but also in establishing equality, mutuality and parity between the GRP and NDFP on questions of safety and immunity. The JASIG unequivocally states: “Each party has the inherent right to issue documents of identification to its negotiators, consultants, staffers, security and other personnel and such documents shall be duly recognized as safe conduct passes as provided in this Joint Agreement.” (I. Safety, No. 2)

The bilateral agreements are replete with examples of how, in negotiating and crafting these agreements, the NDFP has taken care to establish and uphold the fundamental principles of equality, parity, mutuality and reciprocity and thereby maintain its integrity as a revolutionary organization.

On several occasions that the GRP stalled the talks after the NDFP had refused to accept its preconditions and impositions, the GRP charged the NDFP with using the peace negotiations to attain a status of belligerency. The NDFP’s response to this charge is that it has neither the intention nor the need to gain a status of belligerency from the GRP through negotiations or by any other means. The NDFP avers that it already has a status of belligerency, and this has been achieved over years of hard struggle and sacrifice in the battlefield and other arenas of struggle.

The current impasse

Formal peace negotiations were resumed in April 2001, three months after the overthrow of Estrada and the assumption into the presidency of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But this was recessed indefinitely and unilaterally by the GRP in June 2001. Formal talks were suspended by the GRP in March 2002 and remain suspended till now.

The current impasse was brought about principally by the GRP’s collaboration with the US and other foreign powers such as the Royal Dutch Government and the European Council of Ministers in naming the CPP, the NPA and the NDFP chief political consultant, Prof. Jose Maria Sison, as terrorists.

The demonization and criminalization of the CPP, NPA and Prof. Sison by the US, Canadian, Australian and Dutch governments and by the Council of Ministers of the European Union by naming them terrorists has seriously jeopardized the peace negotiations, if it had not yet in fact been scuttled. The CPP and NPA are major organizations in the NDFP, with the NPA as its main armed force and the CPP in turn wielding absolute leadership over the NPA.

The inclusion of Prof. Sison in the terrorist list is absolutely without any factual, legal or moral basis. It is a grave injustice and violation of his democratic rights. Prof Sison is not only a key participant in the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations as the Chief Political Consultant of the NDFP, he is also the prime mover behind the NDFP’s participation in the peace talks. As pointed out earlier, it was Professor Sison who clearly laid down the principles, guidelines and safeguards on the conduct of the NDFP in peace negotiations with the GRP. Prof. Sison’s role in the actual negotiations is aptly described by UN Justice Romeo Capulong when he said that Prof. Sison is the main architect of the ten GRP-NDFP bilateral agreements. It is grotesque irony for one who has contributed that much to the pursuit of peace, to be internationally branded a terrorist.

Beyond doubt, and some of the highest GRP officials themselves have declared as much publicly, the GRP has intended and is now using this terrorist tag as a negotiating lever to intimidate and pressure the NDFP into signing a “final peace accord” which in fact bears all the features of a negotiated surrender or capitulation.

This so-called “final peace agreement” proposes to go through the motions of forging agreements on substantive socio-economic and political reforms. But its real aim is to make the NDFP agree to end hostilities and disarm and demobilize the New People’s Army even without any assurance that such reforms are in place or will even be implemented at all. There is in fact a proviso that practically kills all reforms even before the ink on the agreement dries. In the last part, the proposed document states that all agreements shall be interpreted and implemented in accordance with the Philippine Constitution and its legal processes.

The NDFP cites several violations by the GRP of the bilateral agreements, notably the 1992 The Hague Joint Declaration, the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees, the Joint Agreement on the Formation, Sequence and Operationalization of the Reciprocal Working Committees and the Supplementary Agreement on the Formation, Sequence and Operationalization of the Reciprocal Working Committees.

The NDFP points to the collaboration of the GRP with the US and other foreign powers in allowing them to encroach on the jurisdiction of the two parties in their negotiations as itself a grievous violation of the bilateral agreements, notably The Hague Joint Declaration of 1992 providing that negotiations must be held in accordance with the principle of national sovereignty, the JASIG which stipulates that none of those involved in the peace negotiations must be put under duress, and the CARHRIHL which provides that the GRP respect the Hernandez doctrine in its own jurisprudence, disallowing the criminalization of alleged political offenses.

Conclusions

The road to genuine peace is no doubt long and tortuous, full of twists and turns, detours,. obstacles and traps. Peace negotiations are no exception. Preserving one’s revolutionary integrity over the negotiating table requires as much clarity in objectives, correct analysis of concrete conditions, correct strategy, alertness, perseverance, firmness in principle and flexibility in tactics as in the battlefield. When those in power realize they could no longer defeat the forces of change in the battlefield, they will attempt to do so over the negotiating table. As much as each party could gain over the negotiating table that they would not in the battlefield, so too are the losses they could incur.

Those who turn to peace negotiations as an alternative path because they are tired of armed struggle, or are enticed by the apparent relief from and mitigation of hardships and sacrifice offered by the prospect of a cessation of hostilities will be vulnerable to succumb to a formula for capitulation and pacification rather than a just and lasting peace.

The capitulation or surrender of an armed group fighting for a legitimate cause may result in a cessation of hostilities and relative calm or peace. But armed conflict is bound to flare up again so long as its roots are not addressed. We have the clear example of the Mindanao conflict, where two peace accords, the second one named a “Final Peace Accord”, coupled with the continuing and intensifying war between the GRP and the MILF, bear witness to the futility of ending war without removing the problems that cause it..

Genuine peace cannot be achieved through peace negotiations alone. The various forms of struggle are interrelated and can complement each other when properly wielded . The strength of a negotiating position arises from one’s strength in the battlefield and in other arenas, including legal protest actions and mass movements. The peace negotiations, in turn, can support the armed struggle and other forms of struggle including legal protest actions and mass movements.

The bottom line is that peace negotiations must contribute to the attainment of a just and lasting peace. They must serve to address and resolve the roots of the armed conflict. In backward third world countries such as the Philippines, peace negotiations must contribute to bringing about the radical social, economic and political changes that are needed to end foreign domination and eradicate poverty, social injustice and inequity.

The forces of reaction will always strive to crush the forces of change. Genuine peace is achieved when the forces of change prevail. #

Paper for NEPP-PEPP Luzon Workshop
Rey Claro Casambre
Philippine Peace Center
Subic Bay, 11 October 2007

Four months ago, in June 2007, a faint glimmer of hope shone amidst the seemingly impermeable darkness and uncertainty that had shrouded the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations for the past three years.

For the first time since the formal talks were postponed and then suspended indefinitely in 2004, both the GRP and the NDFP appeared to be seeking a way out of the impasse, both sides displaying a willingness to compromise and bend from erstwhile hardline positions in order to find a mutually acceptable formula for the declaration of a ceasefire and the resumption of formal peace talks. The government proposed a ceasefire for a number of months for the duration of talks, a departure from its prior precondition of a prolonged or indefinite ceasefire that the NDFP had always before rejected. The NDFP responded by saying it was open to a limited ceasefire for the duration of the formal talks, preceded by a joint agreement in accordance with a proposed ten-point “Concise Agreement for an Immediate Just Peace”, with all prior bilateral agreements.

The optimism would be reinforced by the positive intervention of the Supreme Court that unequivocally spoke against the evident pattern and state policy of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Under the leadership of Chief Justice Reynato Puno, the Supreme Court called for an unprecedented national summit to address these problems and formulate new legal procedures that would help deter and minimize, if not eradicate, the incidence of these human rights violations.

All that now seems so far away. The glimmer of hope has not only faded, it has been violently extinguished

There is no doubt that the recent arrest of Prof. JMS and the raids on the office and residences of the NDFP panel members and staff in Utrecht, The Netherlands have drastically changed the situation for the worse, perhaps irreversibly.

What is the impact of arrest on the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations?

• At a time when the peace negotiations badly need gestures of goodwill and confidence-building measures, the arrest of JMS and raids on offices and residences of NDFP negotiating panel members and staff have dealt the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations a severe blow, that threatens to extinguish what little hope is left for the resumption of the formal talks and the advance in the negotiations.
• As expected, the NDFP condemns the attacks, sees these as a sign of negotiating in bad faith, and declares it will not negotiate with a government that violates, rather than complies with the bilateral agreements.
• Mauunawaan natin ang NDF kung iisipin nitong wala nang intension ang GRP sa ilalim ni Macapagal-Arroyo at pursigido itong gamitin ang buong marahas na lakas ng estado para durugin ito. While it initially denied any participation in the move of the Dutch government, documents released by the Dutch prosecution show that the Dutch action was in response to a request by the GRP to extradite Prof. Sison (26 Jan 2005). Eventually, Sec. Norberto Gonzales, Sec. Raul Gonzales, PNP Director Calderon and Deputy Director Razon all admitted, or rather claimed, that they had provided the Dutch government evidences and assisted the accusers of Prof. Sison in filing the case in the Netherlands.
• The US likewise professes not to have been involved, and offers its assistance if the Dutch government requests it, but in fact the testimonies of some of the witnesses were taken by the Dutch investigators at the US embassy.
• It is also clear that NDFP will not give in to GRP pressure to sign a “final peace accord” that does not address the roots of the armed conflict, or that is tantamount to its capitulation or surrender.
• Despite this, neither party has terminated the negotiations nor declared the agreements are no longer binding. This is the proverbial silver lining that gives us, peace advocates, the objective basis for persevering in our calls for the resumption of formal talks and for pushing the negotiations forward in accordance with the bilateral agreements both parties had forged.

What can and should peace advocates do in a situation where both sides appear to be unwilling to resume formal talks?

• We cannot remain passive in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds. Rather, these only mean we must work harder to keep the peace negotiations alive and exert utmost effort to push it forward.
• Join hands in common struggle, seek common principles, aspirations and goals, and work on these together and present a stronger voice.
• Our advocacy cannot be a function of our perception of how “sincere” or “willing” either or both parties are in seeking a genuine peace, but from our faith and conviction that a just and enduring peace is possible and necessary.
• Our quest for a genuine peace has as its main content the advocacy for basic or fundamental reforms that address the roots of the armed conflict. (Note: learn from the experience of the Moro people, or from the peace negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF and the MILF).
• Here are some concrete proposals to address the roots of the armed conflict:
  o Genuine land reform and national industrialization
  o Empowerment of masses through genuine representation
  o Economic sovereignty
  o Independent foreign policy
  o Indictment, investigation and prosecution of plunder, corruption
  o Normal trade and diplomatic relations with other countries
  o Patriotic, scientific and mass culture through education, mass media and mass organizations, cherish the cultural heritage of the Filipino nation and all the ethno-linguistic communities in the country
  o Recognition of right to self-determination of minorities
  o Cancellation of unjust, onerous foreign debts
  o Truce for the purpose of alliance and other constructive purposes

(These are the items in the NDFP’s “Concise Proposal for an Immediate and Just Peace, presented to the GRP in August 2005)

• Take a long view of the peace process
  • Tactically, what to do under conditions that Arroyo government has no intention of proceeding with an agenda that will address the roots of the armed conflict;
    • Study the process, especially the bilateral agreements (see The GRP-NDFP Peace Negotiations). Pay special attention to The 1992 Hague Joint Declaration, on p.1)
    • Call for the resumption of the formal talks
    • Absent the resumption, call for the operationalization of the JMC (to address the complaints vs EJKs and other violations of both sides.)
    • Take a position on the problems and issues, eg the recent arrest and raids, and political
  • Strategically or in the long term, view the peace process beyond GMA whether or not she remains de-facto president before, up to or beyond 2010. Peace negotiations has spanned and can continue to span different administrations (Ramos, Estrada, GMA), and will certainly outlive GMA

Annex:

From Chapter 9, Searching for Peace in Asia-Pacific – An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (edited by Annelies Heijmans, Nicola Simmonds, and Hans van de Veen; a project of the European Center for Conflict Prevention):

The more fundamental difference between the GRP and the NDFP impeding the peace negotiations is a disagreement on the root causes of the armed conflict, and on the nature of a “just and lasting peace”.

The GRP considers the following as the roots of the armed conflict:

• massive and abject poverty
• iniquitous distribution of wealth and control over the base of resources needed for livelihood
• injustice
• poor governance

These are all acknowledged by the NDFP. But the GRP is silent on how foreign domination and control has stunted the growth of the Philippine economy and caused suffering and misery. In contrast, the NDFP highlights this as the fundamental problem.

The difference goes beyond semantics. The NDFP points out that rather than address this problem, successive administrations since the Marcos regime have pursued basically the same economic policies that further open up the economy to foreign exploitation and plunder. Thus, measures being pursued by the GRP, such as Ramos’ Social Reform Agenda, fall short when assessed in terms of how economic independence and progress can be achieved to alleviate the the people’s suffering.

A comparison of the two parties’ proposals for social and economic reforms reveals great disparity on how to address the roots of the armed conflict. The GRP’s proposals all lie within the framework of the Philippine Constitution and laws, notwithstanding the provision in the “six paths to peace” that reforms “may involve constitutional amendments”. In initial negotiations for the Comprehensive Agreement on Social Economic Reform, the GRP resisted any reference whatsover to foreign domination and control of the Philippine economy.

From the 1993 NUC list of “reforms which will deal with the root cause of insurgency”, to last year’s GRP draft “Final Peace Agreement”, for example, no constitutional amendment is proposed for land reform or national industrialization, only better and more vigorous implementation of existing laws such as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

NDFP proposals, on the other hand, hew closely to the “Program for a People’s Democratic Revolution”. Even as adjustments are made considering the nature of negotiations, these proposals nonetheless aim to dismantle monopolies – foreign and local — from which arise the economic and political power of the ruling elite. The most important of these are in agrarian reform, national industrialization, the protection of economic sovereignty and the national patrimony, and upholding the people’s basic social and economic rights. Many of these proposals, if agreed upon would require major constitutional changes.

Without the assistance of a neutral third party, it is unlikely that the peace negotiations would advance this far. From the outset the NDFP has been open to having a foreign neutral third party in the negotiations. But the GRP argued that the armed conflict was an internal matter that should be resolved without any foreign third party intervention. The GRP, wary that having a foreign third party in the negotiations would give the armed conflict an international character and grant the NDFP belligerency status, initially insisted on holding the talks in the Philippines, then proposed a “shifting venue”. The NDFP objected, pointing to the 1986 experience when CPP/NPA/NDFP personnel who surfaced for the peace talks were subjected to intensive surveillance, identification and punitive actions[i]. To underscore its point, the NDFP offered to host the peace talks inside NDFP territory, with the NDFP issuing safe-conduct passes to GRP personnel.

Exploratory and formal talks have been hosted by The Netherlands and Belgium since 1992. The Royal Norwegian Government has acted as third party host since the resumption of formal GRP-NDFP talks in April 2001. It has taken an even more active role as third party facilitator since October 2003. Other, less significant activities by outside parties have included an offer from the Swiss government to host talks (rejected by the GRP)[ii], similar offers from the European Parliament, and European Parliament resolutions supporting the negotiations and expressing concern over human right violations.

In contrast, there is also what might be called foreign third party “conflict aggravation”. For example, the US, The Netherlands, and the Council of the European Union have jeopardized peace negotiations by listing the CPP/NPA and NDFP Chief Political Consultant Jose Maria Sison as “foreign terrorists” since August 2002.

The GRP has itself undermined confidence-building efforts by campaigning for the “terrorist” listing among member-states of the European Union in October 2002, welcoming such actions, and then using the “terrorist” listing to pressure the NDFP into agreeing to a “new enhanced process” that would lead to the signing of a “Final Peace Accord”. The NDFP has denounced the listing and the actions of the GRP as violations of national sovereignty and of the bilateral agreements. It also rejected the GRP’s proposed “new process” and draft “Final Peace Accord” as “negotiated capitulation”.

(This has taken a turn for the worse with the collaboration of the US and Dutch governments in the recent arrest of Prof Sison and the raids on the office and residences of the NDFP negotiating panel members and staff.)

Recommendations

The Philippine experience in conflict resolution validates the criteria for an efficacious approach prescribed by Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse in “Calling for a Broad Approach to Conflict Resolution”[iii]. The GRP-NDFP negotiations and the agreements reached show that progress is possible so long as (1) the parties enter into the negotiations without preconditions or any imposition from either side or outside parties, (2) the agreements are crafted in precise language that strikes a balance between commitment and flexibility (3) there is mutuality and reciprocity in the provisions, and (4) they deal with the core issues and bring about basic changes in society, “in accordance with mutually acceptable principles, including national sovereignty, democracy and social justice[iv].”

1. The most difficult but essential thing to “justpeace-building” is to ensure that the peace process “deals with the core issues” – i.e., it is aimed at addressing the root causes of the armed conflict, especially the social and economic ones. With respect to bilateral peace negotiations, conflict resolution and prevention means ensuring that agreements identify and address the root causes of conflict, prevent their perpetuation and aggravation, and thereby avert the recurrence of violent conflict.

2. Addressing the root causes of armed conflict is invariably a long-drawn out and complicated process. Thus the peace process must be so designed as to generate immediate tangible gains that benefit the people in general, mitigate the adverse effects of the armed conflict, and serve to build confidence and goodwill as the negotiations advance towards the goal of a lasting peace.

This is the advantage in having the agreement on the respect for human rights and international humanitarian law as the first item of the substantive agenda. Its implementation could at once, in the absence of a settlement, mitigate the human cost of the armed conflict. The returns in terms of imbuing both combatants and non-combatants with greater respect for human rights are invaluable, if intangible. The forging of the CARHRIHL likewise helped build confidence in the capabilities of the two parties to move forward to the more contentious item on the agenda, the socio-economic reforms.

3. The peace process needs all the help it can get. Third party official intervention can be either positive (offers of good offices, hosting, facilitation) or negative (e.g., the “terrorist” listings). Intervention by other international organizations can be positive if they contribute to the identification, elaboration and resolution of the causes of armed conflict, and if they help the parties build on their bilateral agreements rather than try to impose their own ideas. Neutrality should mean not taking the side of either party. In the Philippine context, the kind of neutrality which is good, possible, and necessary makes the interests of the greater majority of the Filipino people the paramount consideration in determining what position to adopt vis à vis the twists and turns in the negotiations.

The GRP-NDFP armed conflict has never been purely an internal affair, with the US playing a dominant role in Philippine politics, economy and social-cultural life. September 11 has injected renewed US military activity in the country under the guise of “counter-terrorism”. The inclusion of the CPP, NPA and Prof. Sison in foreign “terrorist” lists underscores the negative impact of international geopolitics on the GRP-NDFP conflict and conflict-resolution.

4. The GRP and NDFP must uphold and comply with bilateral agreements that have proven to be effective in advancing the talks and achieving further substantial agreements. Foremost is The Hague Joint Declaration which serves as the framework and foundation of the negotiations.

5. There is a vast potential for building a strong peace constituency in the people’s movement clamoring for socio-economic and political reforms. To a larger extent, such potential lies in both the organized and still unorganized grassroots masses in the countryside, who are most directly affected by the armed conflict, and who stand to benefit most by its just resolution.

The NGOs, POs and other organizations and individuals in this people’s movement have presented sharp critiques of the present system, policies, etc., and clamor for basic reforms. But they still have to link their advocacy to the peace process, particularly the peace negotiations, and affirm their roles as true stakeholders.

There is a pressing need for further peace education and information work among the populace, the POs, NGOs and other sectoral and grassroots organizations, and for involving them into activities that directly support and enhance the peace process.

In the end it is the people’s conscious and sustained participation in the peace process that will push it forward in the direction of addressing the roots of the armed conflict. The Filipino people are the final arbiters on what will bring about genuine peace.

Realistically speaking, a just and lasting peace in the Philippines is still far beyond the horizon. The peace process has stretched out over many years. The ultimate resolution of the conflict will only come with much more painstaking work not only inside the negotiating room, but more decisively, outside its walls.

 

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[i] Government intelligence officials reported that their intelligence stock on the CPP/NPA/NDFP increased by 60% after the 1986-87 ceasefire and peace talks.

[ii] “Switzerland offers good offices for peace talks between NDF and Aquino government in Geneva. Aquino government rejects offer”, Neue Zuricher Zeitung, 17 May 1991

[iii]Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham & Tony Woodhouse, “Calling for a Broad Approach to Conflict Resolution”, in Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia, edited by Monique Mekenkamp, Paul van Tongeren and Hans van de Veen. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002, p. 34.

[iv]Luis Jalandoni and Jose Yap, “The Hague Joint Declaration”. Signed and issued by Cong. Jose Yap and Luis Jalandoni representing GRP President Ramos and the NDFP, respectively, The Hague, 1 September 1992.

Rey Claro Casambre
Philippine Peace Center
8 November 2007

Paper presented at the Church Leaders’ Meeting under the auspices of the Norwegian Ecumenical Peace Platform (NEPP), 7-8 November 2007.

Introduction

The topic assigned to me is “The Human Security Act and the Rule of Law”.My task is to make a discussion of this topic fit into the program and objectives of this workshop. More particularly, the question I must answer is, why should we talk about the Human Security Act and the Rule of Law after listening to the updates on the peace negotiations from the GRP and NDFP representatives, and before discussing the demands of conflict transformation and the challenges of reconciliation in the peace process?

Let me start by citing a seemingly insignificant and only remotely related incident that appeared in the news a couple of days ago. It was a simple case of a work of art – a mural — being altered by its owner to please his guests, and the artist who created it protesting the changes made. It would have been a simple question of an owner’s right on one hand to do whatever he wants with something he owns, and an artist’s right on the other, to preserve his or her creation. But the cast of characters makes the incident more than that.

The mural – one depicting the state of press freedom in the Philippines — was created by the Neo Angono Artists collective, as commissioned by the National Press Club, which now owns the mural. The NPC had made some afterations on the mural without consulting the Neo-Angono Artists, after the Presidential Security Group commander commented that it (the mural) had “Leftist” marks. The PSG commander was referring, among others, to the alibata K on the arm of Bonifacio. The NPC had this altered with a heart pierced with an arrow. What were the other alterations made?

Interestingly and ironically, among the other alterations made was the complete obliteration of the statement of concern by the International Federation of Journalists over the Human Security Act, or the Anti-Terrorism Law, which was passed by Congress early this year.

The incident itself has a chilling effect. No less than the supposed guardians of press freedom were intimidated and impelled into this act of vandalism and censorship by what the PSG commander claims was a mere casual remark.

The NPC leadership’s reaction is absolutely unjustifiable and unforgivable. The excuse they offered – that the NPC wants to be apolitical and does not want being associated with the Left nor the Right — is quite lame and unacceptable. Altering the mural to please the PSG and avoid incurring the ire of GMA (who would be the guest of honor at its unveiling) was itself a blatantly political and Rightist act.

But if one views this incident in the context of unsolved killings and disappearances of journalists under the GMA government, the filing of libel cases against them by no less than the First Gentleman, and their inclusion in the AFP’s “order of battle” or listing of “enemies of the state”, then the NPC’s reaction of panic is understandable.

In fact, the NPC’s action demonstrates how terrorized and insecure they have become, perhaps just like anyone who is branded as an “enemy of the state”, despite or even because of the Anti-Terrorist Law, aka “Human Security Act”.

The Human Security Act

This, too sounds ironic, but not altogether strange. The Philippine version of an Anti-Terrorist Law, like many of its counterparts worldwide, has among its most objectionable features the following (slide):

1) failure to define clearly what “terrorists” and “terrorist acts”, thereby lumping together criminal acts and legitimate actions of protest, demands, or expressions of dissent and grievance.
2) imposing stiffer penalties on allegedly “terrorist” acts than on the same criminal acts not associated nor accompanied with “terrorism” or political ends
3) suspending if not entirely denying individual and collective rights, even constitutionally mandated rights, for the sake of anti-terrorism
4) vesting certain entities and individuals with extraordinary powers (e.g., the “Anti-Terrorism Council” is vested with prosecutory and judicial powers even if it is not part of the Philippine judiciary).

One possible impact of the HSA on the peace negotiations is that the CPP, NDF and NPA could be proscribed as terrorist organizations. Not a few high government officials, including the AFP and PNP top brass, have expressed their desire and objective to do so. This would surely terminate the peace negotiations.

Another possibility is that progressive organizations and individuals already listed as “enemies of the state” or “communist fronts” would also be proscribed as “terrorist”, giving state security forces further leeway in acting against these organizations and individuals to suppress dissent.

But the real and greater danger in the HSA lies even beyond its provisions. While state security forces and agencies decry what they call the emasculation of the Anti-terrorist law, that it is “toothless” and not strong enough to counter terrorism and send the terrorists to jail, the truth is that grievous human rights violations have been committed with absolute impunity and at an unprecedented scale and intensity for the past six years, even without the HSA. What the HSA has done is to provide an aura of legality, a legal justification, to an extrajudicial “counterterrorist” action, even if the HSA is not actually invoked or applied on a particular case.

In sum, the Human Security Act is itself a source of insecurity. This Anti-Terrorist Law itself terrorizes a broad range of potential victims.

No less than Supreme Court Chief Justice Reynato Puno declared:

… Terrorism is just one means of violating our human rights, especially our right to life itself, and should not consume our entire attention… Terrorism is terrible enough but the mindless, knee jerk reaction to extirpate the evil is more discomforting. The quickie solution is … for the military and the police to use their weapons of destruction under the theme victory at all cost. To put constitutional cosmetics to the military-police muscular efforts, lawmakers usually enact laws using security of the state to justify the dimunition of human rights by allowing arrests without warrants; surveillance of suspects; interception and recording of communications; seizure or freezing of bank deposits, assets and records of suspects. They also redefine terrorism as a crime against humanity and the redefinition is broadly drawn to constrict and shrink further the zone of individual rights.

In many countries, including the US and in Europe, many provisions of their anti-terrorist laws (such as the USA PATRIOT Act) have been questioned, and some have been ruled as unconstitutional or illegal by their own courts. Again, this is not strange, considering that there is no single, universally accepted legal definition of “terrorism”, even six years after 9-11 and the launching of the so-called “war on terror”.

Again citing Chief Justice Puno:

On the universal level, 9/11 altered the face of international law. As the worst victim of terrorism, the United States led the fight to excise and exorcise terrorism from the face of the earth. It pursued a strategy characterized by a bruising aggressiveness that raised the eyebrows of legal observers. The leader country of democracy did not wait for the United Nations to act but immediately sought to search and destroy terrorists withersoever they may be found. In less polite parlance, the search and destroy strategy gave little respect to the sovereignty of states and violated their traditional borders. The strategy which is keyed on military stealth and might had trampling effects on the basic liberties of suspected terrorists for laws are silent when the guns of war do the talking. The war on terrorism has inevitable spilled over effects on human rights all over the world, especially in countries suspected as being used as havens of terrorists. One visible result of the scramble to end terrorism is to take legal shortcuts and legal shortcuts always shrink the scope of human rights.

Are we blaming the US-led “war on terror” entirely for the human rights violations, the state of lawlessness, and the lawlessness of the state? Definitely not. The Arroyo government has its own reasons, and is totally responsible, for tolerating, if not itself promoting, a pattern and policy of extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture and massacres against alleged “enemies of the state”, and using the “war on terror” as a pretext and justification for doing so.

Despite claims of economic recovery and progress, the broad majority of people suffer joblessness, hunger, spiraling prices, onerous taxes, etc. The economy is largely dependent on and at the mercy of foreign capital, and the national patrimony is being opened up further to foreign exploitation and plunder. The Arroyo regime itself is suffering from a serious and long-festering crisis of legitimacy, rocked by monstrous corruption scandals of its own making. Confronted with incessant protests, calls for its removal from office – either through voluntary resignation or by forced ouster — it has resorted to deception, bribery, cooptation and coercion to ward off criticisms and suppress dissent. But most of all it unleashes the coercive forces of the state against those who rise up in protest.

According to Chief Justice Puno :

The threats to our national security and human rights will be aggravated if we have a state, weakened internally by a government hobbled by corruption, struggling with credibility, battling the endless insurgence of the left and the right; and, by a state weakened externally by pressure exerted by creditor countries, by countries where our trade comes from, by countries that supply our military and police armaments. A weak state cannot fully protect the rights of its citizens within its borders just as a state without economic independence cannot protect the rights of its citizens who are abroad from the exploitation of more powerful countries.

Human Rights and Peace

What does all this have to do with the peace process? Chief Justice Puno points out the relationship between human rights, violations of economic and cultural rights, and the relevance of these to the quest for peace:

The promotion of human rights is also the indispensable predicate of peace and progress. For this reason, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Its two implementing covenants are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These instruments not only denounced nazism and fascism, but also recognized that the “security of individual rights, like the security of national rights, was a necessary requisite to a peaceful and stable world order.”

xxx we need to give a broader, innovative view on our efforts to protect the human rights of our people which should consider our distinct social, economic and political context.
Xxx In poor countries, it is poverty that truly terrorizes people for they are terrorized by the thought that they will die because of empty stomachs and not that they will lose their lives due to some invisible suicide bombers. In poor countries, it is also poverty that renders the poor vulnerable to violation of their rights, for the poor will not vindicate their rights in a justice system that moves in slow motion and whose wheels have to be greased with money. And would any dare to doubt, that our national security and our human rights are more threatened by the fear that we face an environmental collapse if we do not take immediate steps to save our seas and our forests from the despoliation to satisfy the economic greed of the few. Again, the realities may be uncomfortable but let the statistics talk and they tell us that in year 2000 for example, 300,000 people all over the world died due to violence in armed conflicts but as many people die each and every month because of contaminated water or lack of adequate sanitation.

In the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal Second Session on the Philippines held in The Hague, Netherlands in March 2007, the plaintiffs – organizations of human rights victims under the Arroyo government – declared in their Summation:

… we have shown that these gross and systematic violations of civil and political rights, of social, economic and cultural rights, and of the right to national self-determination and independence, are distinct but at the same time not isolated from each other. They are closely and intrinsically interrelated.

1. The poverty and social injustice brought about by the economic plunder, rampant graft and corruption, and other violations of their social, economic and cultural rights by the Defendants are pushing the great majority of the people, especially the toiling peoples, to protest their condition and fight for better social conditions.

2. The Macapagal-Arroyo regime, like its predecessors, uses deception and coercion alternately and in combination in order to suppress and defeat the peoples’ protests and struggle for genuine independence, democracy and social justice. But as the people’s movements gain strength and they become less vulnerable to deception, the Macapagal-Arroyo regime and its foreign patrons increasingly resort to the coercive forces at its disposal. It does so for its own political survival, for retaining and protecting its narrow economic interests, and to protect the interests of its foreign patrons, especially US imperialism.

Our role and contribution

This brings us to where the peace negotiations currently are, and what we as peace advocates and church leaders can and should contribute in our people’s quest for a just and enduring peace.

What can and should peace advocates do in a situation where both sides appear to be unwilling to resume formal talks? Allow me to reiterate some points I had presented earlier at the Luzon Workshop held at Subic last October.

• We cannot remain passive in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds. Rather, these only mean we must work harder to keep the peace negotiations alive and exert utmost effort to push it forward.
• Join hands in common struggle, seek common principles, aspirations and goals, and work on these together and present a stronger voice.
• Our advocacy cannot be a function of our perception of how “sincere” or “willing” either or both parties are in seeking a genuine peace, but from our faith and conviction that a just and enduring peace is possible and necessary.
• Our quest for a genuine peace has as its main content the advocacy for basic or fundamental reforms that address the roots of the armed conflict. (Note: learn from the experience of the Moro people, or from the peace negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF and the MILF).
• Here are some concrete proposals to address the roots of the armed conflict:
  • Genuine land reform and national industrialization
  • Empowerment of masses through genuine representation
  • Economic sovereignty
  • Independent foreign policy
  • Indictment, investigation and prosecution of plunder, corruption
  • Normal trade and diplomatic relations with other countries
  • Patriotic, scientific and mass culture through education, mass media and mass organizations, cherish the cultural heritage of the Filipino nation and all the ethno-linguistic communities in the country
  • Recognition of right to self-determination of minorities
  • Cancellation of unjust, onerous foreign debts
  • Truce for the purpose of alliance and other constructive purposes

(These are the items in the NDFP’s “Concise Proposal for an Immediate and Just Peace, presented to the GRP in August 2005)

• Take a long view of the peace process
  • Tactically, what to do under conditions that Arroyo government has no intention of proceeding with an agenda that will address the roots of the armed conflict;
    • Study the process, especially the bilateral agreements (see The GRP-NDFP Peace Negotiations). Pay special attention to The 1992 Hague Joint Declaration, on p.1)
    • Call for the resumption of the formal talks
    • Absent the resumption, call for the operationalization of the JMC (to address the complaints vs EJKs and other violations of both sides.)
    • Take a position on the problems and issues, eg the recent arrest and raids, and political
  • Strategically or in the long term, view the peace process beyond GMA whether or not she remains de-facto president before, up to or beyond 2010. Peace negotiations has spanned and can continue to span different administrations (Ramos, Estrada, GMA), and will certainly outlive GMA

Briefly, here are some suggested concrete measures:
1. Protection of Human Rights

1.1. Call on the government to repudiate “Oplan Bantay Laya” and the AFP policy and practice of branding its critics, progressives, peace advocates, etc as “enemies of the state”, which have been pointed out by the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial Killings, Philip Alston, as having resulted in extra-judicial executions and other violations of human rights.
1.2. Call for the immediate reactivation or resumption of meetings of the Joint Monitoring Committee even while the formal talks remain suspended.

2. Social and Economic Reforms

2.1. Work for the resumption of formal talks so that the formal negotiations on the Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms, which had started in April 2001 can resume.
2.2. Hold widespread consultations, fora, roundtable discussions, education and information campaigns, etc. on the draft proposals of the GRP and NDFP.

3. Resumption of formal talks

3.1. Call for the immediate resumption of formal talks on the basis of The Hague Joint Declaration and other bilateral agreements.
3.2. Support the proposal for a ceasefire based on a concise agreement for an immediate just peace
3.3. Support the formation of technical working groups and groups of experts to accelerate the talks.

Finally, I would like to conclude by giving my two cents’ worth on two points raised in the very frank and animated discussion last night:

Can genuine peace be achieved through the bilateral peace negotiations alone? (No. The bilateral negotiations are an important or essential arena, but only one of many.)
Can genuine peace be achieved by the removal – by forced resignation, ouster, or whatever — of GMA alone?
No. This is the clear lesson from EDSA 1 and 2 (or People Power 1 and 2).

But is the removal of GMA necessary to achieve genuine peace? We still have the rest of this morning and the whole afternoon to answer this question.

Inihanda ni Rey Casambre
Para sa Pulong ng BAYAN National Council
Oktubre 28, 2002

Sa unang tingin, may nagaganap na biglaan at malaking pagbabago sa mundo na nagsimula noong Setyembre 11, 2001. Mabilis at mabalasik ang mga pangyayari mula nang bombahin ang World Trade Center at ang Pentagon. Kagyat na nagdeklara si George W. Bush, Presidente ng USA, ng isang “digmaan laban sa terorismo” na diumano sasaklaw sa buong mundo at tatagos at ikasasangkot ng lahat ng bayan, nang walang pasubali. “Kung hindi kayo papanig sa amin, ituturing namin kayong kaaway,” ani Bush. Kagyat ding itinuon ng US ang pag-uusig sa sarili nitong mga mamamayang di nito mapagkatiwalaan. Ilang linggo pa lang ipinasa ng Kongreso ng US ang “Patriot Act” na sumusupil sa mga karapatang pantao ng mga Amerikanong pinaghihinalaan pa lamang na may kaugnayan sa mga diumanong mga terorista.

Wala pang isang buwan ang nakalipas, nilusob ng US ang Afghanistan nang walang pagsangguni man lamang sa United Nations. Simpleng ikinatwiran ang hinalang kinukupkop ng gobyernong Taliban ng Afghanistan ang pinaghihinalaang mga teroristang bumomba sa WTC at Pentagon, si Osama bin Laden at ang pinamumunuan nitong Al Qaeda. Matapos ang walang habas at walang habag na pambobomba at pag-atake maging sa mga sibilyan na populasyon at mga instalasyon, nagtagumpay ang US sa pagpapabagsak at pagpapalit sa gobyernong Taliban. Pero bigo ito sa idineklarang layunin na “dalhin sa hustisya, o dalhin ang hustisya, kay Bin Laden at Al Qaeda. Ngayon, ginagamit pa itong dahilan ng US para sa patuloy na pagpapanatili ng mga pwersang militar nila sa Afghanistan at mga kanugnog na bayan sa Central Asia.

Kasunod nito ang isinagawang pagtugis diumano sa Abu Sayyaf sa Pilipinas, sa likod ng balatkayong “Balikatan 02-1 joint combined exercises training”. Kaakibat ng deklarasyong ang Pilipinas at Timog-silangang Asia ang “ikalawang larangan” ng “gyera laban sa terorismo”, maramihan at matagalang lumahok ang US Special Operations Forces sa kampanyang militar laban sa mga Abu Sayyaf sa Basilan at iba pang bahagi ng Mindanao. Simpleng ikinatwirang mga terorista ang mga ito kahimat walang matibay na ebidensya ng tuwirang ugnayan sila kina bin Laden at Al Qaeda, liban sa katotohanang kapwa sila nilikha ng CIA bilang bahagi ng mga “surrogate forces” ng US. Muli, bigo ang US at AFP sa isinaad na layuning durugin ang Abu Sayyaf. Muli, ginagamit pa itong katwiran para sa patuloy na pagpapanatili sa ilang US Special Forces sa Mindanao diumano para tapusin ang mga “humanitarian & infrastructure projects” na sinimulan nilang gawin sa panahong tinutugis ang Abu Sayyaf.

Ngayon naman maingay na nagtatambol at naghahamon ang US para sa pakikipag-gyera kay Saddam Hussein ng Iraq. Bilang bahagi diumano ng “war against terror”, ang pagpapabagsak kay Hussein, pagpapaupo ng gobyernong maamo sa US, at ang pagwasak sa kakayahan ng Iraq na gumawa ng mga bombang nuclear at iba pang “weapons of mass destruction” ang inilalahad ng gobyernong Bush na layunin sa pag-atake sa Iraq. Pero di tulad ng digma sa Afghanistan, hirap ngayon ang gubyernong Bush na makakabig ng malakas at malawak na suporta para sa gyera sa Iraq.

Ito’y sa dahilang kung ihahambing sa paglusob nito sa Afghanistan, malayong higit nang nailalantad at kung gayon binabatikos ang tunay na layunin ng US sa paglusob sa Iraq: (1) ang mapalakas ang pampulitikang lakas nito sa Gitnang Silangan, at (2) ang pag-agaw at pagkontrol ng malaking rekurso sa langis na matatagpuan sa teritoryo ng Iraq.

Malinaw na mula Setyembre 11, nagkaroon ng ibayong paglakas at paglawak ng opensiba ng US sa larangan ng pulitika, ekonomya at militar. Dulot lang ba ito ng pambobomba ng Setyembre 11, tulad ng paniwala ng marami? Ang mga ito ba’y kontraopensibang tugon lamang ng US bilang paghiganit sa sinapit nitong trahedya sa kamay ng mga terorista, pagtatanggol sa sarili para hindi maulit ang kalunos-lunos na pangyayari, at responsableng pamumuno sa isang dakilang pandaigdigang kampanya laban sa terorismo para sa kaligtasan at pag-unlad ng buong daigdig?

Alam na natin ngayon ang sagot sa tanong na ito. May malilinaw na mga indikasyon at katunayang ang nabanggit na mayor na mga hakbang tulad ng Patriot Act, paglusob sa Afghanistan at mga pagbabago sa disposisyong militar matapos ang 9-11 ay napag-isipan at napaghandaang ipatupad ilang buwan o taon pa nga bago nangyari ang 9-11. Kung bubuin ang mga katunayan, at susuriin nang mas malalim, makikita ang katotohanang ang “gyera laban sa terorismo” ay isa lamang balatkayo para sa ibayo at walang-habas na opensibang pampulitika, pang-ekonomya, pangkultura at militar ng imperyalismong US para mapalawak at mapatatag ang pandaigdigang hegemonya nito.

Ang ibayong opensibang ito ay masasabing nagsimula noon pang nakaraang dekada kung kailan nagsibagsakan ang mga rehimen sa Silangang Europa at tuluyang gumuho ang Unyong Sobyet. Ang pagtatapos ng “Cold War” ang nagtulak sa US sa pusisyon bilang nag-iisa at walang-kasinlakas na superpower. Matatandaan nating namayagpag ang US noon at kagyat na inilunsad ang “globalisasyon” bilang mayor at masaklaw na opensiba sa ekonomya at ideolohiya.

Matatandaan din nating nagtapos ang “Cold War” sa panahong dalawang dekada nang nakabalaho ang pandaigdigang sistemang kapitalista sa papatinding krisis ng sobrang produksyon, na namamanipesta sa matumal na paglago ng mga ekonomya maging ng mga pinakamalalaking kapitalistang kapangyarihan. Para mapalakas ang pusisyon ng mga imperyalistang estado at ng monopolyo kapital, ipinataw sa mga mahihina’t maliiit na ekonomya ang neoliberal na mga patakaran ng liberalisasyon, deregulasyon, at pribatisasyon na nagpatindi ng pagsasamantala at pang-aapi sa higit na nakararami sa mamamayan ng buong daigdig.

Tinawag ito ni George H. Bush, Sr. bilang “New World Order” o “Bagong Kaayusan”. Pero sa katunayan ito’y dili’t iba kundi ang lumang kaayusang higit na naging magulo. Pinatunayan ng mahigit sampung taong pagpapatupad ng mga “neoliberal” na mga patakaran na hindi pa rin makaahon sa krisis ng sobrang produksyon ang pandaigdigang kapitalistang sistema, lalong lumubog sa kumunoy ng utang at depresyon ang maliliit at mahihinang ekonomya lalo na ng Ikatlong Daigdig, at nanatiling nakabalaho sa mababang antas na paglago ang mga makapangyarihang ekonomyang imperyalista. Kamakailan, pumasok sa recession ang mga ekonomyang US, Russia, Australia, Canada Japan at Germany. (review Pol’s charts). Kamakailan, pumutok ang “economic bubble” sa US, na likha ng matagal at malubhang artipisyal na pagpapalobo ng mga tubo at halaga ng mga transaksyon. Kabilang dito ang pinakagarapal at lansakang pandaraya at pagsisinungaling sa pagdeklara ng mga tubo ng malalaking monopolyong korporasyong Amerikano.

Dahil sa kagahulan ng panahon, ihahanay lamang natin ang ilang pinaka-signipikanteng mga katangian ng komprehensibong opensibang ito na nagtatago sa maskarang “gyera laban sa terorismo” at kung ano ang naging hugis nito mula noong Setyembre 11.

1. Sa larangan ng pulitika:

1. ang pagtatangkang hatiin ang mundo sa pagitan ng “terorista” at “kontra-terorista” samantantalang arbitraryo at tusong inihanay na “terorista” at pinagmumukhang-demonyo ang mga matatatag at epektibong anti-imperyalista tulad ng CPP-NPA at si Prop. Sison;
2. pagpapatindi at pagpapalawak ng mga mapanupil at pasistang hakbang tulad ng Patriot Act, pagbubuo ng mga sekretong military tribunal para sa pag-usig at paglitis sa mga diumanong pinaghihinalaang terorista, at paghikayat o pagtulak sa mga kliyenteng estado na magpatupad ng katumbas na mga batas at hakbang sa iba’t ibang bayan;
3. paglalagay ng sarili sa ibabaw ng ibang mga bansa; paglabag sa soberanya at territorial integrity ng mga bansa maisagawa lamang ang pakay ayon sa makitid na sariling interes, e.g. ang itinutulak ng US na anti-teroristang tratado sa Timog-silangang Asya kung saan pinaaalis nito ang mga probisyong nangangalaga sa soberanya ng mga bansa
4. tahasang pagdeklara na maaari nilang tanggalin at palitan ang sinumang head of state nang ayon sa kagustuhan at interes ng US (tingnan ang QDRR 2000 at ang talumpati ni Bush sa West Point)
5. paglagay sa sarili sa ibabaw ng United Nations, ng internasyunal na batas at internasyunal na makataong batas;
   • paglabag sa probisyon ng UN Charter hinggil sa mga kondisyon sa paggamit ng dahas o digma (self-defense when under attack, exhaustion of diplomatic means, multilateral peace-enforcement action decided on by Security Council)
   • paggamit ng resolusyon ng UN bilang lisensya sa pagdigma (eg Reso 678 vs Iraq)

6. paggawa ng mga hakbang na tahasang nagbubunga ng paglabag sa makataong karapatan, pagtanggi na mapailalim ang tropang US sa ilalim ng mga Kasunduan at international norms na nagtatanggol sa mga karapatang pantao, halimbawa:
   • pagtutulak na ideklara ng ibang bayan na “terorista” ang mga itinuturing ng US na terorista batay sa sarili nitong depinisyon
   • pagsasantabi o pagbabalewala ng mga probinsyon laban sa political extradition (ekstradisyon sa dahilang political)
   • kampanya laban sa ratipikasyon ng Rome Statute at pagtatatag sa ICC at nagbibigay dito ng mandato at kapangyarihan, at pagbuo ng mga bilateral na kasunduang epektibong magsasawalamisa sa ICC.

2. Sa larangan ng militar

1. ang pagpapalakas ng “permanently stationed”, “forward stationed” at “forward deployed” na mga pwersa sa iba’t ibang rehyon ng daigdig (QDRR 2001);
2. pagbanta ng “preemptive strike” o “first strike”, kasama ang banta ng paggamit ng sandatang nuclear
3. paggamit ng mataas na teknolohiya para sa intelligence and surveillance, mas malalakas, mabisa at mapanirang mga sandata at munisyon tulad ng mga deep-penetration incendiary bombs, cluster bumbs, etc. na naglalayon diumanong magbigay ng maririin at pamatay na dagok sa kaaway nang may minimal na kaswalidad sa mga tropang US, pero sa kalakaran ay nagdudulot sa mga sibilyan ng ng malalaking pinsala at pagkasalanta na manhd na tinatawag lamang na “collateral damage”
4. ibayong paggamit ng mga Special Operations Forces na may kasanayan, kakayahan at atas na magsagawa ng intelligence & surveillance, “foreign internal defense operations”, pag-oorganisa ng mga katutubo para sa kontra-insurhensya, at mga lihim na misyon tulad ng sabotahe, asasinasyon, pagdukot (abductions) kung saan “hindi maaaring aminin ng gobyernong US ang pagkasangkot dito”
   5. pagsasanay-militar ng mga lokal na pwersang panagupa sa iba’t ibang dako at bayan
      • 100,000 tropang dayuhan ang sinasanay ng US taun-taon sa US at 180 bansa
      • isa itong paraan ng forward deployment — sa bawat linggo, may idinaraos na pagsasanay ang 5,000 US-SOF sa 60 bansa sa buong mundo
      • noong 1997-98, nagdaos ng mga pagsasanay sa Turkmenistan

3. Sa larangan ng ekonomya

1. pagtiyak sa kontrol sa mga estratehikong rekurso lalo na ang reserba ng langis
2. paghahanda at paglunsad ng digma para makatulong sa pag-ahon mula sa krisis at pagkamal na mas malalaking tubo ng mga korporasyon sa “military-industrial complex”
3. pagsusulong ng mga “neoliberal” na mga patakaran ng globalisasyon
4. pag-bailout sa mga malalaking monopolyong nalulugi bunga ng pagputok ng “economic bubble” ng artipisyal at dinayang mga “tubo” at transayson

4. Sa larangan ng ideolohiya at kultura

1. pagpapalitaw na ang US ang sentro at pinagmumulan ng kalayaan, demokrasya, katarungan, kasaganaan, etc at kung gayon siyang may solong kakayahan at karapatang maging “tagapagtanggol” nito sa buong mundo
2. pagpapalaganap sa “kabutihan” at superyoridad ng neoliberalismo, globalisasyon at ng kapitalismo bilang “dulo ng kasaysayan”
3. pagsasa-demonyo sa mga kaaway ng imperyalismo bilang mga “rogue states”, “axis of evil”, “terorista”, etc.

Mga Pangunahing Punto:

1. Malinaw na napapatunayan ang pagsusuri na imperyalismo ang pinagmumulaan ng digmaan at ng banta ng digmaan. Nangangahulugan ang imperyalismo ng digma.
2. Bago pa man nangyari ang 9/11 o ang pambubomba sa WTC at Pentagon, puspusan nang naghahanda ang US sa paglulunsad ng mga gyera ng agresyon, ng malawak at masinsing interbensyong militar sa iba’t ibang bahagi ng daigdig, na ang layunin ay palawakin at patatagin ang hegemonya nito, ang kanyang imperyalistang dominasyon at paghahari sa buong mundo.
3. Katangian ng “gyera laban sa terorismo”:
   • mas matindi at malawak na paggamit ng terorismo ng estado ng US at mga alyado nito
   • lansakang pagbalewala at paglabag sa mga internasyunal na batas
   • lansakang pagbalewala at paglabag sa karapatang pantao
   • lansakang pagbalewala at paglabag sa internasyunal na makataong batas

Kongklusyon

Mga kasama! Noong 1998, binigyan ninyo ako ng pagkakataon at tungkuling talakayin sa Pambansang Kongreso ng BAYAN imperyalistang globalisasyon. Binanggit ko noon na may ispesyal o natatanging papel na ginagampanan ang Pilipinas sa paglitaw ng globalisasyon sa mundong ito: na kasaba ng “pagtuklas” ni Magellan sa ating mga isla, napatunayan niya na ang mundo ay hindi isang malawak na kapatagan kundi isang globo. Higit pa rito, natuklasan ni Magellan ang bagong mga ruta ng kalakalan – trade routes – mula sa “Old World” tungo sa “New World” ng Americas at sa Asya. Ito ang isa sa mga nagbunsod ng tinatawag na “primitive accumulation of capital” na naging daan sa paglakas ng kapitalismo sa Europa hanggang sa maging dominanteng sistemang pang-ekonomya ito sa buong mundo.

Kung babalik-aralan ang nakaraang siglo ng pag-iral at pag-unlad ng imperyalismo, lalo na ang imperyalismong US, makikita rin an ng kahalagahan ng Pilipinas sa pag-unlad at paglakas nito. Mistulang isang laboratoryo at “pilot project” ang Pilipinas sa paglikha, pagpapaunlad at pagkikinis ng mga kolonyal at neokolonyal na mga pamamaraan nito, tulad ng paggamit ng dalawahang-taktika ng dahas at panlilinlang. Malinaw din ang kahalagahan ng Pilipinas sa US bilang “outpost” para sa ekspansyon at dominasyon sa Asya. Sa larangan ng militar, matagal na nagsilbi ang Pilipinas bilang forward base, likuran, at lunsaran ng mga aksyong pulitiko-militar ng US . Ipinapaliwanag nito kung bakit at papaanong nagiging mapagpasyang salik ang US sa pulitika, ekonomya, kultura at patakarang panlabas ng Pilipinas.

Sa kabilang banda, narito rin sa Pilipinas ang isa sa pinakamalakas, tumpak at mabisang anti-imperyalistang kilusan sa mundong ito. Maningning at dakila ang kasaysayan ng mamamayang Pilipino sa pagtutol at paglanban sa dayuhang pananakop at dominasyon. Sa kasalukuyan, kinikilala ang rebolusyonaryong kilusang mapagpalaya sa Pilipinas bilang isa sa mga nasa unahan ng anti-imperyalistang kilusan sa buong mundo, at makabuluhang umaambag dito.

Sa mga dahilang ito, malaki ang tungkulin nating suriing mabuti ang mga implikasyon ng pandaigdigang kalagayan, lalo na ang kasalukuyang “gyera laban sa terorismo”, sa lipunan at pakikibaka dito sa Pilipinas. Kaalinsabay nito ang pagkakaroon ng Pilipinas sa kasalukuyan ng isang sagadsarin at sunud-sunurang gobyerno na walang kahihiyan at walang katulad sa pagiging sipsip sa US. Kailangan din nating isaalang-alang ang malalim pang atrasadadong kolonyal na mentalidad ng malawak na bilang ng mamamayang Pilipino.