I. Istorikal na Pagbalik-tanaw

Mahigit tatlumpung taon nang umiiral sa ating bayan ang digmaang sibil. Noong 1968-69, halos magkasabay na nagdeklara ang Communist Party of the Philippines- New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) at ang Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) ng mga armadong paghamon sa kapangyarihan ng Gobyerno ng Republika ng Pilipinas (GRP). Noong 1972, ginamit ni Marcos ang diumanong “rebelyon mula sa Kaliwa at sa Kanan” bilang dahilan o katwiran para sa pagdeklara ng batas militar. Pero sa katunayan, ipinataw ni Marcos ang pasistang diktadurang pahahari para panatilihin ang sarili sa kapangyarihan at supilin ang protesta at paglaban ng mamayan para sa kanilang kapakanan at mga karapatan.

Hindi nagawa ng buong lakas ng estado maging sa rurok ng lakas ng diktadura na supilin ang paglaban ng mamamayan. Bagkus, ang panunupil ng estado ay tinugunan ng mamamayan ng mas matibay at mas malakas na paglaban. At sapagkat inianak ng diktadura ang higit pang pagkatuta sa dayuang interes, mga katiwalian at korupsyon sa gobyerno, at pang-aabuso ng mga pasistang militar, higit pang tumindi ang pagsasamantala at pang-aapi sa mamamayan. Ang hindi na mabatang pagsasamantala at pang-aapi ang nagtulak sa parami nang paraming mamamayan na tumutol at lumaban, kapwa sa armado at di-armadong mga paraan.

Kapwa lumakas, lumaki, lumaganap at tumindi ang pakikipaglaban ng CPP-NPA-NDF at ng Bangsa Moro sa Gobyerno ng Republika ng Pilipinas. Kaalinsabay, ang pagtindi ng krisis at ang kasakiman ng mga naghaharing paksyon ng mga reaksyunaryo ang nagpalalim at nagpalaki sa bitak sa hanay ng mga naghaharing uri. Hanggang namuo ang makapangyarihang anti-pasistang daluyong na nagpabagsak sa diktadurang Marcos.

Sa ilalim ng humaliling administrasyong Aquino, idinaos noong Disyembre 1986-Enero 1987, sa kauna-unahang pagkakataon, ang negosasyong pangkapayapaan sa pagitan ng gobyerno (GRP) at ng National Democratic Front (NDF). Pero nabahura ito sa pag-uusap hinggil sa mga teknikalidad ng seguridad at tigil-putukan. Kagyat itong gumuho matapos ang Mendiola Massacre ng Enero 22 kung saan 27 magbubukid ang napatay nang pagbabarilin ng mga tropa ng gobyerno ang mga magsasakang mapayapang nagpapahayag ng kanilang lehitimong mga hinaing at kahilingan sa harap ng Malacanang.

Noong 1990, nagmungkahi ang NDF na muling buksan ang negosasyong pangkapayapaan, subalit hinadlangan ito ng mga militarista sa gobyerno sa pangunguna ni Hen Fidel V. Ramos, na naggiit na dapat munang magkaroon ng tigil-putukan at magsalong ng mga sandata ang mga NPA bago muling buksan ang negosasyong pangkapayapaan.

Kaya’t maraming nagulat nang ihayag ni Ramos, sa kanyang Inaugural Address matapos mahalal na Pangulo noong 1992, ang patakarang itulak ang negosasyong pangkapayapaan sa mga armadong grupong lumalaban sa gobyerno, kabilang ang NDF, ang MNLF at MILF, at ang RAM-SFP-YOU. Nagbunga ito ng kagyat na kasunduan sa pagitan ng GRP at RAM noong Disyembre 1992, at ang Kasunduan sa pagitan ng GRP at MNLF noong 1996. Itong huli ang nagbunsod ng pagkakabuo sa ilalim ng GRP ng SPCPD sa pamumuno ni Nur Misuari, ang pinuno ng MNLF.

Hindi kataka-taka ni kagulat-gulat ang kasunduang GRP-RAM-SFP-YOU. Mula’t mula’y kinikilala at nagpapailim ang mga rebeldeng militar sa Konstitusyon ng Republika ng Pilipinas at sa prinsipyong ang AFP ang tanging lehitimong armadong pwersa.

Hindi rin kataka-taka ang kasunduan sa pagitan ng GRP at MNLF dahil noong 1974 pa lamang, tinanggap na ng MNLF ang tagubilin ng OIC na dapat lutasin ang sigalot sa Mindanao sa balangkas ng Konstitusyon at mga batas ng GRP. Sa Kasunduang Tripoli ng 1976, pumayag ang MNLF na ipatupad ang “pang-rehiyong awtonomiya” sa balangkas ng Konstitusyon ng GRP, na taliwas sa dating ipinaglalaban nitong isang Bangsa Moro na malaya at hiwalay sa Republika ng Pilipinas. Hindi ito naging katanggap-tanggap sa isang bahagi ng MNLF sa pamumuno ni Hashim Salamat. Paglaon, noong 1984, humiwalay sa MNLF ang bahaging ito at itinayo ang Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

Kung ikukumpara sa negosasyon ng GRP sa RAM at MNLF, higit na naging mabagal, atras-abante at masalimuot ang negosasyong GRP-NDF. Noong 1992, inihayag ang “The Hague Joint Declaration” sa pagitan ng GRP at NDF na nagtatakda ng layunin, balangkas, mga pamamaraan at substantibong agenda ng usapang pangkapayapaan sa pagitan ng dalawang panig.

Malinaw na isinaad sa Deklarasyon na pangunahin at ultimong layunin ng negosasyon ang resolusyon ng armadong labanan sa pamamagitan ng pagharap at paglutas sa mga ugat nito. (Note: in contrast, tinangkang igiit ng GRP bilang ultimong layunin ang “paglutas o pagharap sa mga ugat ng armadong labanan sa pamamagitan ng mapayapang paraan.”)

Inilinaw rin na ang balangkas ng negosasyon ay ang mga prinsipyong katatanggap-tanggap sa dalawang panig tulad ng demokrasya, pambansang soberanya at katarungang panlipunan. Ibig sabihin, hindi ipapataw ng alinmang panig ang sarili nitong Konstitusyon at mga batas sa kabilang panig. Nangangahulugan din itong hindi dapat magkaroon ng mga paunang kundisyong taliwas sa likas na katangian ng negosasyon kung saan magkapantay at magkatimbang ang dalawang panig. (cf GRP framework: GRP Constitution and legal processes)

Bagamat mabagal at masalimuot ang proseso, nakamit ng GRP at NDF ang ilan pang mahahalagang kasunduan sa mga pamamaraan (o tinatatawag na “modalities”) ng negosasyon. Tampok dito ang JASIG, ang Ground Rules of the Formal Meetings, at ang Formation, Sequence and Operationalization of the RWCs. Nagsimula ang Pormal na Usapan noong Hunyo 1995, bagamat noong Hulyo 1996 na lamang nagsimula ang aktwal na usapan hinggil sa unang substantibong agenda, ang paggalang sa Karapatang pantao at sa Internasyunal na Batas Pantao (International Humanitarian Law).

Matapos ang halos dalawang taon na negosasyon, nilagdaan ng dalawang panel noong Marso 16, 1998 ang “Komprehensibong Kasunduan sa Paggalang ng mga Karapatang Tao at sa Internasyonal na Makataong Batas” (Comprehensive Agreement on the Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, o CARHRIHL). Kagyat itong inaprubahan ni Mariano Orosa, Tagapangulo ng NDF, noong Abril 10, 1998. Sa kabilang dako, hindi ito inaprubahan ni Fidel Ramos kahit may nalalabi pang panahon sa kanyang panunungkulan bilang Pangulo ng GRP. Noong Agosto 7, 1998, inaprubahan ni G. Estrada ang CARHRIHL. Pero sa halip na ipatupad ang CARHRIHL, tumanggi ang GRP na ipatupad ito batay sa pagdadalawang-isip at pagtutol nila sa ilang probisyon ng Kasunduan.

Simula lang ito ng isang serye ng paglabag ng GRP sa mga kasunduan sa NDF, na humantong sa de-facto at sa pormal na pagbaklas ng GRP mula sa negosasyon sa NDF at terminasyon ng negosasyong GRP-NDF noong Hunyo-Hulyo 1999. Tampok sa mga ito ang sumusunod:

1. ang makaisang panig na pagwawalang-bisa sa JASIG noong Pebrero 24, 1999
2. ang pagtutulak sa VFA na paglalapastangan sa pambansa at teritoryal na soberanya
3. pagtangging repasuhin ang mga mapanupil na batas
4. patuloy na paglulunsad ng malalaking opensibang militar at paggamit ng sobra-sobrang lakas ng armas sa mga ito lalo na laban sa masang magsasaka sa kanayunan
5. patuloy na pagsasakdal at pag-uusig sa mga bilanggong pulitikal sa mga salang kriminal sa halip na pulitikal
6. pagtannging bigyan ng indemnipikasyon ang mga biktima ng pang-aabuso sa karapatang pangao noong panahon ng batas militar
7. pagdukot kay NDFP consultant Vic Ladlad kahit may bisa pa ang JASIG

Ilang buwan makalipas ang pagsasara ng negosasyong pangkapayapaan sa pagitan ng GRP at NDFP, de-facto ring binaklas ng GRP ang negosasyong GRP-MILF nang patraydor na nilabag nito ang mga naunang kasunduan sa MILF, at todo-todong sinalakay ang mga pwersa ng MILF at ang mamamayang Moro sa Central Mindanao noong Pebrero-Hulyo 2000. Bagamat pansamantalang tumaas ang popularidad ni Estrada sa mga di-Muslim na bahagi ng Pilipinas bunga ng mga pananalakay na ito, naging mayor na salik naman ito sa pagbulusok ng ekonomya at pagtindi ng krisis pampulitika at pang-ekonomya sa buong bayan. Kalaunan, humantong ang krisis sa pagpapatalsik kay Estrada mula sa poder.

II. Negosasyong pangkapayapaan sa ilalim ng gobyernong GMA

Ipinangako ni Gng. Arroyo, noong siya’y Bise-Presidente pa, na babaligtarin niya ang patakarang “all-out war” kapag napatalsik si Estrada at siya ang umupong Presidente. Ngayon, makaraan ang anim na buwan bilang Presidente, masasabi bang nabaligtad na ni Gng Arroyo ang patakarang “all-out war”?

Oo, nga’t itinigil na ang pambobomba at pagsalakay sa mga kampo at komunidad ng mga Muslim sa Central Mindanao, at muling binuksan ng gobyernong Arroyo ang negosasyong pangkapayapaan kapwa sa MILF at sa NDF. Nagresulta na ito sa isang kasunduan para sa tigil-putukan sa pagitan ng GRP at MILF. Nagkaroon na rin ng dalawang round na pag-uusap ang GRP at NDF sa Oslo nitong nakaraang Abril at Hunyo. Sa isang banda, pumayag na ang GRP na buuin ang Joint Monitoring Committee ayon sa CARHRIHL, at nasimulan na ang pag-uusap ng dalawang RWC hinggil sa repormang sosyo-ekonomiko. Sa kabilang banda naman, makaisang panig na nagdeklara ng recess ang GRP panel bilang pagprotesta sa pagpaslang ng NPA kay Koronel Rodolfo Aguinaldo, isang sagadsarin at kinamumuhiang kriminal at tortyurer.

Sa katunayan, walang katwiran ang pagprotesta ng GRP sa pagpaslang kay Aguinaldo. Walang tigil-putukang umiiral. Sa bahagi ng GRP, nananatili ang mga operasyon at kampanyang militar ng AFP at PNP sa lahat ng dako ng Pilipinas. Ang mga kampanyang ito ay laban diumano sa CPP-NPA pero sa katunayan, malaking paghihirap at pagkasalanta ang idinudulot nito sa masang magsasaka sa kanayunan. Hindi humuhupa, bagkus ay dumarami pa at lumalala, ang mga pang-aabuso ng mga militar at paglabag nila sa karapatang tao.

(Tingnan ang “Human Rights Violations — GMA Administration – Jan 20 – Sept 21, 2001.)

Pansinin din, halimbawa, na sa maiksing panahon ng panunungkulan ni GMA, mayroon nang mahigit 100 bilanggong pulitikal, mga biktima ng arbitraryo at ilegal na pagdakip at detensyon. Samantala, hindi pa nito pinalalaya ang lahat ng mga napatunayan nang mga bilanggong pulitikal at kung gayon inosente sa sakdal sa kanilang kriminal na pagkakasala. Sa halip na mabawasan, nadagdagan pa nga ang mga bilanggong pulitikal.

Noong Abril 24, 2001, dalawang araw bago mag-resume ang usapang pangkapayapaan sa pagitan ng GRP at NDFP, inatasan ni Macapagal-Arroyo ang AFP at PNP na dapat ipagpatuloy ang mga operasyong militar laban sa CPP-NPA-NDF para pahinain ito at palakasin ang pusisyon sa negosasyon ng GRP.

Higit pa, walang makikitang anumang malinaw na senyal na nais ng gobyernong Arroyo na harapin at lutasin ang mga saligang suliraning ugat na dahilan ng armadong tunggalian. Sa halip, ipinagpapatuloy nito ang parehong mga patakarang nagpapatindi sa pagsasamantala at pang-aapi sa mamamayang Pilipino at nagpapalala sa krisis ng lipunang Pilipino. Pangunahin na rito ang pangangayupapa sa dayuhang monopolyo kapital, at pagtatanggol sa interes ng malalaking komprador at panginoong maylupa, samantalang binabalewala at niyuyurakan ang kapakanan at mga karapatan ng malawak na masang Pilipino. Walang-habas na ipinapatupad ang deregulasyon, liberalisasyon at pribatisasyon. Isang resulta nito ang pagtutol na ibigay sa mga manggagawa ang hinihinging makabuluhan at sapat na P125 pagtaas ng sahod. Bagkus, ginigipit ito nang husto at nagbigay lamang ng pakitang-taong pagtaas nang P35 kada buwan.

Kamakailan, isa pang matingkad na halimbawa nito ang mistulang pagkatuta at kahiya-hiyang pag-sipsip sa US matapos maganap ang pambobomba sa US noong Set. 11. Hindi pa man hinihiling ng US, nagkandakumahog ang gobyernong GMA sa pag-alok sa US ng mga pasilidad, baseng militar at kahit mga tropang panlaban sa binabalak na pagsalakay sa Afghanistan.

III. Ilang obserbasyon, aral at kongklusyon

• May kapayapaang makatarungan at matagalan; mayroon ding “kapayapaan” na dimakatarungan at panandalian. Ang tunay at matagalang kapayapaan ay nakabatay sa katarungan, sa paggalang sa mga karapatan ng mamamayan – hindi lamang sa karapatang pulitikal o sibil, kundi, at higit na mahalaga, sa karapatang panlipunan, pang-ekonomya at pangkultura. Tanging sa isang lipunan kung saan tinatamasa ang kalayaang pambansa at panlipunan maaaring yumabong at umunlad ang mga pundamental na indibidwal at kolektibong mga karapatang ito.

Sa buong itinakbo ng mga negosasyong pangkapayapaan, makikitang may iisang prinsipyong tumatahi sa mga patakaran at pagkilos ng GRP: ang pagkamit ng “katahimikan” o “political stability” sa pamamagitan ng pagpapahina hanggang sa pagpapasuko sa mga “rebelde”. Sa maraming pagkakataon, malinaw at lantad ito sa mga kundisyong “magbaba o magsalong muna ng mga sandata”, “magtigil-putukan muna”. Sa ilang pagkakataon, nakakubli ang layuning ito sa paggugumiit ng “natatanging pampulitikang awtoridad o soberanya” at sa paggamit ng Konstitusyon at mga legal na proseso ng GRP bilang balangkas ng negosasyon.

Hindi nito layunin ang tunay at makatarungang kapayapaan kundi ang simpleng pasipikasyon o kapitulasyon ng mga “rebelde”.

Mayor na salik sa pagpasok ng GRP sa negosasyong pangkapayapaan ang pangangailangang maibsan ang krisis pampulitika at pang-ekonomiya na patuloy na bumabatbat dito. Tahasang inihayag ni Ramos noong 1992 na kailangan ang political stability para maakit ang mga dayuhang puhunan na aniya’y kailangan para mabuhay ang ekonomya. Kaya’t kasabay nito, ipinatupad ni Ramos, tulad din nina Marcos, Aquino at Estrada, ang mga patakaran sa ekonomyang aakit sa mga dayuhang puhunan ngunit makakasalanta naman sa kabuhayan ng mamamayan, tulad ng pagpapababa sa sahod ng mga manggagawa at iba pang neo-liberal na patakaran ng globalisasyon at WTO. Hindi pumapasok sa konsiderasyon nito na ibsan ang krisis sa pulitika at ekonomiya sa pamamagitan ng pagpapatupad ng mga makabayan at maka-mamamayang mga patakaran.
• Mahalagang anyo ng pakikibaka ang negosasyong pangkapayapaan, pero hindi ito ang pinakamahalagang anyo. Hindi matatamo ang kapayapaan sa pamamagitan ng negosasyon lamang, kahit humantong pa ito sa isang kasunduan para sa pagsalong ng mga armas ng mga “rebelde”. Maaaring magkaroon ng isang kasunduang pangkapayapaan sa pagitan ng gobyerno at isang armadong “rebeldeng” grupo pero magpapatuloy pa rin ang digma.

Ipinapakita ito sa buong kasaysayan ng Pilipinas, kung saan nagkaroon ng mga kasunduan sa pagitan ng naghaharing rehimen at ng mga lumalabang grupo na sa katunayan ay kapitulasyon o pasipikasyon ang katangian. (hal., ang Pact of Biac na Bato) . Sa kasalukuyan, malinaw na halimbawa ang Kasunduang Tripoli at 1996 Kasunduang GRP-MNLF na kapwa hindi nagdulot ng kapayapaan sa Mindanao at sa mamamayang Muslim, bagkus higit pang nagpalala ito sa krisis at digma, dahil hindi nito hinarap at nilutas ang saligang ugat ng armadong tunggalian: ang suliranin sa lupa at ang pang-aapi at pagsasamantala sa Bangsa Moro.

• May karahasang di-makatarungan at mayroong karahasang makatarungan. Dimakatarungan ang anumang karahasang sumusupil at yumuyurak sa mga karapatan ng mamamayan, nang-aapi at nagsasamantala sa kanila. Makatarungan ang karahasang nagtataguyod at nagtatanggol sa mga saligang karapatan at interes ng mamamayan. Makatarungan kung gayon ang karahasang bunsod ng pakikibaka para sa pambansa at panlipunang pagpapalaya.

• Mahalaga at mahigpit ang pangangailangan sa paggalang ng mga karapatang tao para mailatag ang batayan ng isang matagalan at makatarungang kapayapaan. Ito ang dahilan kung bakit ipinanunakala ng NDFP mula pa noong 1990 bilang unang sustantibong agenda ng negosasyon ang usapan hinggil sa paggalang sa karapatang tao at internasyunal na makataong batas. Dahil sa malawak at matinding paglabag sa mga karapatang tao sa nakaraan at maging sa kasalukuyan, ang isang kasunduan dito ay makakatulung sa kagyat na pagbibigay ng pinakamalaking lunas sa paghihirap ng mamayan kahit habang nagpapatuloy pa ang armadong tunggalian.

• Maaaring may makamit na mga pakinabang para sa mamamayan ang negosasyong pangkapayapaan, kahit hindi ito humantong sa isang komprehensibong kasunduan. Halimbawa, malaki ang benepisyong matatamo ng mamamayan kapag ipinatupad ang CARHRIHL.

(Nota: bahagi ng CARHRIHL ang sumusunod na mga probisyon na kagyat na dapat ipatupad ng GRP: indemnipikasyon ng mga biktima ng paglabag ng karapatang tao sa panahon ng diktadurang Marcos, pagpapalaya sa lahat ng bilanggong pulitikal, pagtigil sa mga opensibang operasyong militar ng AFP at PNP, at pagpapawalambisa sa mga mapanupil na batas.)

• Gumaganap ng mahalagang papel ang kilusang masa sa pagsulong ng negosasyong pangkapayapaan.

Anumang kasunduan sa negosasyong pangkapayapaan na kapaki-pakinabang sa mamamayan, tulad ng CARHRIHL, ay tunay na mapapakinabangan lamang sa pamamagitan ng paggugumiit at pakikibaka ng mamamayan para sa kanilang mga karapatan. Kung hindi ipaglalaban ng mamamayan ang kanilang interes, mananatiling walang-halagang pirasong papel ang mga kasunduang ito.

Hindi naging posible ang pagpapanumbalik o resumption ng negosasyon kung hindi napatalsik ng higanteng daluyong ng kilusang protesta ang bulok na rehimeng Estrada na tumayong pangunahing balakid sa pagsulong ng usapang pangkapayapaan.

Mahalagang patuloy na maihayag ng mamamayan ang pagtutol nila sa mapagsamantala at mapang-aping sistema, para maidiin sa GRP at sa publiko ang pangangailangan sa mga saligang pagbabago.

Mahalagang mailantad ang pagtatangka ng gobyerno at ng ilang mga repormista at kontra-rebolusyonaryong grupo na palabasing ang gobyerno o ang mga grupong ito ang tunay na kumakatawan sa interes at mga kahilingan ng mamamayan. Binabalak ng GRP na magdaos ng mga “konsultasyon” diumano hinggil sa repormang sosyo-ekonomiko, ala-NUC noong 1992-93. Matatandaang sa mga konsultasyong iyon, pinalabnaw kundi man lubusan nilang pinagtakpan ang saligang mga suliranin ng lipunang Pilipino – ang imperyalismo, pyudalismo at burukrata-kapitalismo – at tinangkang palabasing ang mga ugat ng armadong tunggalian ay matinding kahirapan, di-pagkakapantay-pantay, kawalan ng katarungan, at mga katiwalian sa gobyerno (poverty, inequity, injustice, graft and corruption).

Kung susumahin, walang ibang landas tungo sa tunay na kapayapaan kundi ang pagpapatupad sa mga saligan at radikal na reporma sa lipunan. Hindi maaasahan ang kasalukuyang gobyernong Arroyo, na tulad ng mga nakaraang rehimen ay lantarang nagsisilbi sa interes ng mga dayuhan at ng iilang naghaharing uri, na ipatupad ang mga repormang ito. Makakamit lamang ito sa pamamagitan ng pakikibaka ng buong sambayanang Pilipino para sa pambansang kalayaan at demokrasya, sa lahat ng maaaring porma at pamamaraan.

Rey Claro Casambre
Philippine Peace Center
2nd Anniversary EDSA 2
January 17, 2002
Shalom Center, Manila

At the height of our campaign to oust the immoral, corrupt, and warmongering Erap, we presented to then Vice President GMA the “People’s Agenda” which is basically identical to what we are challenging her with now. We recall that even then, GMA had hedged and hawed on the issues of national and economic sovereignty. And it was only on the issue of the peace that she categorically, emphatically and unequivocally committed herself to “reverse the Estrada policy of all-out-war” and embark on the road to all-out-peace. Specifically, she would resume the peace negotiations with the NDF and the MILF which had both been terminated during Estrada’s time.

Indeed, when GMA assumed the presidency, we were dismayed, but not surprised, that she would retain, continue to pursue and even reinforce the same anti-national and anti-people and anti-national economic policies and foreign policies of previous administrations. On the other hand, she did keep her promise of resuming talks with the NDF and MILF.

But not for long. Formal talks with the NDF were unilaterally recessed by the government in June 2001 and have never been resumed since then.

From June 2001 up to the present, instead of undertaking confidence and building measures to pave the way for the resumption of formal talks, the GMA government put up one obstacle after another and made the resumption virtually impossible.

First, it expanded Cabinet Cluster E (which oversees the peace negotiations with armed the NDF, MILF and MNLF) into a Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security (COC-IS) with the addition of top defense, military, police and intelligence officials, thereby allowing the hawks and militarists to dominate and control government policy and decisions on the peace process.

Second, it emasculated the GRP Negotiating panel’s mandate to negotiate by requiring it to clear everything and anything with the COC-IS before it signs anything – be it an agreement, a joint communique, implementing guidelines, or even a one-page press statement, by suspending formal negotiations (in March 2002) and ordering backchannel talks in its stead, and adding a new layer of authority — special emissaries for backchannel talks with the power to negotiate and sign agreements with both the NDF and MILF.

Third, in several backchannel talks, the GRP proposed ,a “final peace agreement” that departed from the previous framework set by The Hague Joint Declaration of 1992 by providing for the end of hostilities and disarming and demobilization of the NPA even without comprehensive agreements on socio-economic, political and constitutional reforms that would address the roots of the armed conflict, and providing that the Agreement be implemented in accordance with the GRP Constitution and its legal processes . Thus, instead of paving the way to the resumption of formal talks, the GRP succeeded, through backchannel talks, in making the resumption of formal talks virtually impossible.

Fourth , the GMA government, at the instance of the hawks and militarists, collaborated with the warmongering US Bush government in using the so-called “war against terror” as a pretext to promote the line of employing superior military force to crush armed opposition groups and end the armed conflict. The US and GMA governments attempted to blackmail both the NDF and MILF into laying down their arms and rejoining the mainstream of society under the government’s terms or run the risk of being tagged terrorist and facing the full force of the gobal “counterterrorist war”. Indeed, the CPP-NPA and Prof Jose Ma Sison were eventually branded “foreign terrorists” by the US, Canada, Australia, and the European Union including The Netherlands and Belgium.

The terrorist tag now presents the single biggest obstacle to the resumption of the formal talks. The NDF points to the GRP’s campaign to have the CPP-NPA and JMS named “terrorist” as a gross violation of the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees or JASIG, and declared that it cannot negotiate with the GRP while the NDFP negotiators and personnel are under duress.

(Note: if there is time, cite similarities or parallels in GRP-MILF peace talks)

“Healing the divisiveness in our society” — this is the second item in GMA’s avowed priorities after she had announced her withdrawal from the 2004 presidential derby.

What “divisiveness” was she referring to? Is it the divisiveness between her political party and that of the opposition? Or could she be referring to the deepest divides in our society — between the haves and the have-nots, the oppressors and the oppressed, the exploiters and the exploiters?

So far we have not seen signs of her addressing these deepest divides, only attempts at conciliation and rapproachment with the opposition. But if, as she claims, she is withdrawing from the 2004 race precisely to be freed from the distractions of politics, then one would think that her avowed new priorities and goals includes resolving the armed conflicts that have been raging in our country for the last 30 plus years – the armed conflict between the government and the NDF, and the armed conflict between the government and the Moro separatist movements.

As many have already pointed out, there can be no true reform without an objective and sincere appraisal and admission of shortcomings and faults. Without correct diagnosis, there can be no correct prescription and cure. Or, as Christians would say, without an act of contrition, there can be no penance, reform, nor forgiveness.

With respect to the armed conflicts, there can be no genuine peace — no healing of divisiveness — without the parties agreeing on what are the causes of the armed conflict and how these can be uprooted and removed. That is why the agenda of the formal peace talks (between the government and the NDF and the MILF) properly conisist of negotiations on basic social, economic and political reforms

We now hear about the GRP accelerating the draft of its “final peace agreement” with the NDFP, and a so-called “package” for the MILF, in preparation for the resumption of formal talks with both parties. This morning, in Today, Secretary Reyes is reported to have announced the “National Internal Security Plan”, which has a “holistic approach” and aims to minimize if not end the threat of insurgency in five years’ time. Is there anything new here? Is this any different from the holistic, total war approach of Marcos, Aquino, Ramos and Estrada?

Will the GMA government reverse herself and remove all the abovementioned obstacles to the resumption of formal peace negotiations with the NDF and MILF?

Learn from the Mindanao experience. There have been two “final peace agreements” in the past 20 years: the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 and the GRP-MNLF Peace Accord of 1996. The Tripoli Agreement led to the formation of the ARMM as well as the formation of the MILF and eventually the continuation, intensification and expansion of armed conflict in Mindanao, including with the MNLF which subsequently rejected the ARMM. The 1996 Accord led to the formation of the SPCPD and the installation of MNLF Chair Nur Misuari as the governor of ARMM. As we very well can see, the two peace agreements did not resolve the armed conflict and Mindanao and Nur Misuari himself is behind bars for rebellion.

To conclude, what is needed is a Genuine Peace Agreement, not a “Final Peace Agreement” that, by its design, intent and content, is anything but final. Genuine because it will lead to genuine peace, genuine because it is genuinely agreed upon by two forces with mutual respect and with the common goal of seeking peace by upholding national freedom, genuine democracy and social justice.

The road to freedom, democracy and social justice is long, winding and tortuous. There are no shortcuts in the genuine quest for genuine peace. #

by Rey Claro Casambre
Philippine Peace Center

Introduction: The armed conflicts in the Philippines

There are two major armed conflicts that have been raging in the Philippines for over three
decades now. One is the civil war between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) a broad united front fighting for national and social liberation under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and with the New People’s Army (NPA) as its armed force. The other is the war between the Manila government and the Muslim secessionist movement initially led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and currently by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

It is no coincidence that the CPP and the MNLF were both founded in the late 1960s and early 1970s amidst the social crisis and turbulence that embroiled Philippine society then. Half a century of colonial rule and two decades of neo-colonial rule has stunted the economy in its backward pre-industrial and semi-feudal state. The economic and political crisis had reached a point where significantly large segments of the population, especially the toiling peasants and workers, were prepared to take up arms against foreign, mainly US, domination and the central political authority. The ruling classes could no longer rule in the old way.

The suspension by President Marcos of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in August 1971 and his subsequent imposition of martial rule in September 1972 indeed demonstrated that the ruling class could no longer rule in the old way, and the country was ripe for revolution. In one stroke of a pen, martial law rendered all dissent and opposition to the Marcos regime illegal, including that of the factions of the ruling class not in power. For fourteen years, the Marcos dictatorship threw its entire apparatus and arsenal of deception and force to suppress the people’s resistance, and especially against the revolutionary forces fighting for national democracy and the Moro liberation movement fighting for self-determination.

Martial law brought about massive human rights violations, intensified social inequities and opened up the nation’s wealth to plunder by foreign monopolists and their local big comprador partners led by the Marcos fascist clique. The intolerable economic hardships and political repression wrought on the people merely drove them to fight the dictatorship even more resolutely and in ever greater numbers. Rather than be intimidated and stifled, both the legal democratic struggles and the armed movements grew in strength and scope. From a few rifles and handguns in a single district in Central Luzon in 1969, the NPA grew to force of a few thousand high power rifles and was deeply rooted among the peasantry in all regions throughout the archipelago by 1986.

As for the Moro secessionist movement, the Marcos regime succeeded in drawing the MNLF into signing the 1976 Tripoli Agreement whereby the Moro people would supposedly be granted regional autonomy in the thirteen southern provinces that consist the island groups of Mindanao and Palawan, but in accordance with the GRP Constitution and legal processes. This resulted in the partial and temporary neutralization of the MNLF.

Partial because in 1977, a significant fraction of the MNLF that rejected the Tripoli Agreement, led by no less than it Vice-Chairman then, Hashim Salamat, broke away and formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Temporary because it soon became clear that the Manila government had no intent to grant outright regional autonomy to all 13 provinces of Mindanao and Palawan, instead subjecting the question to a referendum, purportedly in accordance with the GRP constitutional and legal processes. The Manila-controlled referendum resulted in a token autonomous region of only four provinces.

The sham GRP referendum and autonomy raised the credibility and standing of the MILF among the Moro people. On the other hand, to maintain its following and to regain lost prestige, the MNLF was compelled to condemn the GRP for reneging on the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. The MNLF eventually resume its call for armed struggle.

In 1996, the MNLF once again signed a peace agreement with the GRP, resulting in the formation of a Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development headed by MNLF Chair Nur Misuari but under the GRP. Again, regional autonomy was promised, this time with substantial funds for administration and development. Clearly, this “Final Peace Accord, as it was optimistically, if deceptively called fully coopted and effectively neutralized the MNLF. But it did not finally bring peace to Mindanao and the Moro people, and in no sense at all could it be called “final”.

The MILF on the other hand persisted in armed struggle even as engaged the Manila government in peace negotiations. Learning from the GRP-MNLF peace talks, the MILF resisted the adoption of the GRP constitution as framework for negotiations. While the MILF entered into interim cease-fire agreements with the GRP for the duration of talks, sporadic fighting continued, flaring up in an all-out war initiated by the Estrada government in 1999. This resulted in the dismantling of large MILF camps in Central Mindanao but not in any significant decimation of MILF armed forces.

Peace negotiations between the GRP and MILF have more or less run a parallel course with the GRP-NDFP negotiations. The MILF have likewise been following closely the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations and are known to have drawn valuable lessons from this. This makes for an interesting comparison, but a comprehensive study is beyond the scope of our discussion now. We shall only refer to some salient points regarding the GRP-MNLF and GRP-MILF talks insofar as they will help clarify and amplify the points we shall raise with regard to the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations.

The GRP-NDFP Peace Negotiations

Peace negotiations between the GRP and the NDFP first became possible in 1986 with the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship and the installation of the Aquino government through a combined people’s uprising and military rebellion. However, the peace talks which began in December got bogged down in issues on safety and immunity guarantees and monitoring the cease-fire. Before any discussion on substantive issues could be undertaken, the talks were scuttled in January 1987 after government troops fired on a demonstration of thousands of peasants clamoring for genuine land reform, killing more than a dozen, and ultra-rightist military elements plotted to assassinate the NDFP negotiators to destabilize the government as part of a coup plot.

The GRP-NDFP peace negotiations that have been going on for the past ten years was initiated by then GRP President Fidel Ramos as soon as he assumed the presidency in 1992. Ironically, it was Ramos who, as Defense Secretary in the Aquino government, stood as the main obstacle to having peace negotiations with the NDFP by insisting that the NPA first lay down their arms, that the talks should be held under the framework of the GRP Constitution, and that local-level talks (i.e., regional and provincial) should be held rather than on the national level, in order to divide the armed movement.

In his inaugural address, Ramos explained that he was calling for peace negotiations with all armed opposition movements (i.e., the CPP-NPA-NDF, the MNLF, the MILF and the RAM-YOU-SFP military rebels) to improve the political atmosphere and thereby attract and retain foreign investments. This is partly true and can be considered among the GRP’s minimum objectives in entering into peace talks with the NDFP and the Moro liberation movements. (In several instances where talks have been recessed or suspended by the GRP, the GRP would return to the negotiating table whenever foreign investments were being driven away by the deteriorating business infrastructure, or by revelations of scandalous cases of graft and corruption.)

What Ramos did not say then was that he wanted peace negotiations because he could ill afford to face armed opposition from several flanks, having been elected by a small 23% minority. . Indeed, engaging the armed opposition in peace talks promptly brought Ramos clear dividends when the military rebels under the RAM-YOU-SFP signed a peace accord with the GRP on December 22, 1992. This is not surprising since, unlike the other armed groups, the military rebels had no problem in recognizing the sovereignty of the GRP and accepting the GRP Constitution as the framework for a peace accord, including its provision that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is the sole legitimate military force in the country.

In fact, the larger and principal objective of Ramos’ offer for peace talks in 1992 was to neutralize the armed opposition by inducing it to capitulate or at the least by sowing confusion, dissension and demoralization among their ranks and their supporters. The peace talks are aimed at driving a wedge deeper between those who firmly advocate armed struggle on one hand and those who are demoralized and tend to prefer parliamentary struggle as the main if not the only form of struggle on the other. They are meant to divert the revolutionary forces and the people as a whole away from revolutionary solutions to the age-old problems of foreign domination, feudal exploitation and oppression, and bureaucrat capitalist graft, corruption and plunder.

In his first State of the Nation address on July 1, 1993, Ramos crowed that “our peace initiative has succeeded beyond expectation… we have split the leadership of the communist insurgency to the core…” The boast turned out to be premature and empty, and the Ramos government was soon compelled to resume talks with the NDFP. Nonetheless, neutralizing the revolutionary movement would remain the overriding GRP goal in the negotiations that would determine and explain the GRP’s positioning, maneuvering and its entire conduct in the peace talks up to the present. What the GRP could no longer achieve through military means in the battlefield, it sought to accomplish over the negotiating table through peace talks.

The key to achieving this objective lies in enticing the armed opposition groups into subordinating themselves to the GRP sovereignty or political authority. This is expressed through the following basic preconditions or stipulations which the GRP would time and again attempt to spring if not impose on these groups in the negotiations:

• That the peace negotiations would be held with the GRP constitution as the framework, and corollarily, that all agreements shall be interpreted and implemented in accordance with the GRP constitution and legal processes.
• That the armed opposition groups lay down their arms first before peace talks are held or, in cases of termination, suspension or recess, before they are resumed.
• That nothing in the negotiations and agreements shall confer to the other party (NDFP, MNLF or MILF) a status of belligerency.

The NDFP is keenly aware of all these objectives of the GRP. Why then had it entered into peace negotiations and continued to engage the government in this form of struggle?

NDFP Chief Political Consultant Prof. Jose Ma.Sison, in two major articles that discussed the historical circumstances and basic principles that would guide the NDFP’s conduct in the peace negotiation, clearly discussed the opposing objectives and frameworks of the GRP and the NDFP in peace negotiations, while pointing out the conditions under which these contradictory aspects could be brought together and contend with the negotiating table as the arena.

First of all, the NDFP recognizes that despite the GRP’s objectives and the resources at its command, any ruling government cannot fully do as it wishes insofar as the negotiations are concerned. The very nature of the negotiations allows the NDFP to consider or weigh whatever terms are being set, and simply reject any precondition that will undermine and destroy its revolutionary integrity. If vigilant and firm enough, the NDFP can always refuse to negotiate under conditions that will lead or amount to its capitulation or surrender

Moreover, any GRP president may be compelled to negotiate by the growing intensity of the social and economic crisis and the growing all-round opposition to its rule or to the entire ruling system. As pointed out earlier, the GRP negotiating panel had unilaterally recessed and suspended the talks several times, but always returned to the negotiating table whenever there was a critical need to improve the political climate. Even the deposed President Estrada, who terminated peace talks with the NDFP before his first year in office was over, seriously and urgently sent emissaries to the NDFP negotiating panel in The Netherlands, offering to resume peace talks at the height of the people’s campaign for his ouster, in a futile attempt to mitigate the increasing attacks on his self and his administration.

The minimum objective of the NDFP in accepting the Ramos initiative to hold peace talks is to show the people that it is the NDFP, and not the GRP, that is genuinely interested in addressing the roots of the armed conflict and attaining a just and lasting peace. By engaging the GRP in peace talks, defining and standing firm on what constitutes a reasonable framework and modalities for the talks, the NDFP challenges and frustrates any GRP administration’s attempt to project itself as seriously seeking social reform to bring genuine peace, and compels it to reveal its real reactionary intentions.

Properly and skillfully handled, the peace negotiations are an important and useful platform for propagating the NDFP’s programme for a people’s democratic revolution based on its analysis of the problems that beset Philippine society. The NDFP programme for a genuinely free, democratic and just society is reflected in its proposals for social, economic and political reforms which form a major part of the substantive agenda of the talks. The NDFP line for achieving a just and lasting peace is no other than the revolutionary line of fighting for national freedom and genuine democracy.

The peace negotiations are also an arena in which the NDFP articulates and demonstrates its firm and principled adherence to international norms, principles and policies such as on human rights, international humanitarian law, and other international social covenants and instruments. In this regard the NDFP is placed on equal footing as the GRP in the eyes of the international community as a legitimate and responsible political authority.

The NDFP goes as far as demonstrating its political and moral superiority over the GRP as a revolutionary force fighting for the interests of the Filipino people. In negotiating the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL), for example, the NDFP consistently applied revolutionary principles on the concrete Philippine human rights situation and adamantly pushed specific provisions for giving redress to and alleviating the plight of human rights victims. Likewise, the principles and instruments of international humanitarian law were applied by the NDFP to the armed conflict in the Philippines to propose concrete provisions that could mitigate the human cost and suffering from war.

The NDFP aims to forge with the GRP bilateral agreements that benefit the people immediately and in the long term. Again the CARHRIHL is an excellent example of how the people are provided a potentially powerful instrument for safeguarding and upholding the their human rights, especially now that both the GRP and NDFP principals have approved it, making it binding and effective on both parties and with both having joint and separate responsibilities in implementing it.

The CARHRIHL by itself and thru its implementation also serves as a confidence-building measure for the continuance of the peace negotiations. That the GRP and NDFP have been able to forge such an agreement was beyond literally everybody’s expectations. It thus provides confidence in and brightens up the prospects for achieving similar agreements on the more contentious issues of social, economic and political reforms.

Viewed in this light, branding the CPP, NPA and Prof Sison terrorists to isolate, stigmatize, demonize and criminalize them is ridiculous, absurd and grossly unjust.

How has the NDFP escaped the trap of capitulation, surrender, or the spread of confusion and dissension in its ranks and among its supporters? How has it preserved and enhanced its revolutionary integrity through ten years of negotiating with the GRP?

First, by clearly establishing that the objective of the negotiations is the resolution of the armed conflict and the attainment of a just and lasting peace. The latter qualification is a safeguard against any attempt merely to attain a cessation of hostilities by whatever means without addressing the social and historical roots of the armed conflict.

Second, by firmly rejecting and resisting the GRP scheme of using the GRP constitution as the framework for the peace negotiations, or corollarily, of interpreting and implementing all agreements in accordance with the GRP constitution and legal processes. The GRP had tried to impose this as a precondition to holding the talks, but the NDFP had always rejected this as absolutely unacceptable and made it clear that it would never negotiate under this framework, in much the same way that the NDFP does not expect the GRP to agree to negotiate with the NDFP constitution as framework.

Third, by firmly rejecting and resisting GRP attempts to subordinate the NDFP legally or politically by various means, such as in the modalities or conduct of the talks and in the formulations of provisions in the agreements on the substantive agenda. These include issues on safety and immunity guarantees, the venue and ground rules for the formal talks, the formation, sequence and operationalization of reciprocal working committees that do preparatory work on each substantive agenda for the negotiating panels.

It would be quite informative and helpful to examine how these safeguards and guidelines are instituted or, in computer parlance, “installed” (in the same way one installs an anti-virus shield in one’s computer) and reflected in a number of major bilateral agreements so far achieved by the GRP and NDFP.

The Hague Joint Declaration of September 1, 1992 is the landmark framework agreement that sets the basic parameters, principles, conditions and guidelines under which the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations can and must take place. It is a one-page document that clearly states the following:

1. Formal peace negotiations between the GRP and the NDFP shall be held to resolve the armed conflict.
2. The common goal of the aforesaid negotiations shall be the attainment of a just and lasting peace.
3. Such negotiations shall take place after the parties have reached tentative agreements on substantive issues in the agreed agenda through the reciprocal working committees to be separately organized by the GRP and the NDFP.
4. The holding of peace negotiations “must be in accordance with mutually acceptable principles including national sovereignty, democracy and social justice and no precondition shall be made to negate the inherent character and purpose of the peace negotiations.
5. Preparatory to the formal peace negotiations, we have agreed to recommend the following:a. Specific measures of goodwill and confidence-building to create a favorable climate for peace negotiations; and
   b. The substantive agenda of the formal negotiations shall include human rights, international humanitarian law, socio-economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms, end of hostilities and disposition of forces.
   We note that items (1) and (2) commit both parties to the goal of resolving the armed conflict and achieving a just and lasting peace. Coupled with item (5), we see that the underlying logic in having the end of hostilities and disposition of forces as the final item in the substantive agenda is that these can only be considered when there are agreements signed and sufficient guarantees in place on substantive reforms that address the roots of the armed conflict.

The Hague Joint Declaration does not explicitly set this sequence, and the GRP not surprisingly attempted to “refine” the substantive agenda by inserting capitulation-related items such as amnesty and rehabilitation and by jumbling the sequence so that cessation of hostilities comes on top. But the NDFP objected to the proposal of adding superfluous and capitulation-oriented items, and insisted on the logic behind the sequence in which they are expressed The Hague Joint Declaration.

This would subsequently be firmed up in the “Joint Agreement on the Formation, Sequence and Operationalization of the Reciprocal Working Committees (RWCs)” signed by both panels on June 26, 1995, and the “Supplemental Agreement on the Formation, Sequence and Operationalization of the Reciprocal Working Committees (RWC Agreement) “ signed on March 18, 1997. The latter agreement stipulates that each agreement on the substantive agenda shall be effective and binding on both parties, with each party having joint as well as separate responsibilities in implementing the agreement, and that the third agenda item will only be.

The importance of the proper sequence is underscored by the fact that throughout the ten years of talks, the GRP had constantly attempted to push for an “adjustment”, proposing one or another variation of a scheme wherein agreements can be crafted and signed by the panels and even their respective principals but the implementation of these are reserved or deferred until the agreement on end of hostilities and disposition of forces is achieved. Currently, the GRP has been pushing for a “final peace agreement” using this formula of “3-in-1”, i.e., three comprehensive agreements in one “final peace accord”.

Item (4) of The Hague Joint Declaration establishes as the framework of the negotiations “mutually acceptable principles including national sovereignty, democracy and social justice…” thus preventing either party from imposing on the other any framework that is not mutually acceptable, especially its own constitution. The NDFP has repeatedly invoked this principle to parry and frustrate all GRP attempts to impose its constitution as framework for the talks.

Furthermore, the NDFP has had to be constantly on the alert against GRP attempts to insert specific provisions stipulating that the agreements, partly or entirely, must be interpreted and implemented in accordance with the GRP constitution and legal processes. The GRP justifies these by equating “national sovereignty” with its claim to being the “sole sovereign power”, therefore implying that the NDFP must submit to its political authority.

But this argument falls flat on its face when “mutually acceptable principles including national sovereignty” is understood in the context of the entire sentence in which it is found. The sentence concludes with “…no precondition shall be made to negate the inherent character and purpose of the peace negotiations”. This phrase at once precludes the precondition that the NDFP recognize the GRP as the “sole sovereign power”. The very reason why negotiations have become necessary is not merely the NDFP’s own claim to being a sovereign power, but that it wields in fact political authority over a significant portion of Philippine territory and population, and a people’s army that defends and enforces that political authority.

Another clear example of such a precondition which the NDFP considers non-negotiable is the GRP’s prior insistence that the NPA first lay down its arms before talks are held. Again, the NDFP has had to be on the alert for other variations of preconditions that effectively subordinate the NDFP to the GRP’s political authority, negating the inherent character and purpose of the negotiations. A not-so-subtle precondition is the proposal of the GRP to have an “interim cease-fire for the duration of the talks”. With this proposal, the GRP can stretch the negotiations indefinitely and preside over a de-facto end of hostilities without a single substantive reform in place. In the negotiations for the CARHRIHL a more innocuous precondition is the proposal to place the Joint Monitoring Committee under the Office of the President of the GRP, effectively subordinating the NDFP members of the JMC under the authority of the GRP.

The GRP time and again has proposed and insisted on holding the negotiations in the Philippines and without any foreign third party. This notwithstanding JASIG, Section III, No. 6 which provides, “The venue of the formal talks shall be Brussels, Belgium, unless both parties mutually agree on another neutral venue. For this purpose, both parties shall separately make arrangements with the host country concerned..”

The GRP argues simplistically that the armed conflict is a domestic and internal problem and should be resolved bilaterally between the GRP and the NDFP, in Philippine territory. Or, it argues that holding negotiations abroad is much more expensive than holding them locally. The NDFP on the other hand insists on holding the talks in a neutral foreign venue, since it will always be under duress if the talks are held in the Philippines, unless they are held in territory controlled by the NDFP, with the NPA providing security to the GRP panel and staff. The GRP, of course, will never concede on paper that the NDFP controls any part of Philippine territory, although in practice they do so whenever they arrange for a safe and expeditious release of prisoners of war held by the NPA.

In this regard, the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) plays an important role not only in safeguarding the security of NDFP personnel and others involved in the negotiations but not necessarily members of the NDFP, but also in establishing equality, mutuality and parity between the GRP and NDFP on questions of safety and immunity. The JASIG unequivocally states: “Each party has the inherent right to issue documents of identification to its negotiators, consultants, staffers, security and other personnel and such documents shall be duly recognized as safe conduct passes as provided in this Joint Agreement.” (I. Safety, No. 2)

The bilateral agreements are replete with examples of how, in negotiating and crafting these agreements, the NDFP has taken care to establish and uphold the fundamental principles of equality, parity, mutuality and reciprocity and thereby maintain its integrity as a revolutionary organization.

On several occasions that the GRP stalled the talks after the NDFP had refused to accept its preconditions and impositions, the GRP charged the NDFP with using the peace negotiations to attain a status of belligerency. The NDFP’s response to this charge is that it has neither the intention nor the need to gain a status of belligerency from the GRP through negotiations or by any other means. The NDFP avers that it already has a status of belligerency, and this has been achieved over years of hard struggle and sacrifice in the battlefield and other arenas of struggle.

The current impasse

Formal peace negotiations were resumed in April 2001, three months after the overthrow of Estrada and the assumption into the presidency of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But this was recessed indefinitely and unilaterally by the GRP in June 2001. Formal talks were suspended by the GRP in March 2002 and remain suspended till now.

The current impasse was brought about principally by the GRP’s collaboration with the US and other foreign powers such as the Royal Dutch Government and the European Council of Ministers in naming the CPP, the NPA and the NDFP chief political consultant, Prof. Jose Maria Sison, as terrorists.

The demonization and criminalization of the CPP, NPA and Prof. Sison by the US, Canadian, Australian and Dutch governments and by the Council of Ministers of the European Union by naming them terrorists has seriously jeopardized the peace negotiations, if it had not yet in fact been scuttled. The CPP and NPA are major organizations in the NDFP, with the NPA as its main armed force and the CPP in turn wielding absolute leadership over the NPA.

The inclusion of Prof. Sison in the terrorist list is absolutely without any factual, legal or moral basis. It is a grave injustice and violation of his democratic rights. Prof Sison is not only a key participant in the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations as the Chief Political Consultant of the NDFP, he is also the prime mover behind the NDFP’s participation in the peace talks. As pointed out earlier, it was Professor Sison who clearly laid down the principles, guidelines and safeguards on the conduct of the NDFP in peace negotiations with the GRP. Prof. Sison’s role in the actual negotiations is aptly described by UN Justice Romeo Capulong when he said that Prof. Sison is the main architect of the ten GRP-NDFP bilateral agreements. It is grotesque irony for one who has contributed that much to the pursuit of peace, to be internationally branded a terrorist.

Beyond doubt, and some of the highest GRP officials themselves have declared as much publicly, the GRP has intended and is now using this terrorist tag as a negotiating lever to intimidate and pressure the NDFP into signing a “final peace accord” which in fact bears all the features of a negotiated surrender or capitulation.

This so-called “final peace agreement” proposes to go through the motions of forging agreements on substantive socio-economic and political reforms. But its real aim is to make the NDFP agree to end hostilities and disarm and demobilize the New People’s Army even without any assurance that such reforms are in place or will even be implemented at all. There is in fact a proviso that practically kills all reforms even before the ink on the agreement dries. In the last part, the proposed document states that all agreements shall be interpreted and implemented in accordance with the Philippine Constitution and its legal processes.

The NDFP cites several violations by the GRP of the bilateral agreements, notably the 1992 The Hague Joint Declaration, the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees, the Joint Agreement on the Formation, Sequence and Operationalization of the Reciprocal Working Committees and the Supplementary Agreement on the Formation, Sequence and Operationalization of the Reciprocal Working Committees.

The NDFP points to the collaboration of the GRP with the US and other foreign powers in allowing them to encroach on the jurisdiction of the two parties in their negotiations as itself a grievous violation of the bilateral agreements, notably The Hague Joint Declaration of 1992 providing that negotiations must be held in accordance with the principle of national sovereignty, the JASIG which stipulates that none of those involved in the peace negotiations must be put under duress, and the CARHRIHL which provides that the GRP respect the Hernandez doctrine in its own jurisprudence, disallowing the criminalization of alleged political offenses.

Conclusions

The road to genuine peace is no doubt long and tortuous, full of twists and turns, detours,. obstacles and traps. Peace negotiations are no exception. Preserving one’s revolutionary integrity over the negotiating table requires as much clarity in objectives, correct analysis of concrete conditions, correct strategy, alertness, perseverance, firmness in principle and flexibility in tactics as in the battlefield. When those in power realize they could no longer defeat the forces of change in the battlefield, they will attempt to do so over the negotiating table. As much as each party could gain over the negotiating table that they would not in the battlefield, so too are the losses they could incur.

Those who turn to peace negotiations as an alternative path because they are tired of armed struggle, or are enticed by the apparent relief from and mitigation of hardships and sacrifice offered by the prospect of a cessation of hostilities will be vulnerable to succumb to a formula for capitulation and pacification rather than a just and lasting peace.

The capitulation or surrender of an armed group fighting for a legitimate cause may result in a cessation of hostilities and relative calm or peace. But armed conflict is bound to flare up again so long as its roots are not addressed. We have the clear example of the Mindanao conflict, where two peace accords, the second one named a “Final Peace Accord”, coupled with the continuing and intensifying war between the GRP and the MILF, bear witness to the futility of ending war without removing the problems that cause it..

Genuine peace cannot be achieved through peace negotiations alone. The various forms of struggle are interrelated and can complement each other when properly wielded . The strength of a negotiating position arises from one’s strength in the battlefield and in other arenas, including legal protest actions and mass movements. The peace negotiations, in turn, can support the armed struggle and other forms of struggle including legal protest actions and mass movements.

The bottom line is that peace negotiations must contribute to the attainment of a just and lasting peace. They must serve to address and resolve the roots of the armed conflict. In backward third world countries such as the Philippines, peace negotiations must contribute to bringing about the radical social, economic and political changes that are needed to end foreign domination and eradicate poverty, social injustice and inequity.

The forces of reaction will always strive to crush the forces of change. Genuine peace is achieved when the forces of change prevail. #

Paper for NEPP-PEPP Luzon Workshop
Rey Claro Casambre
Philippine Peace Center
Subic Bay, 11 October 2007

Four months ago, in June 2007, a faint glimmer of hope shone amidst the seemingly impermeable darkness and uncertainty that had shrouded the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations for the past three years.

For the first time since the formal talks were postponed and then suspended indefinitely in 2004, both the GRP and the NDFP appeared to be seeking a way out of the impasse, both sides displaying a willingness to compromise and bend from erstwhile hardline positions in order to find a mutually acceptable formula for the declaration of a ceasefire and the resumption of formal peace talks. The government proposed a ceasefire for a number of months for the duration of talks, a departure from its prior precondition of a prolonged or indefinite ceasefire that the NDFP had always before rejected. The NDFP responded by saying it was open to a limited ceasefire for the duration of the formal talks, preceded by a joint agreement in accordance with a proposed ten-point “Concise Agreement for an Immediate Just Peace”, with all prior bilateral agreements.

The optimism would be reinforced by the positive intervention of the Supreme Court that unequivocally spoke against the evident pattern and state policy of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Under the leadership of Chief Justice Reynato Puno, the Supreme Court called for an unprecedented national summit to address these problems and formulate new legal procedures that would help deter and minimize, if not eradicate, the incidence of these human rights violations.

All that now seems so far away. The glimmer of hope has not only faded, it has been violently extinguished

There is no doubt that the recent arrest of Prof. JMS and the raids on the office and residences of the NDFP panel members and staff in Utrecht, The Netherlands have drastically changed the situation for the worse, perhaps irreversibly.

What is the impact of arrest on the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations?

• At a time when the peace negotiations badly need gestures of goodwill and confidence-building measures, the arrest of JMS and raids on offices and residences of NDFP negotiating panel members and staff have dealt the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations a severe blow, that threatens to extinguish what little hope is left for the resumption of the formal talks and the advance in the negotiations.
• As expected, the NDFP condemns the attacks, sees these as a sign of negotiating in bad faith, and declares it will not negotiate with a government that violates, rather than complies with the bilateral agreements.
• Mauunawaan natin ang NDF kung iisipin nitong wala nang intension ang GRP sa ilalim ni Macapagal-Arroyo at pursigido itong gamitin ang buong marahas na lakas ng estado para durugin ito. While it initially denied any participation in the move of the Dutch government, documents released by the Dutch prosecution show that the Dutch action was in response to a request by the GRP to extradite Prof. Sison (26 Jan 2005). Eventually, Sec. Norberto Gonzales, Sec. Raul Gonzales, PNP Director Calderon and Deputy Director Razon all admitted, or rather claimed, that they had provided the Dutch government evidences and assisted the accusers of Prof. Sison in filing the case in the Netherlands.
• The US likewise professes not to have been involved, and offers its assistance if the Dutch government requests it, but in fact the testimonies of some of the witnesses were taken by the Dutch investigators at the US embassy.
• It is also clear that NDFP will not give in to GRP pressure to sign a “final peace accord” that does not address the roots of the armed conflict, or that is tantamount to its capitulation or surrender.
• Despite this, neither party has terminated the negotiations nor declared the agreements are no longer binding. This is the proverbial silver lining that gives us, peace advocates, the objective basis for persevering in our calls for the resumption of formal talks and for pushing the negotiations forward in accordance with the bilateral agreements both parties had forged.

What can and should peace advocates do in a situation where both sides appear to be unwilling to resume formal talks?

• We cannot remain passive in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds. Rather, these only mean we must work harder to keep the peace negotiations alive and exert utmost effort to push it forward.
• Join hands in common struggle, seek common principles, aspirations and goals, and work on these together and present a stronger voice.
• Our advocacy cannot be a function of our perception of how “sincere” or “willing” either or both parties are in seeking a genuine peace, but from our faith and conviction that a just and enduring peace is possible and necessary.
• Our quest for a genuine peace has as its main content the advocacy for basic or fundamental reforms that address the roots of the armed conflict. (Note: learn from the experience of the Moro people, or from the peace negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF and the MILF).
• Here are some concrete proposals to address the roots of the armed conflict:
  o Genuine land reform and national industrialization
  o Empowerment of masses through genuine representation
  o Economic sovereignty
  o Independent foreign policy
  o Indictment, investigation and prosecution of plunder, corruption
  o Normal trade and diplomatic relations with other countries
  o Patriotic, scientific and mass culture through education, mass media and mass organizations, cherish the cultural heritage of the Filipino nation and all the ethno-linguistic communities in the country
  o Recognition of right to self-determination of minorities
  o Cancellation of unjust, onerous foreign debts
  o Truce for the purpose of alliance and other constructive purposes

(These are the items in the NDFP’s “Concise Proposal for an Immediate and Just Peace, presented to the GRP in August 2005)

• Take a long view of the peace process
  • Tactically, what to do under conditions that Arroyo government has no intention of proceeding with an agenda that will address the roots of the armed conflict;
    • Study the process, especially the bilateral agreements (see The GRP-NDFP Peace Negotiations). Pay special attention to The 1992 Hague Joint Declaration, on p.1)
    • Call for the resumption of the formal talks
    • Absent the resumption, call for the operationalization of the JMC (to address the complaints vs EJKs and other violations of both sides.)
    • Take a position on the problems and issues, eg the recent arrest and raids, and political
  • Strategically or in the long term, view the peace process beyond GMA whether or not she remains de-facto president before, up to or beyond 2010. Peace negotiations has spanned and can continue to span different administrations (Ramos, Estrada, GMA), and will certainly outlive GMA

Annex:

From Chapter 9, Searching for Peace in Asia-Pacific – An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities (edited by Annelies Heijmans, Nicola Simmonds, and Hans van de Veen; a project of the European Center for Conflict Prevention):

The more fundamental difference between the GRP and the NDFP impeding the peace negotiations is a disagreement on the root causes of the armed conflict, and on the nature of a “just and lasting peace”.

The GRP considers the following as the roots of the armed conflict:

• massive and abject poverty
• iniquitous distribution of wealth and control over the base of resources needed for livelihood
• injustice
• poor governance

These are all acknowledged by the NDFP. But the GRP is silent on how foreign domination and control has stunted the growth of the Philippine economy and caused suffering and misery. In contrast, the NDFP highlights this as the fundamental problem.

The difference goes beyond semantics. The NDFP points out that rather than address this problem, successive administrations since the Marcos regime have pursued basically the same economic policies that further open up the economy to foreign exploitation and plunder. Thus, measures being pursued by the GRP, such as Ramos’ Social Reform Agenda, fall short when assessed in terms of how economic independence and progress can be achieved to alleviate the the people’s suffering.

A comparison of the two parties’ proposals for social and economic reforms reveals great disparity on how to address the roots of the armed conflict. The GRP’s proposals all lie within the framework of the Philippine Constitution and laws, notwithstanding the provision in the “six paths to peace” that reforms “may involve constitutional amendments”. In initial negotiations for the Comprehensive Agreement on Social Economic Reform, the GRP resisted any reference whatsover to foreign domination and control of the Philippine economy.

From the 1993 NUC list of “reforms which will deal with the root cause of insurgency”, to last year’s GRP draft “Final Peace Agreement”, for example, no constitutional amendment is proposed for land reform or national industrialization, only better and more vigorous implementation of existing laws such as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

NDFP proposals, on the other hand, hew closely to the “Program for a People’s Democratic Revolution”. Even as adjustments are made considering the nature of negotiations, these proposals nonetheless aim to dismantle monopolies – foreign and local — from which arise the economic and political power of the ruling elite. The most important of these are in agrarian reform, national industrialization, the protection of economic sovereignty and the national patrimony, and upholding the people’s basic social and economic rights. Many of these proposals, if agreed upon would require major constitutional changes.

Without the assistance of a neutral third party, it is unlikely that the peace negotiations would advance this far. From the outset the NDFP has been open to having a foreign neutral third party in the negotiations. But the GRP argued that the armed conflict was an internal matter that should be resolved without any foreign third party intervention. The GRP, wary that having a foreign third party in the negotiations would give the armed conflict an international character and grant the NDFP belligerency status, initially insisted on holding the talks in the Philippines, then proposed a “shifting venue”. The NDFP objected, pointing to the 1986 experience when CPP/NPA/NDFP personnel who surfaced for the peace talks were subjected to intensive surveillance, identification and punitive actions[i]. To underscore its point, the NDFP offered to host the peace talks inside NDFP territory, with the NDFP issuing safe-conduct passes to GRP personnel.

Exploratory and formal talks have been hosted by The Netherlands and Belgium since 1992. The Royal Norwegian Government has acted as third party host since the resumption of formal GRP-NDFP talks in April 2001. It has taken an even more active role as third party facilitator since October 2003. Other, less significant activities by outside parties have included an offer from the Swiss government to host talks (rejected by the GRP)[ii], similar offers from the European Parliament, and European Parliament resolutions supporting the negotiations and expressing concern over human right violations.

In contrast, there is also what might be called foreign third party “conflict aggravation”. For example, the US, The Netherlands, and the Council of the European Union have jeopardized peace negotiations by listing the CPP/NPA and NDFP Chief Political Consultant Jose Maria Sison as “foreign terrorists” since August 2002.

The GRP has itself undermined confidence-building efforts by campaigning for the “terrorist” listing among member-states of the European Union in October 2002, welcoming such actions, and then using the “terrorist” listing to pressure the NDFP into agreeing to a “new enhanced process” that would lead to the signing of a “Final Peace Accord”. The NDFP has denounced the listing and the actions of the GRP as violations of national sovereignty and of the bilateral agreements. It also rejected the GRP’s proposed “new process” and draft “Final Peace Accord” as “negotiated capitulation”.

(This has taken a turn for the worse with the collaboration of the US and Dutch governments in the recent arrest of Prof Sison and the raids on the office and residences of the NDFP negotiating panel members and staff.)

Recommendations

The Philippine experience in conflict resolution validates the criteria for an efficacious approach prescribed by Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse in “Calling for a Broad Approach to Conflict Resolution”[iii]. The GRP-NDFP negotiations and the agreements reached show that progress is possible so long as (1) the parties enter into the negotiations without preconditions or any imposition from either side or outside parties, (2) the agreements are crafted in precise language that strikes a balance between commitment and flexibility (3) there is mutuality and reciprocity in the provisions, and (4) they deal with the core issues and bring about basic changes in society, “in accordance with mutually acceptable principles, including national sovereignty, democracy and social justice[iv].”

1. The most difficult but essential thing to “justpeace-building” is to ensure that the peace process “deals with the core issues” – i.e., it is aimed at addressing the root causes of the armed conflict, especially the social and economic ones. With respect to bilateral peace negotiations, conflict resolution and prevention means ensuring that agreements identify and address the root causes of conflict, prevent their perpetuation and aggravation, and thereby avert the recurrence of violent conflict.

2. Addressing the root causes of armed conflict is invariably a long-drawn out and complicated process. Thus the peace process must be so designed as to generate immediate tangible gains that benefit the people in general, mitigate the adverse effects of the armed conflict, and serve to build confidence and goodwill as the negotiations advance towards the goal of a lasting peace.

This is the advantage in having the agreement on the respect for human rights and international humanitarian law as the first item of the substantive agenda. Its implementation could at once, in the absence of a settlement, mitigate the human cost of the armed conflict. The returns in terms of imbuing both combatants and non-combatants with greater respect for human rights are invaluable, if intangible. The forging of the CARHRIHL likewise helped build confidence in the capabilities of the two parties to move forward to the more contentious item on the agenda, the socio-economic reforms.

3. The peace process needs all the help it can get. Third party official intervention can be either positive (offers of good offices, hosting, facilitation) or negative (e.g., the “terrorist” listings). Intervention by other international organizations can be positive if they contribute to the identification, elaboration and resolution of the causes of armed conflict, and if they help the parties build on their bilateral agreements rather than try to impose their own ideas. Neutrality should mean not taking the side of either party. In the Philippine context, the kind of neutrality which is good, possible, and necessary makes the interests of the greater majority of the Filipino people the paramount consideration in determining what position to adopt vis à vis the twists and turns in the negotiations.

The GRP-NDFP armed conflict has never been purely an internal affair, with the US playing a dominant role in Philippine politics, economy and social-cultural life. September 11 has injected renewed US military activity in the country under the guise of “counter-terrorism”. The inclusion of the CPP, NPA and Prof. Sison in foreign “terrorist” lists underscores the negative impact of international geopolitics on the GRP-NDFP conflict and conflict-resolution.

4. The GRP and NDFP must uphold and comply with bilateral agreements that have proven to be effective in advancing the talks and achieving further substantial agreements. Foremost is The Hague Joint Declaration which serves as the framework and foundation of the negotiations.

5. There is a vast potential for building a strong peace constituency in the people’s movement clamoring for socio-economic and political reforms. To a larger extent, such potential lies in both the organized and still unorganized grassroots masses in the countryside, who are most directly affected by the armed conflict, and who stand to benefit most by its just resolution.

The NGOs, POs and other organizations and individuals in this people’s movement have presented sharp critiques of the present system, policies, etc., and clamor for basic reforms. But they still have to link their advocacy to the peace process, particularly the peace negotiations, and affirm their roles as true stakeholders.

There is a pressing need for further peace education and information work among the populace, the POs, NGOs and other sectoral and grassroots organizations, and for involving them into activities that directly support and enhance the peace process.

In the end it is the people’s conscious and sustained participation in the peace process that will push it forward in the direction of addressing the roots of the armed conflict. The Filipino people are the final arbiters on what will bring about genuine peace.

Realistically speaking, a just and lasting peace in the Philippines is still far beyond the horizon. The peace process has stretched out over many years. The ultimate resolution of the conflict will only come with much more painstaking work not only inside the negotiating room, but more decisively, outside its walls.

 

---

 

[i] Government intelligence officials reported that their intelligence stock on the CPP/NPA/NDFP increased by 60% after the 1986-87 ceasefire and peace talks.

[ii] “Switzerland offers good offices for peace talks between NDF and Aquino government in Geneva. Aquino government rejects offer”, Neue Zuricher Zeitung, 17 May 1991

[iii]Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham & Tony Woodhouse, “Calling for a Broad Approach to Conflict Resolution”, in Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia, edited by Monique Mekenkamp, Paul van Tongeren and Hans van de Veen. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002, p. 34.

[iv]Luis Jalandoni and Jose Yap, “The Hague Joint Declaration”. Signed and issued by Cong. Jose Yap and Luis Jalandoni representing GRP President Ramos and the NDFP, respectively, The Hague, 1 September 1992.

Rey Claro Casambre
Philippine Peace Center
8 November 2007

Paper presented at the Church Leaders’ Meeting under the auspices of the Norwegian Ecumenical Peace Platform (NEPP), 7-8 November 2007.

Introduction

The topic assigned to me is “The Human Security Act and the Rule of Law”.My task is to make a discussion of this topic fit into the program and objectives of this workshop. More particularly, the question I must answer is, why should we talk about the Human Security Act and the Rule of Law after listening to the updates on the peace negotiations from the GRP and NDFP representatives, and before discussing the demands of conflict transformation and the challenges of reconciliation in the peace process?

Let me start by citing a seemingly insignificant and only remotely related incident that appeared in the news a couple of days ago. It was a simple case of a work of art – a mural — being altered by its owner to please his guests, and the artist who created it protesting the changes made. It would have been a simple question of an owner’s right on one hand to do whatever he wants with something he owns, and an artist’s right on the other, to preserve his or her creation. But the cast of characters makes the incident more than that.

The mural – one depicting the state of press freedom in the Philippines — was created by the Neo Angono Artists collective, as commissioned by the National Press Club, which now owns the mural. The NPC had made some afterations on the mural without consulting the Neo-Angono Artists, after the Presidential Security Group commander commented that it (the mural) had “Leftist” marks. The PSG commander was referring, among others, to the alibata K on the arm of Bonifacio. The NPC had this altered with a heart pierced with an arrow. What were the other alterations made?

Interestingly and ironically, among the other alterations made was the complete obliteration of the statement of concern by the International Federation of Journalists over the Human Security Act, or the Anti-Terrorism Law, which was passed by Congress early this year.

The incident itself has a chilling effect. No less than the supposed guardians of press freedom were intimidated and impelled into this act of vandalism and censorship by what the PSG commander claims was a mere casual remark.

The NPC leadership’s reaction is absolutely unjustifiable and unforgivable. The excuse they offered – that the NPC wants to be apolitical and does not want being associated with the Left nor the Right — is quite lame and unacceptable. Altering the mural to please the PSG and avoid incurring the ire of GMA (who would be the guest of honor at its unveiling) was itself a blatantly political and Rightist act.

But if one views this incident in the context of unsolved killings and disappearances of journalists under the GMA government, the filing of libel cases against them by no less than the First Gentleman, and their inclusion in the AFP’s “order of battle” or listing of “enemies of the state”, then the NPC’s reaction of panic is understandable.

In fact, the NPC’s action demonstrates how terrorized and insecure they have become, perhaps just like anyone who is branded as an “enemy of the state”, despite or even because of the Anti-Terrorist Law, aka “Human Security Act”.

The Human Security Act

This, too sounds ironic, but not altogether strange. The Philippine version of an Anti-Terrorist Law, like many of its counterparts worldwide, has among its most objectionable features the following (slide):

1) failure to define clearly what “terrorists” and “terrorist acts”, thereby lumping together criminal acts and legitimate actions of protest, demands, or expressions of dissent and grievance.
2) imposing stiffer penalties on allegedly “terrorist” acts than on the same criminal acts not associated nor accompanied with “terrorism” or political ends
3) suspending if not entirely denying individual and collective rights, even constitutionally mandated rights, for the sake of anti-terrorism
4) vesting certain entities and individuals with extraordinary powers (e.g., the “Anti-Terrorism Council” is vested with prosecutory and judicial powers even if it is not part of the Philippine judiciary).

One possible impact of the HSA on the peace negotiations is that the CPP, NDF and NPA could be proscribed as terrorist organizations. Not a few high government officials, including the AFP and PNP top brass, have expressed their desire and objective to do so. This would surely terminate the peace negotiations.

Another possibility is that progressive organizations and individuals already listed as “enemies of the state” or “communist fronts” would also be proscribed as “terrorist”, giving state security forces further leeway in acting against these organizations and individuals to suppress dissent.

But the real and greater danger in the HSA lies even beyond its provisions. While state security forces and agencies decry what they call the emasculation of the Anti-terrorist law, that it is “toothless” and not strong enough to counter terrorism and send the terrorists to jail, the truth is that grievous human rights violations have been committed with absolute impunity and at an unprecedented scale and intensity for the past six years, even without the HSA. What the HSA has done is to provide an aura of legality, a legal justification, to an extrajudicial “counterterrorist” action, even if the HSA is not actually invoked or applied on a particular case.

In sum, the Human Security Act is itself a source of insecurity. This Anti-Terrorist Law itself terrorizes a broad range of potential victims.

No less than Supreme Court Chief Justice Reynato Puno declared:

… Terrorism is just one means of violating our human rights, especially our right to life itself, and should not consume our entire attention… Terrorism is terrible enough but the mindless, knee jerk reaction to extirpate the evil is more discomforting. The quickie solution is … for the military and the police to use their weapons of destruction under the theme victory at all cost. To put constitutional cosmetics to the military-police muscular efforts, lawmakers usually enact laws using security of the state to justify the dimunition of human rights by allowing arrests without warrants; surveillance of suspects; interception and recording of communications; seizure or freezing of bank deposits, assets and records of suspects. They also redefine terrorism as a crime against humanity and the redefinition is broadly drawn to constrict and shrink further the zone of individual rights.

In many countries, including the US and in Europe, many provisions of their anti-terrorist laws (such as the USA PATRIOT Act) have been questioned, and some have been ruled as unconstitutional or illegal by their own courts. Again, this is not strange, considering that there is no single, universally accepted legal definition of “terrorism”, even six years after 9-11 and the launching of the so-called “war on terror”.

Again citing Chief Justice Puno:

On the universal level, 9/11 altered the face of international law. As the worst victim of terrorism, the United States led the fight to excise and exorcise terrorism from the face of the earth. It pursued a strategy characterized by a bruising aggressiveness that raised the eyebrows of legal observers. The leader country of democracy did not wait for the United Nations to act but immediately sought to search and destroy terrorists withersoever they may be found. In less polite parlance, the search and destroy strategy gave little respect to the sovereignty of states and violated their traditional borders. The strategy which is keyed on military stealth and might had trampling effects on the basic liberties of suspected terrorists for laws are silent when the guns of war do the talking. The war on terrorism has inevitable spilled over effects on human rights all over the world, especially in countries suspected as being used as havens of terrorists. One visible result of the scramble to end terrorism is to take legal shortcuts and legal shortcuts always shrink the scope of human rights.

Are we blaming the US-led “war on terror” entirely for the human rights violations, the state of lawlessness, and the lawlessness of the state? Definitely not. The Arroyo government has its own reasons, and is totally responsible, for tolerating, if not itself promoting, a pattern and policy of extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture and massacres against alleged “enemies of the state”, and using the “war on terror” as a pretext and justification for doing so.

Despite claims of economic recovery and progress, the broad majority of people suffer joblessness, hunger, spiraling prices, onerous taxes, etc. The economy is largely dependent on and at the mercy of foreign capital, and the national patrimony is being opened up further to foreign exploitation and plunder. The Arroyo regime itself is suffering from a serious and long-festering crisis of legitimacy, rocked by monstrous corruption scandals of its own making. Confronted with incessant protests, calls for its removal from office – either through voluntary resignation or by forced ouster — it has resorted to deception, bribery, cooptation and coercion to ward off criticisms and suppress dissent. But most of all it unleashes the coercive forces of the state against those who rise up in protest.

According to Chief Justice Puno :

The threats to our national security and human rights will be aggravated if we have a state, weakened internally by a government hobbled by corruption, struggling with credibility, battling the endless insurgence of the left and the right; and, by a state weakened externally by pressure exerted by creditor countries, by countries where our trade comes from, by countries that supply our military and police armaments. A weak state cannot fully protect the rights of its citizens within its borders just as a state without economic independence cannot protect the rights of its citizens who are abroad from the exploitation of more powerful countries.

Human Rights and Peace

What does all this have to do with the peace process? Chief Justice Puno points out the relationship between human rights, violations of economic and cultural rights, and the relevance of these to the quest for peace:

The promotion of human rights is also the indispensable predicate of peace and progress. For this reason, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Its two implementing covenants are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These instruments not only denounced nazism and fascism, but also recognized that the “security of individual rights, like the security of national rights, was a necessary requisite to a peaceful and stable world order.”

xxx we need to give a broader, innovative view on our efforts to protect the human rights of our people which should consider our distinct social, economic and political context.
Xxx In poor countries, it is poverty that truly terrorizes people for they are terrorized by the thought that they will die because of empty stomachs and not that they will lose their lives due to some invisible suicide bombers. In poor countries, it is also poverty that renders the poor vulnerable to violation of their rights, for the poor will not vindicate their rights in a justice system that moves in slow motion and whose wheels have to be greased with money. And would any dare to doubt, that our national security and our human rights are more threatened by the fear that we face an environmental collapse if we do not take immediate steps to save our seas and our forests from the despoliation to satisfy the economic greed of the few. Again, the realities may be uncomfortable but let the statistics talk and they tell us that in year 2000 for example, 300,000 people all over the world died due to violence in armed conflicts but as many people die each and every month because of contaminated water or lack of adequate sanitation.

In the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal Second Session on the Philippines held in The Hague, Netherlands in March 2007, the plaintiffs – organizations of human rights victims under the Arroyo government – declared in their Summation:

… we have shown that these gross and systematic violations of civil and political rights, of social, economic and cultural rights, and of the right to national self-determination and independence, are distinct but at the same time not isolated from each other. They are closely and intrinsically interrelated.

1. The poverty and social injustice brought about by the economic plunder, rampant graft and corruption, and other violations of their social, economic and cultural rights by the Defendants are pushing the great majority of the people, especially the toiling peoples, to protest their condition and fight for better social conditions.

2. The Macapagal-Arroyo regime, like its predecessors, uses deception and coercion alternately and in combination in order to suppress and defeat the peoples’ protests and struggle for genuine independence, democracy and social justice. But as the people’s movements gain strength and they become less vulnerable to deception, the Macapagal-Arroyo regime and its foreign patrons increasingly resort to the coercive forces at its disposal. It does so for its own political survival, for retaining and protecting its narrow economic interests, and to protect the interests of its foreign patrons, especially US imperialism.

Our role and contribution

This brings us to where the peace negotiations currently are, and what we as peace advocates and church leaders can and should contribute in our people’s quest for a just and enduring peace.

What can and should peace advocates do in a situation where both sides appear to be unwilling to resume formal talks? Allow me to reiterate some points I had presented earlier at the Luzon Workshop held at Subic last October.

• We cannot remain passive in the face of seemingly insurmountable odds. Rather, these only mean we must work harder to keep the peace negotiations alive and exert utmost effort to push it forward.
• Join hands in common struggle, seek common principles, aspirations and goals, and work on these together and present a stronger voice.
• Our advocacy cannot be a function of our perception of how “sincere” or “willing” either or both parties are in seeking a genuine peace, but from our faith and conviction that a just and enduring peace is possible and necessary.
• Our quest for a genuine peace has as its main content the advocacy for basic or fundamental reforms that address the roots of the armed conflict. (Note: learn from the experience of the Moro people, or from the peace negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF and the MILF).
• Here are some concrete proposals to address the roots of the armed conflict:
  • Genuine land reform and national industrialization
  • Empowerment of masses through genuine representation
  • Economic sovereignty
  • Independent foreign policy
  • Indictment, investigation and prosecution of plunder, corruption
  • Normal trade and diplomatic relations with other countries
  • Patriotic, scientific and mass culture through education, mass media and mass organizations, cherish the cultural heritage of the Filipino nation and all the ethno-linguistic communities in the country
  • Recognition of right to self-determination of minorities
  • Cancellation of unjust, onerous foreign debts
  • Truce for the purpose of alliance and other constructive purposes

(These are the items in the NDFP’s “Concise Proposal for an Immediate and Just Peace, presented to the GRP in August 2005)

• Take a long view of the peace process
  • Tactically, what to do under conditions that Arroyo government has no intention of proceeding with an agenda that will address the roots of the armed conflict;
    • Study the process, especially the bilateral agreements (see The GRP-NDFP Peace Negotiations). Pay special attention to The 1992 Hague Joint Declaration, on p.1)
    • Call for the resumption of the formal talks
    • Absent the resumption, call for the operationalization of the JMC (to address the complaints vs EJKs and other violations of both sides.)
    • Take a position on the problems and issues, eg the recent arrest and raids, and political
  • Strategically or in the long term, view the peace process beyond GMA whether or not she remains de-facto president before, up to or beyond 2010. Peace negotiations has spanned and can continue to span different administrations (Ramos, Estrada, GMA), and will certainly outlive GMA

Briefly, here are some suggested concrete measures:
1. Protection of Human Rights

1.1. Call on the government to repudiate “Oplan Bantay Laya” and the AFP policy and practice of branding its critics, progressives, peace advocates, etc as “enemies of the state”, which have been pointed out by the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial Killings, Philip Alston, as having resulted in extra-judicial executions and other violations of human rights.
1.2. Call for the immediate reactivation or resumption of meetings of the Joint Monitoring Committee even while the formal talks remain suspended.

2. Social and Economic Reforms

2.1. Work for the resumption of formal talks so that the formal negotiations on the Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms, which had started in April 2001 can resume.
2.2. Hold widespread consultations, fora, roundtable discussions, education and information campaigns, etc. on the draft proposals of the GRP and NDFP.

3. Resumption of formal talks

3.1. Call for the immediate resumption of formal talks on the basis of The Hague Joint Declaration and other bilateral agreements.
3.2. Support the proposal for a ceasefire based on a concise agreement for an immediate just peace
3.3. Support the formation of technical working groups and groups of experts to accelerate the talks.

Finally, I would like to conclude by giving my two cents’ worth on two points raised in the very frank and animated discussion last night:

Can genuine peace be achieved through the bilateral peace negotiations alone? (No. The bilateral negotiations are an important or essential arena, but only one of many.)
Can genuine peace be achieved by the removal – by forced resignation, ouster, or whatever — of GMA alone?
No. This is the clear lesson from EDSA 1 and 2 (or People Power 1 and 2).

But is the removal of GMA necessary to achieve genuine peace? We still have the rest of this morning and the whole afternoon to answer this question.

Inihanda ni Rey Casambre
Para sa Pulong ng BAYAN National Council
Oktubre 28, 2002

Sa unang tingin, may nagaganap na biglaan at malaking pagbabago sa mundo na nagsimula noong Setyembre 11, 2001. Mabilis at mabalasik ang mga pangyayari mula nang bombahin ang World Trade Center at ang Pentagon. Kagyat na nagdeklara si George W. Bush, Presidente ng USA, ng isang “digmaan laban sa terorismo” na diumano sasaklaw sa buong mundo at tatagos at ikasasangkot ng lahat ng bayan, nang walang pasubali. “Kung hindi kayo papanig sa amin, ituturing namin kayong kaaway,” ani Bush. Kagyat ding itinuon ng US ang pag-uusig sa sarili nitong mga mamamayang di nito mapagkatiwalaan. Ilang linggo pa lang ipinasa ng Kongreso ng US ang “Patriot Act” na sumusupil sa mga karapatang pantao ng mga Amerikanong pinaghihinalaan pa lamang na may kaugnayan sa mga diumanong mga terorista.

Wala pang isang buwan ang nakalipas, nilusob ng US ang Afghanistan nang walang pagsangguni man lamang sa United Nations. Simpleng ikinatwiran ang hinalang kinukupkop ng gobyernong Taliban ng Afghanistan ang pinaghihinalaang mga teroristang bumomba sa WTC at Pentagon, si Osama bin Laden at ang pinamumunuan nitong Al Qaeda. Matapos ang walang habas at walang habag na pambobomba at pag-atake maging sa mga sibilyan na populasyon at mga instalasyon, nagtagumpay ang US sa pagpapabagsak at pagpapalit sa gobyernong Taliban. Pero bigo ito sa idineklarang layunin na “dalhin sa hustisya, o dalhin ang hustisya, kay Bin Laden at Al Qaeda. Ngayon, ginagamit pa itong dahilan ng US para sa patuloy na pagpapanatili ng mga pwersang militar nila sa Afghanistan at mga kanugnog na bayan sa Central Asia.

Kasunod nito ang isinagawang pagtugis diumano sa Abu Sayyaf sa Pilipinas, sa likod ng balatkayong “Balikatan 02-1 joint combined exercises training”. Kaakibat ng deklarasyong ang Pilipinas at Timog-silangang Asia ang “ikalawang larangan” ng “gyera laban sa terorismo”, maramihan at matagalang lumahok ang US Special Operations Forces sa kampanyang militar laban sa mga Abu Sayyaf sa Basilan at iba pang bahagi ng Mindanao. Simpleng ikinatwirang mga terorista ang mga ito kahimat walang matibay na ebidensya ng tuwirang ugnayan sila kina bin Laden at Al Qaeda, liban sa katotohanang kapwa sila nilikha ng CIA bilang bahagi ng mga “surrogate forces” ng US. Muli, bigo ang US at AFP sa isinaad na layuning durugin ang Abu Sayyaf. Muli, ginagamit pa itong katwiran para sa patuloy na pagpapanatili sa ilang US Special Forces sa Mindanao diumano para tapusin ang mga “humanitarian & infrastructure projects” na sinimulan nilang gawin sa panahong tinutugis ang Abu Sayyaf.

Ngayon naman maingay na nagtatambol at naghahamon ang US para sa pakikipag-gyera kay Saddam Hussein ng Iraq. Bilang bahagi diumano ng “war against terror”, ang pagpapabagsak kay Hussein, pagpapaupo ng gobyernong maamo sa US, at ang pagwasak sa kakayahan ng Iraq na gumawa ng mga bombang nuclear at iba pang “weapons of mass destruction” ang inilalahad ng gobyernong Bush na layunin sa pag-atake sa Iraq. Pero di tulad ng digma sa Afghanistan, hirap ngayon ang gubyernong Bush na makakabig ng malakas at malawak na suporta para sa gyera sa Iraq.

Ito’y sa dahilang kung ihahambing sa paglusob nito sa Afghanistan, malayong higit nang nailalantad at kung gayon binabatikos ang tunay na layunin ng US sa paglusob sa Iraq: (1) ang mapalakas ang pampulitikang lakas nito sa Gitnang Silangan, at (2) ang pag-agaw at pagkontrol ng malaking rekurso sa langis na matatagpuan sa teritoryo ng Iraq.

Malinaw na mula Setyembre 11, nagkaroon ng ibayong paglakas at paglawak ng opensiba ng US sa larangan ng pulitika, ekonomya at militar. Dulot lang ba ito ng pambobomba ng Setyembre 11, tulad ng paniwala ng marami? Ang mga ito ba’y kontraopensibang tugon lamang ng US bilang paghiganit sa sinapit nitong trahedya sa kamay ng mga terorista, pagtatanggol sa sarili para hindi maulit ang kalunos-lunos na pangyayari, at responsableng pamumuno sa isang dakilang pandaigdigang kampanya laban sa terorismo para sa kaligtasan at pag-unlad ng buong daigdig?

Alam na natin ngayon ang sagot sa tanong na ito. May malilinaw na mga indikasyon at katunayang ang nabanggit na mayor na mga hakbang tulad ng Patriot Act, paglusob sa Afghanistan at mga pagbabago sa disposisyong militar matapos ang 9-11 ay napag-isipan at napaghandaang ipatupad ilang buwan o taon pa nga bago nangyari ang 9-11. Kung bubuin ang mga katunayan, at susuriin nang mas malalim, makikita ang katotohanang ang “gyera laban sa terorismo” ay isa lamang balatkayo para sa ibayo at walang-habas na opensibang pampulitika, pang-ekonomya, pangkultura at militar ng imperyalismong US para mapalawak at mapatatag ang pandaigdigang hegemonya nito.

Ang ibayong opensibang ito ay masasabing nagsimula noon pang nakaraang dekada kung kailan nagsibagsakan ang mga rehimen sa Silangang Europa at tuluyang gumuho ang Unyong Sobyet. Ang pagtatapos ng “Cold War” ang nagtulak sa US sa pusisyon bilang nag-iisa at walang-kasinlakas na superpower. Matatandaan nating namayagpag ang US noon at kagyat na inilunsad ang “globalisasyon” bilang mayor at masaklaw na opensiba sa ekonomya at ideolohiya.

Matatandaan din nating nagtapos ang “Cold War” sa panahong dalawang dekada nang nakabalaho ang pandaigdigang sistemang kapitalista sa papatinding krisis ng sobrang produksyon, na namamanipesta sa matumal na paglago ng mga ekonomya maging ng mga pinakamalalaking kapitalistang kapangyarihan. Para mapalakas ang pusisyon ng mga imperyalistang estado at ng monopolyo kapital, ipinataw sa mga mahihina’t maliiit na ekonomya ang neoliberal na mga patakaran ng liberalisasyon, deregulasyon, at pribatisasyon na nagpatindi ng pagsasamantala at pang-aapi sa higit na nakararami sa mamamayan ng buong daigdig.

Tinawag ito ni George H. Bush, Sr. bilang “New World Order” o “Bagong Kaayusan”. Pero sa katunayan ito’y dili’t iba kundi ang lumang kaayusang higit na naging magulo. Pinatunayan ng mahigit sampung taong pagpapatupad ng mga “neoliberal” na mga patakaran na hindi pa rin makaahon sa krisis ng sobrang produksyon ang pandaigdigang kapitalistang sistema, lalong lumubog sa kumunoy ng utang at depresyon ang maliliit at mahihinang ekonomya lalo na ng Ikatlong Daigdig, at nanatiling nakabalaho sa mababang antas na paglago ang mga makapangyarihang ekonomyang imperyalista. Kamakailan, pumasok sa recession ang mga ekonomyang US, Russia, Australia, Canada Japan at Germany. (review Pol’s charts). Kamakailan, pumutok ang “economic bubble” sa US, na likha ng matagal at malubhang artipisyal na pagpapalobo ng mga tubo at halaga ng mga transaksyon. Kabilang dito ang pinakagarapal at lansakang pandaraya at pagsisinungaling sa pagdeklara ng mga tubo ng malalaking monopolyong korporasyong Amerikano.

Dahil sa kagahulan ng panahon, ihahanay lamang natin ang ilang pinaka-signipikanteng mga katangian ng komprehensibong opensibang ito na nagtatago sa maskarang “gyera laban sa terorismo” at kung ano ang naging hugis nito mula noong Setyembre 11.

1. Sa larangan ng pulitika:

1. ang pagtatangkang hatiin ang mundo sa pagitan ng “terorista” at “kontra-terorista” samantantalang arbitraryo at tusong inihanay na “terorista” at pinagmumukhang-demonyo ang mga matatatag at epektibong anti-imperyalista tulad ng CPP-NPA at si Prop. Sison;
2. pagpapatindi at pagpapalawak ng mga mapanupil at pasistang hakbang tulad ng Patriot Act, pagbubuo ng mga sekretong military tribunal para sa pag-usig at paglitis sa mga diumanong pinaghihinalaang terorista, at paghikayat o pagtulak sa mga kliyenteng estado na magpatupad ng katumbas na mga batas at hakbang sa iba’t ibang bayan;
3. paglalagay ng sarili sa ibabaw ng ibang mga bansa; paglabag sa soberanya at territorial integrity ng mga bansa maisagawa lamang ang pakay ayon sa makitid na sariling interes, e.g. ang itinutulak ng US na anti-teroristang tratado sa Timog-silangang Asya kung saan pinaaalis nito ang mga probisyong nangangalaga sa soberanya ng mga bansa
4. tahasang pagdeklara na maaari nilang tanggalin at palitan ang sinumang head of state nang ayon sa kagustuhan at interes ng US (tingnan ang QDRR 2000 at ang talumpati ni Bush sa West Point)
5. paglagay sa sarili sa ibabaw ng United Nations, ng internasyunal na batas at internasyunal na makataong batas;
   • paglabag sa probisyon ng UN Charter hinggil sa mga kondisyon sa paggamit ng dahas o digma (self-defense when under attack, exhaustion of diplomatic means, multilateral peace-enforcement action decided on by Security Council)
   • paggamit ng resolusyon ng UN bilang lisensya sa pagdigma (eg Reso 678 vs Iraq)

6. paggawa ng mga hakbang na tahasang nagbubunga ng paglabag sa makataong karapatan, pagtanggi na mapailalim ang tropang US sa ilalim ng mga Kasunduan at international norms na nagtatanggol sa mga karapatang pantao, halimbawa:
   • pagtutulak na ideklara ng ibang bayan na “terorista” ang mga itinuturing ng US na terorista batay sa sarili nitong depinisyon
   • pagsasantabi o pagbabalewala ng mga probinsyon laban sa political extradition (ekstradisyon sa dahilang political)
   • kampanya laban sa ratipikasyon ng Rome Statute at pagtatatag sa ICC at nagbibigay dito ng mandato at kapangyarihan, at pagbuo ng mga bilateral na kasunduang epektibong magsasawalamisa sa ICC.

2. Sa larangan ng militar

1. ang pagpapalakas ng “permanently stationed”, “forward stationed” at “forward deployed” na mga pwersa sa iba’t ibang rehyon ng daigdig (QDRR 2001);
2. pagbanta ng “preemptive strike” o “first strike”, kasama ang banta ng paggamit ng sandatang nuclear
3. paggamit ng mataas na teknolohiya para sa intelligence and surveillance, mas malalakas, mabisa at mapanirang mga sandata at munisyon tulad ng mga deep-penetration incendiary bombs, cluster bumbs, etc. na naglalayon diumanong magbigay ng maririin at pamatay na dagok sa kaaway nang may minimal na kaswalidad sa mga tropang US, pero sa kalakaran ay nagdudulot sa mga sibilyan ng ng malalaking pinsala at pagkasalanta na manhd na tinatawag lamang na “collateral damage”
4. ibayong paggamit ng mga Special Operations Forces na may kasanayan, kakayahan at atas na magsagawa ng intelligence & surveillance, “foreign internal defense operations”, pag-oorganisa ng mga katutubo para sa kontra-insurhensya, at mga lihim na misyon tulad ng sabotahe, asasinasyon, pagdukot (abductions) kung saan “hindi maaaring aminin ng gobyernong US ang pagkasangkot dito”
   5. pagsasanay-militar ng mga lokal na pwersang panagupa sa iba’t ibang dako at bayan
      • 100,000 tropang dayuhan ang sinasanay ng US taun-taon sa US at 180 bansa
      • isa itong paraan ng forward deployment — sa bawat linggo, may idinaraos na pagsasanay ang 5,000 US-SOF sa 60 bansa sa buong mundo
      • noong 1997-98, nagdaos ng mga pagsasanay sa Turkmenistan

3. Sa larangan ng ekonomya

1. pagtiyak sa kontrol sa mga estratehikong rekurso lalo na ang reserba ng langis
2. paghahanda at paglunsad ng digma para makatulong sa pag-ahon mula sa krisis at pagkamal na mas malalaking tubo ng mga korporasyon sa “military-industrial complex”
3. pagsusulong ng mga “neoliberal” na mga patakaran ng globalisasyon
4. pag-bailout sa mga malalaking monopolyong nalulugi bunga ng pagputok ng “economic bubble” ng artipisyal at dinayang mga “tubo” at transayson

4. Sa larangan ng ideolohiya at kultura

1. pagpapalitaw na ang US ang sentro at pinagmumulan ng kalayaan, demokrasya, katarungan, kasaganaan, etc at kung gayon siyang may solong kakayahan at karapatang maging “tagapagtanggol” nito sa buong mundo
2. pagpapalaganap sa “kabutihan” at superyoridad ng neoliberalismo, globalisasyon at ng kapitalismo bilang “dulo ng kasaysayan”
3. pagsasa-demonyo sa mga kaaway ng imperyalismo bilang mga “rogue states”, “axis of evil”, “terorista”, etc.

Mga Pangunahing Punto:

1. Malinaw na napapatunayan ang pagsusuri na imperyalismo ang pinagmumulaan ng digmaan at ng banta ng digmaan. Nangangahulugan ang imperyalismo ng digma.
2. Bago pa man nangyari ang 9/11 o ang pambubomba sa WTC at Pentagon, puspusan nang naghahanda ang US sa paglulunsad ng mga gyera ng agresyon, ng malawak at masinsing interbensyong militar sa iba’t ibang bahagi ng daigdig, na ang layunin ay palawakin at patatagin ang hegemonya nito, ang kanyang imperyalistang dominasyon at paghahari sa buong mundo.
3. Katangian ng “gyera laban sa terorismo”:
   • mas matindi at malawak na paggamit ng terorismo ng estado ng US at mga alyado nito
   • lansakang pagbalewala at paglabag sa mga internasyunal na batas
   • lansakang pagbalewala at paglabag sa karapatang pantao
   • lansakang pagbalewala at paglabag sa internasyunal na makataong batas

Kongklusyon

Mga kasama! Noong 1998, binigyan ninyo ako ng pagkakataon at tungkuling talakayin sa Pambansang Kongreso ng BAYAN imperyalistang globalisasyon. Binanggit ko noon na may ispesyal o natatanging papel na ginagampanan ang Pilipinas sa paglitaw ng globalisasyon sa mundong ito: na kasaba ng “pagtuklas” ni Magellan sa ating mga isla, napatunayan niya na ang mundo ay hindi isang malawak na kapatagan kundi isang globo. Higit pa rito, natuklasan ni Magellan ang bagong mga ruta ng kalakalan – trade routes – mula sa “Old World” tungo sa “New World” ng Americas at sa Asya. Ito ang isa sa mga nagbunsod ng tinatawag na “primitive accumulation of capital” na naging daan sa paglakas ng kapitalismo sa Europa hanggang sa maging dominanteng sistemang pang-ekonomya ito sa buong mundo.

Kung babalik-aralan ang nakaraang siglo ng pag-iral at pag-unlad ng imperyalismo, lalo na ang imperyalismong US, makikita rin an ng kahalagahan ng Pilipinas sa pag-unlad at paglakas nito. Mistulang isang laboratoryo at “pilot project” ang Pilipinas sa paglikha, pagpapaunlad at pagkikinis ng mga kolonyal at neokolonyal na mga pamamaraan nito, tulad ng paggamit ng dalawahang-taktika ng dahas at panlilinlang. Malinaw din ang kahalagahan ng Pilipinas sa US bilang “outpost” para sa ekspansyon at dominasyon sa Asya. Sa larangan ng militar, matagal na nagsilbi ang Pilipinas bilang forward base, likuran, at lunsaran ng mga aksyong pulitiko-militar ng US . Ipinapaliwanag nito kung bakit at papaanong nagiging mapagpasyang salik ang US sa pulitika, ekonomya, kultura at patakarang panlabas ng Pilipinas.

Sa kabilang banda, narito rin sa Pilipinas ang isa sa pinakamalakas, tumpak at mabisang anti-imperyalistang kilusan sa mundong ito. Maningning at dakila ang kasaysayan ng mamamayang Pilipino sa pagtutol at paglanban sa dayuhang pananakop at dominasyon. Sa kasalukuyan, kinikilala ang rebolusyonaryong kilusang mapagpalaya sa Pilipinas bilang isa sa mga nasa unahan ng anti-imperyalistang kilusan sa buong mundo, at makabuluhang umaambag dito.

Sa mga dahilang ito, malaki ang tungkulin nating suriing mabuti ang mga implikasyon ng pandaigdigang kalagayan, lalo na ang kasalukuyang “gyera laban sa terorismo”, sa lipunan at pakikibaka dito sa Pilipinas. Kaalinsabay nito ang pagkakaroon ng Pilipinas sa kasalukuyan ng isang sagadsarin at sunud-sunurang gobyerno na walang kahihiyan at walang katulad sa pagiging sipsip sa US. Kailangan din nating isaalang-alang ang malalim pang atrasadadong kolonyal na mentalidad ng malawak na bilang ng mamamayang Pilipino.

Rey Claro Casambre
Philppine Peace Center
13 November 2002

A couple of days ago, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously in favor of a US-
sponsored resolution with regard to Iraq. The resolution compels Saddam Hussein of Iraq to allow a team of UN inspectors to ascertain the veracity of the Iraqi leader’s pronouncements on Iraq’s manufacture and possession of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons or “weapons of mass destruction”. Opinions are divided on whether or not in the long run, this resolution will lead us closer to world peace, depending on whether or not you are, as Bush says, “with us or against us”. But there is little disagreement that in the short run, it means that it will only be a matter of time when the US would once again unleash a full-scale offensive against Iraq, with the objective of deposing Saddam, gaining control of the immense Iraqi oil reserves and consolidating US hold on Western Asia.

US President George Bush struggles and strains to pass this off as part of the US-led “war against terrorism” and a logical sequel to the war on Afghanistan. But opposition to the war on Iraq has been as broad as support for the Afghanistan war had been. In fact, opposition to the entire US-led “war against terror” has grown throughout the world over the past year and two months since the bombings of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

Questions have been raised, and attempts to give answers only give rise to more questions. Who are the terrorists? Who are behind them? Why do they hate America so much? How can they be discovered and defeated? How should they be dealt with? How will this “war on terror” be carried out? How can it succeed? Will it lead to world peace?

Here at home, few eyebrows were raised when President Macapagal-Arroyo quickly threw the Philippines’ support behind the “war on terror”, generously offering the US use of Philippine territory and resources, including Philippine troops, for the Afghanistan offensive. When US troops were deployed in Southwestern Mindanao to participate in military offensives against the Abu Sayyaf under the pretext of joint military exercises. The exercises are long over, US troops are still around. So are the Abu Sayyaf. What has been gained by compromising our sovereignty and territorial integrity? Are the US troops staying over to keep the peace, or will they cause the further escalation of armed conflict?

To answer all these questions, we must take a closer, more critical look at this US-led “war against terrorism”.

1. The current US-led “war on terror” did not begin on or shortly after September 11, 2001. The war plans, including the offensive against Afghanistan to dislodge the Taliban government, were on Pres. Bush’s table a day before the terrorists crashed their planes on the WTC and the Pentagon. Thus this so-called “War on Terror” is not as it is being touted, a retaliatory strike and a defensive campaign to prevent other terrorist attacks from occurring.

2. The global military offensive is closely linked, and compliments, the US-led trade and cultural offensive commonly known as “globalization”. This includes primarily the imposition on weaker states and economies of the “neo-liberal” policies of liberalization, deregulation and privatization. The breaking down of trade and protectionist barriers purportedly to allow the free flow of capital, technology, ergo, peace and prosperity – from the highly industrialized countries to the developing third world countries. The economic offensive is accompanied by the drumbeating over the demise of socialism, the victory of democracy over communism, capitalism as the end of history.The past twelve years have shown that “globalization” has resulted not in the flow of capital and high technology from the advanced economies to the backward, but rather that of greater profits from the backward to the advanced. Greater reconcentration of wealth. Bigger monopolies and supermonopolies. Global financial crises as a result of the abuse of finance capital, as exemplified by the bloated value of transactions and the flagrant misrepresentation of profits by giant conglomerates. Third world economies are drowning in an ever deeper and wider ocean of debt. Even the advanced economies – US, Europe and Japan – are bogged down in depressed growth rates and feeble recoveries.

3. The Sept 11 bombings provided the impetus for the implementation of a “paradigm shift” in US global military force structure and approach. From a force structure that was greatly reduced in the wake of the end of the Cold War, to one of increased forward stationing and forward deployment. The declared objective is to be able to fight two simultaneous major wars and win them quickly and decisively with the minimum of reinforcements or redeployment of forces from one theater to another. From an approach that was multilateral – requiring military actions to be undertaken by US-led coalitions (such as the Desert Storm in 1991) and alliances (Kosovo, 1995) – to one that is unilateral (“if other governments won’t act, America will).This paradigm shift will be carried out by increasing the number of US military bases (which had been reduced with the end of the Cold War), by maintaining status-of-forces and access or logistics support agreements, and by conducting a wide variety of “stability operations”. According to the Defense Department’s Base Structure Report the US currently has military bases in at least 38 countries worldwide. This number could rise to 60 if we include newly acquired bases and forward bases such as in Saudi Arabia and the Balkans, and considerable troop concentrations in Central Asia (60,000) since 9-11. In addition, the US has access agreements with 57 countries. There are 250,000 US troops outside US territory, 200,000 on land and 50,000 at sea. One hundred thousand of these are in the Asia-Pacific region, 75,000 of which are in Northeast Asia.

   Stability operations are operations conducted by US Armed Forces outside the US and US territories. They include joint military training exercises, humanitarian and civic assistance, peace-keeping, peace-enforcement, support to insurgencies, information-gathering, counternarcotics, counter-terrorist, “foreign internal defense” operations, noncombatant evacuation, arms control, “small contingency actions”, and “show of force”. These operations are planned and synchronized in such a way as to ensure or maintain a suitable and effective forward deployment of forces at all times.

   Special operations forces — which include Army Rangers, Green Berets, Navy Seals, Air Force Special Forces, and the clandestine “Delta Force” – are at the core and play a key role in all these operations.A special word on the special forces: numerous independent and government (e.g., congressional) studies have raised the concern for rampant human rights violations brought about by US-sponsored training programs and by the increased deployment and use of Special Operations Forces. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has stepped up the training of surrogate forces. The US trains and employs local forces in much the same way and for much the same reason as the AFP trains and employs the CAFGUs: to economize, to bring down the casualty rate of the regulars, and to exploit the familiarity of the local forces with the terrain and the population.

   Special operations forces gained fame in the Vietnam War, notably the Green Berets who were touted as highly trained, highly skilled, armed with sophisticated weapons and high-tech gizmos. Indeed, they are trained and armed to perform special missions. With the end of the Cold War, the political imperative to bring down casualty rates and military spending has further bolstered their role in the US war machine. More and more, they have been given covert roles.

   Listed last but not least among the “Special Collateral Missions” of the SOFs is the following: Special activities – subject to limitations imposed by Executive Order and in conjunction with a presidential finding and congressional oversight, plan and conduct actions abroad in support of national foreign policy objectives so that the role of the U.S. government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly

   As described in the US Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review Report 2001, issued September 20, 2001, the “paradigm shift” visibly calls for beefing up US “forward deterrent forces” in the entire Asian region. US strategists anticipate – or predict — that these two wars would likely be fought in Asia: one in West Asia (aka Middle East) and another in Northeast Asia (Korea-Japan). Thus the increased importance of Asia to its military strategy. Thus also, the increased strategic importance of Southeast Asia, which lies midway between West Asia and Northeast Asia. And finally of the Philippines, which lies smack in the middle of Southeast Asia.

   The US has currently no permanent military base between North Asia (where it has big military bases in South Korea and Japan) and Diego Garcia in the India Ocean. Rand Corporation, a US military think tank whose board of directors includes Paul Wolfowitz and whose recommendations have always been followed by Pentagon, has pointed out the need for the US to re-establish a major military base in the Philippines. The team that conducted this particular study was headed by Zalmay Khalilzad, who became a member of the US National Security Council and is the US special ambassador to Afghanistan.

4. Bush has declared that the US reserves the right to act unilaterally, to make a preemptive strike, even a nuclear strike, and includes in its objectives the option for regime change, i.e., a forcible overthrow of an existing government that the US has decided to be a threat to world peace – read: US interests. All these disregard the norms of international law and infringe on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nations. It has ignored and violated the UN Charter and UN Resolutions when it wishes and uses them when it suits its purpose. In launching the war against Afghanistan, the US did not bother to seek the approval of the UN Security Council, even if it had a good chance of gaining it.(The UN Charter allows a state to use force or attack another state in self defense when under attack by that state, or when all diplomatic means have been exhausted, or as part of a multilateral peace-enforcement action decided on by the Security Council.)

5. The US has opposed ratification of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC), a permanent independent judicial body mandated to receive complaints and prosecute the gravest crimes under international law: genocide, other crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.The US admits that it opposes the establishment of the ICC because it does not want the operations and actions of its overseas troops to be harassed with suits filed against them with the ICC, or by the threat of being sued with the ICC for whatever acts they commit in the performance of their duties or the execution of their mission.

6. The US has taken a lead in enacting “anti-terrorist” laws that suspend the constitutional rights of its citizens. The “Patriot Act” has resulted in thousands of cases of secret arrests and prolonged detention of Americans and aliens, mostly Arab and of color, violations of privacy and other violations of human rights. The US has encouraged and pressed other countries to enact and enforce similar laws under the mantle of “anti-terrorism” and “counterterrorism”.

7. The US has used 9/11 to declare a polarized world: of terrorist vs counter-terrorist, with us or against us, virtually declaring war against all who would not do its bidding.The US defines terrorism as “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence …usually directed against civilians… to inculcate fear…intending to coerce or intimidate governments or societies… in pursuit of political, religious, or ideological goals.”

   Is there a universal definition for “terrorism”? The United Nations has at least twelve conventions or treaties covering “terrorist” acts such as hijackings, bombings, kidnapping of civilians and civilian establishments, but does not have a single consolidated definition of what “terrorism” is. Last January, diplomats and legal advisers from more than 100 countries attempted to craft a definition that has evaded the United Nations for 30 years. This would have been the key to a comprehensive treaty against terrorism that would compel all 189 UN member-states to go after terrorists.

   While there was little debate on the condemnation of any targeting of civilians, there was significant insistence on differentiating terrorists from “national liberation movements” and “resistance to foreign occupation.”

   The European Union Council on Justice and Home Affairs proposed to define terrorism as, “offenses intentionally committed by an individual or a group against one or more countries, their institutions or people, with the aim of intimidating them and seriously altering or destroying the political, economic, or social structures of a country.” This proposal promptly provoked an appeal from 200 European lawyers expressing their concern that the definition could be used to crack down on legitimate dissent such as trade union strikes and anti-globalization mass protest actions.

   So how can a global “war on terror” be carried out without a global definition of terrorism? This lack of a universal definition has not hampered the US from carrying out its so-called “war on terror” unilaterally. Bush’ “if you’re not with us, you’re against us” statement makes it clear whose definition matters. Ironically, the statement carries a thinly veiled threat backed up by the actual use of awesome power against those the US has considered “terrorist”.

8. Not a few have pointed out that by its own definition, the US itself would turn out to be not just a terrorist but the number one terrorist or a superterrorist. It would also include several countries solidly behind the US in the global “war on terror” such as Pakistan and Israel, who are themselves guilty of violating human rights and international humanitarian law.

The conclusion is stark-clear. The US-led “war on terror” is nothing but a naked use of power to consolidate and gain more economic, political and military power under the guise of “combatting terrorism”, “defending the US”, “promoting world stability and peace”. It threatens to lead to more wars, collateral damage, violations of human rights, sovereignty of nations.

The US-led “war on terror” will not lead to world peace. As designed, its objective is to strengthen and impose US supremacy throughout the world, of shaping or creating a world that will promote the economic interests not of the world at large, not of the American nation, but only of the small clique of the wealthiest and most powerful monopolists in the US. It aims to deter and decisively and swiftly defeat all those that threaten these interests. It imposes its will by the combination of sheer coercion, bribery and deception. It puts itself above international law, and wantonly violates human rights and international humanitarian law. But this design has the grievous flaw of creating more and more enemies as it attempts –and momentarily succeeds—to do so.

Implications on the Philippines:

We can now examine and understand recent events in the Philippines in the light of the discussion above on the US-led “war on terror”.

1. Philippines and Southeast Asia as “second front” in the “war against terror”.
2. Strategic position
3. Increased military presence: VFA, Balikatan, then Balikatan 02-1 purportedly vs Abu Sayyaf, MLSA—-> setting up a base
4. Peace Negotiations

The peace negotiations between the government and the NDFP and between the government and the MILF are among the first casualties in the US-led “war on terror” in the Philippines.

Even before Sept 11, there was a quiet tug of war between the doves and hawks in government on how to go about the peace negotiations. The doves favored the continuation and even the acceleration of the formal talks wherein the substantive agenda of basic reforms to address the age-old social, political, economic and cultural problems which bring about armed conflict. The hawks favored the abandonment of the peace negotiations and recourse to greater military force to pressure the rebels to surrender or to negotiate within the framework of the Philippine Constitution.

The “war on terror” shifted the balance heavily in favor of the hawks. On March 16, Malacanang announced the unilateral suspension of formal talks with both the NDF and MILF. Backchannel talks would supposedly be undertaken instead.

On August 5, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo ordered more troops redeployed to NPA areas, including those that have been employed in the combat operations against the Abu-Sayyaf during Balikatan 02-1. On August 9, Secretary of State Collin Powell announced the US action declaring the CPP-NPA as “foreign terrorist organizations”. This action was promptly “welcomed” by the Arroyo government, signaling a further shift away from the peace talks, given the government’s policy not to negotiate with terrorists.

August 12, the US Department of Finance included Prof. Jose Ma Sison in its list of terrorists against whom financial actions are to be taken. Prof Sison is the NDFP chief political consultant and a key person in the peace negotiations. On August 13, the Dutch government, upon the request of the US, declared the CPP-NPA and Prof. Sison as terrorists, and subsequently froze Prof. Sison’s bank account (which contained his subsidy), and withdrew his housing and other personal privileges from the Dutch government due him as a recognized political refugee who was barred from earning a living in The Netherlands.

On October 28, as a result of a country-hopping campaign by a Philippine delegation led by Secretary Ople and including Secretaries Norberto Gonzales, Silvestre Afable and Ermita, the European Council of Ministers included the NPA in their list of terrorists.

These actions, by their own pronouncements, are intended by the US, Dutch and Philippine governments to stigmatize and isolate the CPP, NPA and Prof. Sison and pressure them into “laying down their arms” and “rejoining the mainstream of society”. The NDF has condemned these moves as attempts to force them into capitulation.

All these seriously jeopardize and may have in fact already killed the peace negotiations. As pointed out, it is untenable now for the GRP and NDFP negotiations to continue with the government considering the CPP-NPA and Prof. Sison as terrorists. The NDFP has also stated that these actions by the government constitute grievous violations of prior agreements, notably the 1992 The Hague Joint Declaration and the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG).

Hopes for Peace

While the US-led “war on terror” appears to be an awesome and unstoppable war machine, it is hampered by its own contradictions, not the least of which is that it is guilty of the very terror it professes to combat.

In the US and Europe, hundreds of thousands have joined rallies and protest actions against the US “war on terror”, especially the impending war against Iraq. Notable is the protest movement that sprouted from among the relatives of the WTC victims and has grown into a nationwide anti-war movement called “NOT IN OUR NAME”. Similar protest movements have grown worldwide, including Asia, Southeast Asia and here in the Philippines.

The US economy, just as the entire world capitalist system, continues to suffer from chronic stagnation and bouts of recession and feeble, incomplete recovery. The US cannot pursue as much unilateralism as it boasts or wishes. It is forced to accommodate and give concessions to rival powers in alliances and coalitions to gain needed political, military and financial support for the wars it seeks to wage. It must contend with them, first of all, in inter-capitalist and inter-imperialist competition for sources of raw materials and cheap labor and outlets for products and excess capital.

Finally, there are the “brushfires” of liberation movements worldwide that continue to burn. It has sought, through the past half century, to extinguish these little pesky fires. But it has so far failed, despite the past decade of unchallenged all-round supremacy. In truth, these brushfires may be the real targets of the “war on terror”. Last January 18, Secretary Colin Powell told the Nepalese King Gyandera and Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba in Kathmandu last January 18:

“You have a Maoist insurgency that’s trying to overthrow the government, and this really is the kind of thing that we are fighting against throughout the world.”

Right now the warmongers and militarists of the world, including our local ones here, are riding high, bleating and boasting, thinking they will eventually get their way and eventually crush all their enemies with military force.

Diyan sila nagkakamali. (That is where they are mistaken.)

Annex I: From: QDDR 2001,

III. Paradigm Shift in Force Planning

“The new force-sizing construct specially shapes forces to:

• Defend the United States
• Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions
• Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts – including the possibility of regime change or occupation
• Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations

Deter Forward

As a global power, the US has important geopolitical interests around the world.

…new planning construct calls for maintaining regionally tailored forces forward stationed and deployed in Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asia Littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia…

…will strengthen its forward deterrent posture. Over time, US forces will be tailored increasingly to maintain favorable regional balances in concert with US allies and friends with the aim of swiftly defeating attacks with only modest reinforcement…. A key objective of US transformation efforts over time will be to increase the capability of its forward forces…

Security cooperation will serve as an important means for linking DoD’s strategic direction with those of its allies and friends…A particular aim… will be to ensure access, interoperability, and intelligence cooperation,,,

From IV. Reorienting the US Military Global Posture

One of the goals of reorienting the global posture is to render forward forces capable of swiftly defeating an adversary’s military and political objectives with only modest reinforcement. Key requirements … include new combinations of immediately employable forward stationed and deployed forces; expeditionary and forcible entry capabilities;…information operations; special operations forces; and rapidly deployable, highly lethal and sustainable forces that may come from outside a theater of operations.

US global military posture will be reoriented to:

• Develop a basing system that provides greater flexibility for US forces in critical areas of the world, placing emphasis on additional bases and stations beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia.
• Provide temporary access to facilities in foreign countries that enable US forces to conduct training and exercises in the absence of permanent ranges and bases.
• Redistribute forces and equipment based on regional deterrence requirements
• Provide sufficient mobility, including airlift, sealift, prepositioning, basing infrastructure, alternative points of debarkation, and new logistical concepts of operations.

Accordingly, the Department has made the following decisions:

• The Secretary of the Army will….
• The Secretary of the Navy will increase aircraft carrier battlegroup presence in the Western Pacific and will explore options for homeporting an additional three to four surface combatants, and guided cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), in that area
• The Secretary of the Air Force will develop plans to increase contingency basing in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as well as in the Arabian Gulf. The Secretary of the Airforce will ensure sufficient en route infrastructure for refueling and logistics to support operations in the Arabian Gulf or Western Pacific Areas
• The Secretary of the Navy will develop new concepts of maritime pre-positioning. High-speed sealift, and new amphibious capabilities for the Marine Corps…. In consultation with allies and friends, the Secretary of the Navy will explore the feasibility of conducting training for littoral warfare in the Western Pacific for the Marine Corps.
• DoD will also recommend changes in the worldwide alignment of special operations forces assets to account for new regional emphases in the defense strategy.
• The United States will maintain its critical bases in Western Europe and Northeast Asia, which may also serve the additional role of hubs for power projection in future contingencies in other areas of the world.

 

Appendix 2

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES MISSIONS AND ACTIVITIES

SOF Principal Missions – SOF are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to accomplish their assigned roles, as described below, in nine mission areas:

• Counterproliferation (CP) – combat proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons across the full range of U.S. efforts, including the application of military power to protect U.S. forces and interests; intelligence collection and analysis; and support of diplomacy, arms control, and export controls. Accomplishment of these activities may require coordination with other U.S. government agencies.
• Combating terrorism (CBT) – preclude, preempt, and resolve terrorist actions throughout the entire threat spectrum, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), and resolve terrorist incidents when directed by the NCA or the appropriate unified commander or requested by the Services or other government agencies
• Foreign internal defense (FID) – organize, train, advise, and assist host-nation military and para-military forces to enable these forces to free and protect their society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency
• Special reconnaissance (SR) – conduct reconnaissance and surveillance actions to obtain or verify information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning characteristics of a particular area
• Direct action (DA) – conduct short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel
• Psychological operations (PSYOP) – induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to the originator’s objectives by conducting planned operations to convey selected information to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals
• Civil affairs (CA) – facilitate military operations and consolidate operational activities by assisting commanders in establishing, maintaining, influencing, or exploiting relations between military orces and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operation
• Unconventional warfare (UW) – organize, train, equip, advise, and assist indigenous and surrogate forces in military and paramilitary operations normally of long duration
• Information operations (IO) – actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting
  adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and
  information systems

SOF Collateral Activities – Based on their unique capabilities, SOF are frequently tasked to participate in the following activities:

• Coalition support – integrate coalition units into multinational military operations by training
  coalition partners on tactics and techniques and providing communications
• Combat search and rescue (CSAR) – penetrate air defense systems and conduct joint air, ground, or sea operations deep within hostile or denied territory, at night or in adverse weather, to recover distressed personnel during wartime or contingency operations. SOF are equipped and manned to perform CSAR in support of SOF missions only. SOF perform CSAR in support of conventional forces on a case-by-case basis not to interfere with the readiness or operations of core SOF missions.
• Counterdrug (CD) activities – train host-nation CD forces and domestic law enforcement agencies on critical skills required to conduct individual and small-unit operations in order to detect, monitor, and interdict the cultivation, production, and trafficking of illicit drugs targeted for use in the United States
• Humanitarian demining (HD) activities – reduce or eliminate the threat to noncombatants and friendly military forces posed by mines and other explosive devices by training host-nation personnel in their recognition, identification, marking, and safe destruction; provide instruction in program management, medical, and mine-awareness activities
• Humanitarian assistance (HA) – provide assistance of limited scope and duration to supplement or complement the efforts of host-nation civil authorities or agencies to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to, or loss of, property
• Security assistance (SA) – provide training assistance in support of legislated programs which provide U.S. defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies or objectives
• Special activities – subject to limitations imposed by Executive Order and in conjunction with a presidential finding and congressional oversight, plan and conduct actions abroad in support of national foreign policy objectives so that the role of the U.S. government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly

June 29, 1999

SOFAs or other agreements conferring legal status on US forces and personnel overseas have been in effect with respect to the following countries and areas since the years indicated below. Agreements for specific or time-limited purposes and activities (other than the Bosnia Sustaining Force, SFOR) are not included. Classified agreements are designated by (C) or (S), as appropriate. “TIAS” references are to the published Treaties and Other International Acts Series of the Department of State. Other unclassified agreements referred to below have not been published.

Albania (1996)

Antigua and Barbuda (1977) (TIAS 9054)

Ascension Island (1956) (TIAS 3603, 4296, 6308)

Australia (1963) (TIAS 5349)

Austria (1998)

Bahamas (1983) (TIAS 11058)

Bahrain (1971) (TIAS 7263, 8208, 8632) and (1987)(S)

Bangladesh (1998)

Belgium (1953) (TIAS 2846)

Benin (1998)

Bermuda (1991)

Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995, for IFOR/SFOR)

Brunei (1994)

Bulgaria (1996)

Cambodia (1996)

Canada (1953) (TIAS 2846, 3074)

Cote d’Ivoire (1998)

Croatia (1995, for IFOR/SFOR)

Czech Republic (1996)

Denmark (1953) (TIAS 2846, 4002)

Diego Garcia (1966) (TIAS 6196, 7481, 8230)

Dominican Republic (1988)

Egypt (1981) (TIAS 10238)

Estonia (1996)

Ethiopia (1994)

Former Republic of Yugoslavia (1997)

Federated States of Micronesia (1986)

Finland (1997)

France (1953) (TIAS 2846)*

FYROM (Macedonia) (1996)

Georgia (1997)

Germany (1963) (TIAS 2846, 5351, 5352, 7759, 10367)

Ghana (1998)

Greece (1963) (TIAS 2846, 3649)

Grenada (1993)

Haiti (1995)

Honduras (1982) (TIAS 10890, 11256)

Hungary (1996)

Iceland (1951) (TIAS 2295)

Israel (1994)

Italy (1953) (TIAS 2846)

Japan (1953) (TIAS 4510)

Jamaica (1962) (TIAS 2105) **

Jordan (1996)

Kazakhstan (1997)

Kenya (1980) (C)

Korea (1966) (TIAS 6127)

Kuwait (1991) (S)

Latvia (1996)

Lithuania (1996)

Luxembourg (1953) (TIAS 2846)

Malaysia (1990) (C)

Mali (1997)

Marshall Islands (1986) (TIAS 11671)

Moldova (1997)

Mongolia (1996)

Morocco (1982) (S)

Netherlands (1953) (TIAS 3174)

New Zealand (1958) (TIAS 4151)

Norway (1953) (TIAS 2846, 2950)

Oman (1980) (S)

Palau (1994)

Panama (1979) (TIAS 10032)

Papua New Guinea (1990) (TIAS 11612)

Philippines (1998)

Poland (1997)

Portugal (1953) (TIAS 2846)

Qatar (1992) (S)

Romania (1996)

St. Kitts & Nevis (1987)

St. Lucia (1979) (TIAS 2105) **

Saudi Arabia (1953) (TIAS 2812, 5830, 7425) (S)

Singapore (1990) (S)

Slovak Republic (1996)

Slovenia (1996)

Solomon Islands (1991)

Somalia (1980) (C)

Spain (1951) (TIAS 2846)

Sri Lanka (1995)

South Africa (1999)

Sudan (1981) (TIAS 10322)

Sweden (1996)

Tonga (1992)

Trinidad and Tobago (1962) (TIAS 2105) **

Turkey (1945) (TIAS 2846, 3020, 3337, 6582, 9901)*

Turks and Caicos Islands (1979) (TIAS 9710, 9711)

Uganda (1997)

Ukraine (1997, provisionally)

United Arab Emirates (1994) (S)

United Kingdom (1952) (TIAS 2846, 11537) ***

Uzbekistan (1996, provisionally)

Western Samoa (1990)

TOTAL: 92

* Both France and Turkey have resisted the application of NATO SOFA to activities in their territory which are not in support of NATO purposes.

** SOFA provisions of 1941 United States – United Kingdom Lend Lease Agreement apply, and were continued in application by former United Kingdom territories when they gained their independence.

*** The 1952 Visiting Forces Act is a unilateral British statute enacted to supplement the NATO SOFA of 1951 within the United Kingdom. Britain elected this approach, rather than concluding a supplementary agreement with the United States as a sending state. Unfortunately, the Visiting Forces Act does not fully agree with NATO SOFA, particularly regarding claims, and this has led to disputes from time to time.

COUNTRIES WHICH ARE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY REGARDING THE STATUS OF FORCES DATED 19 JUNE 1951 (as of March 2000)

Belgium

Canada

Denmark

France

Germany

Greece

Hungary

Italy

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Spain

Turkey

United Kingdom

United States

COUNTRIES WHICH ARE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE STATES PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY AND THE OTHER STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE REGARDING THE STATUS OF THEIR FORCES

DATED 7 JULY 1955 (as of March 2000)

Albania                                                                                      Poland

Austria                                                                                       Romania

Belgium                                                                                     Slovak Republic

Bulgaria                                                                                     Slovenia

Canada                                                                                      Spain

Czech Republic                                                                         Sweden

Denmark                                                                                   United Kingdom

Estonia                                                                                      United States

FYROM (Macedonia)                                                               Uzbekistan

Finland

Georgia

Germany

Hungary

Italy

Kazakhstan

Latvia

Lithuania

Moldova

Netherlands

Norway

US military bases, facilites and activities overseas fall into three general categories:

1. Larger bases or installations with a permanent US military presence, usually comprising combat-capable forces (Attachment A).

2. Lesser or technical facilities, again with a permanent US military presence, which may be largely civilian contractor personnel (Attachment B).

3. Access rights for US forces to use host country facilities for visits, exercises or training, without a significant permanent US military presence (Attachment C).

Most of these arrangements were established through securing prior approval from the host countries concerned, and negotiating formal agreements with them. In the NATO area, Japan and Korea, host nations generally made state-owned land and structures available without cost. Following Congressional approval, new facilities were then constructed, either by the U.S. at its own expense, or through multilateral infrastructure funding in NATO countries. As a matter of international law, title to those improvements vests in the host nation, which grants use rights to the U.S.

With respect to larger bases or installations, no rent is paid as a matter of principle, and the following considerations apply:

(1) Japan, Korea and Germany absorb a significant proportion of the local support costs of U.S. forces. Other wealthy Allies also make a burdensharing contribution, but to a lesser extent.

(2) U.S. security and economic assistance programs for such countries as Greece, Turkey and Egypt reflect in part their provision of basing or access rights.

The U.S. does pay rent for certain lesser facilities and access rights in Antigua, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Oman and Seychelles.

Attachments D and E respectively list those countries with formal U.S. defense commitments, and those having defense relations with the U.S., but not a formal defense commitment.

COUNTRIES AND AREAS WITH US MILITARY BASES OR INSTALLATIONS

Europe (10) East Asia and Pacific (3)

Belgium, Australia, Germany, Japan, Greece, Korea, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal (Azores), Spain, Turkey,United Kingdom

Western Hemisphere (4) Indian Ocean (1)

Canada, Diego Garcia, Cuba, (United Kingdom) Greenland, Panama

TOTAL: 18

COUNTRIES AND AREAS WITH LESSER OR TECHNICAL US MILITARY FACILITIES

Western Hemisphere (2) East Asia and Pacific (2)

Antigua and Barbuda, Marshall Islands, Bahamas, New Zealand

Middle East/Indian Ocean (1) South Atlantic (1)

Bahrain Ascension Island (United Kingdom)

TOTAL: 6

COUNTRIES GRANTING THE US ACCESS RIGHTS FOR USE OF THEIR FACILITIES

Europe (2) East Asia (5)

Denmark, Brunei, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand

North Africa, Middle East

and Southwest Asia (9) Other Africa (5)

Egypt, Djibouti, Israel, Liberia*, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Senegal, Morocco, Somalia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates

Western Hemisphere (2)

Antigua and Barbuda, Honduras

TOTAL: 23

* Exercise of U.S. access rights is currently in abeyance.

COUNTRIES WITH FORMAL U.S. DEFENSE COMMITMENTS

(By treaty or otherwise)

NATO (15) Rio Pact (22)

Belgium, Argentina,Canada, Bahamas, Czech Republic, Bolivia, Denmark, Brazil, France, Chile, Germany, Colombia, Greece Costa Rica, Hungary, Cuba*, Iceland, Dominican Republic, Italy, Ecuador, Luxembourg, El Salvador, Netherlands, Guatemala, Norway, Haiti, Poland, Honduras, Portugal, Mexico, Spain, Nicaragua, Turkey, Panama, United Kingdom, Paraguay, Peru

Asia/Pacific Bilaterals (4)

Trinidad & Tobago, Japan, Uruguay, Korea, Venezuela, Philippines, Thailand

ANZUS (2) Agreements of Cooperation (2)

Australia, Liberia***, New Zealand**, Pakistan****

Freely Associated States (3)

Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Palau

TOTAL: 48
* Cuba has been excluded from participation in the Inter American System, including the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

** The US has suspended its security obligation to New Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty of 1951.

*** By 1959 executive agreement only.

**** By 1959 executive agreement pursuant to 1957 joint Congressional resolution.

COUNTRIES HAVING DEFENSE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. THROUGH MILITARY COOPERATION, EXCHANGES OR VISITS, BUT NOT A FORMAL DEFENSE COMMITMENT

Partners for Peace (26) North Africa/Middle East (11)

Albania, Bahrain, Austria, Egypt, Armenia, Israel, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Belarus, Kuwait, Bulgaria, Morocco, Estonia, Oman, Finland, Qatar, Georgia, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan,Tunisia, Kyrgyzstan, United Arab Emirates, Latvia, Lithuania

Other, Africa (5)

Macedonia (FYROM), Moldova, Dijbouti, Romania, Eritrea, Russia, Kenya, Slovakia, Senegal, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

Caribbean (2)

Organization of Eastern Caribbean States*, Jamaica

Asia/Pacific (7)

Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Singapore, Taiwan**

TOTAL: 51

* Comprises Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

** No formal diplomatic relations. A foreign mlitary sales relationship is provided by the Taiwan Relations Act, 1979.